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Since the end of the Cold War, naval analysts and strategists have faced a crisis. On the 
one hand, they are well versed with the enduring concepts of strategy, intelligence and 
the procedures and lessons generated by nearly fifty years of Cold War. On the other 
hand, there is a widespread notion that traditional ways of doing business undermine 
new, more cooperative opportunities that have arisen in international politics since 1989. 
This criticism is reflected in attempts at "New Thinking" which places societal, 
environmental and even "Utopian" solutions to military and intelligence problems ahead 
of traditional concepts of strategy. At the same time, events like the Gulf War, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Desert Fox and " intelligence surprises" (Indian and Pakistan nuclear testing) 
demonstrate a mastery of the principles of intelligence and strategy are the cornerstone of 
U.S. foreign and defense policy. 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
To address these issues, several initiatives were undertaken in FYOO. First, the PI 
identified an international team of scholars to address issues of strategy in the 






Enduring issues of Strategy: We will describe the evolution of strategic thought and 
the contribution of the key classical strategists (Thucydides to Clausewitz). We also 
will explore the perennial problems related to the relationship between force and 
morality and the causes of war. 
Evolution of the Components of Joint Warfare: We will explore the theory and 
practice of land warfare, sea power and air power with an eye to placing post-Cold 
War events in an historical context. 
20th Century Theories an Update: These authors will be asked to explore ideas about 
deterrence, arms control and disarmament, and terrorism and irregular warfare - ideas 
that preoccupied U.S. strategists during the Cold War - and update them to our 
present strategic circumstances. 
Contemporary Issues of Grand Strategy: These contributors have been asked to 
evaluate new ideas about strategy and new issues that have emerged in the conduct of 
joint and combined operations since the end of the Cold War. We will explore the 
RMA, Spacewar and Cybenvar, the consequences of the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, the explosion of humanitarian intervention peacekeeping 
operations, new environmental and social concerns that are emerging as issues of 
national security and the future of strategy as a topic of discourse among scholars and 
an educated officer corps. 
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FY 00 RESULTS 
A workshop held in Monterey California on 19-21 September 2000. Fourteen 
internationally renowned scholars presented their research on issues of strategy to a group 
of mid-level officers and policymakers. Participants exchanged ideas about refining the 
analyses presented and about crafting the papers into a coherent manuscript. 
This report presents the conference working papers. 
FYOl COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT 
In FYOl conference participants will complete drafts of their papers. James 
Wirtz, Naval Postgraduate School and John Baylis, University of Wales will edit these 
drafts. The edited manuscript will then be provided to the sponsor by the summer of 
2001 as the final deliverable for this project. This deliverable will form the basis of a 
major publication by Oxford University Press (in which conference sponsorship will be 
acknowledged). 
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Strategy in the Contemporary World 
Introduction 
John Baylis 
This book has two main aims. The first is to introduce new students to the study of 
strategy and the second is to make the case that strategic studies remains a vibrant, 
intellectually stimulating and relevant subject. Clearly both of these aims are closely 
interrelated. Implicit in the second aim is the recognition that strategic studies is 
currently under threat. With the end of the Cold War many felt that strategic studies 
had finally had its day (Baldwin). It had been one of the dominant sub-fields in the 
study of international politics from the 1950s to the 1980s, but with easing of East-West 
tension in the early 1990s it became to be regarded by some as a "Cold War" subject 
which was no longer relevant to the new development taking place in world politics. 
The utility of force was seen to be in decline and intellectual attention shifted to new 
issues associated particularly with the processes of globalization which many believed 
were transforming the whole basis of international relations. To the extent that conflict 
remained an area of academic study, the focus was now on "security", broadly defined 
to take in a range of political, social, economic and environmental, as well as military 
aspects. 
At one level the decline in significance of strategic studies is understandable and 
perhaps even to be welcomed. In many respects, as a sub-field of international politics, 
it was too dominant during the Cold War. However, the editors of this volume believe 
that attempts by some to abolish the subject from the university syllabus is not only 
premature but unwise. As the various conflicts which have occurred since the end of 
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the Cold War testify, the role of force remains a significant feature of world politics and 
an understanding of strategy continues to be, not only relevant, but import in any study 
of international relations. 
In order to set the scene for the chapters that follow, this introduction aims to provide 
answers to three main questions: 1) What is Strategic Studies? 2) What criticisms are 
made of Strategic Studies and 3) What is the relationship of Strategic Studies to Security 
Studies? 
WHAT IS STRATEGIC STUDIES? 
The definitions of "strategy" contained in Box 1 display some common features but also 
some apparently significant differences. The definitions by Clauswitz, Von Moltke, 
Liddell Hart and Beaufre all focus on a fairly narrow definition which relates military 
force to the objectives of war. This reflects the origins of the word from the ancient 
Greek term for "generalship". The definitions from Foster and Osgood, however, draw 
attention to the broader focus on "power", while Murray and Grimslay highlight the 
dynamic quality of "process" inherent in the formulation of strategy. While the essence 
of strategy is conveyed in the former definitions, increasingly writers on the subject 
have emphasized that strategy (particularly in the nuclear age) has a peace time as well 
as a war time application. It is much wider than simply the study of wars and military 
campaigns. Thus, the most useful definition of contemporary stratem, therefore, is the 
application of military power to achieve political objectives, or more specifically "the 
theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political 
purposes" (Gray 1999). Broader still is the concept of Grand Stratew which involves 
3 
the coordination and direction of “all the resources of a nation, a band of nations, 
towards the attainment of the political objectives” sought (Liddell Hart). 
Box 1 Definitions of Strate- 
“Strategy (is) the use of engagements for the object of war” 
Carl von Clausewitz 
”Strategy is the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s 
disposal to the attainment of the object in War” 
Von Moltke 




”Strategy is . . . the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of 
the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute”. 
Andre Beaufre 
“Strategy is ultimately about effectively exercising power” 
Gregory D Foster 
”Strategy is a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a 
purpose 
together with a system of measures for its accomplishment”. 
J C Wylie 
”Strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to the shifting conditions and 
circumstances in a world where chance, uncertaintity, and ambiquity 
dominate”. 
Murray and Grimslay 
“Strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan 
for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion - in conjuction with 
economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power - to 
support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit means” 
Robert Osgood 
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Because strategy provides the bridge between military means and political goals, 
students of strategy require knowledge of both the political process and military 
operations. As Richard K Betts has argued: “It is impossible to understand impulses 
and choices in the political dimension of war and peace without understanding 
constraints and opportunities in the military dimension. This point has also been made 
in a slightly different way by Henry Kissinger who has argued that ’the separation of 
strategy and policy can only be achieved to the detriment of both. It causes military 
power to become identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts 
diplomacy into an over-concern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national 
policy are in the areas where political, economic, psychological and military factors 
overlap we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as ”purely military 
advice”’. 
It follows from this that strategy has to be studied from an interdisciplinary perspective. 
To understand both dimensions of strategy, it is necessary to know something about 
politics, economics, psychology, sociology and geography, as well as technology, force 
structure and tactics. 
Another aspect of the subject which follows from the definition of strategy as the link 
between military power and political purpose is that it is essentially a pragmatic and 
practical activity. This is summed up in Bernard Brodie’s comment that “Strategic 
theory is a theory of action”. It is a “how to do it” study, a guide to accomplishing and 
doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the question that matters in 
strategy is: will the idea work? As such, in some ways strategic studies can be seen as 
“policy relevant”. It can be an intellectual aid to official performance. At the same time, 
however, it can also be pursued as “an idle academic pursuit for its own sake”. Despite 
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the criticisms which have been leveled against it (see below) it provides an exacting 
intellectual training for those who wish to pursue a strategic education. 
As a subject of study, however, it is worth noting that strategic studies cannot be 
regarded as a discipline in its own right. As one of the contributors to this volume has 
noted elsewhere, it is a subject with a sharp focus - the role of military power - but 
no clear parameters, and it is parasitic upon arts, sciences and social science subjects for 
ideas and concepts which its practitioners have developed. (Garnett). Many of those 
who have made a contribution to the literature on the subject have come from very 
different fields. Herman Kahn was a physicist, Thomas Schelling was an economist, 
Albert Wholstetter was a mathematician, Henry Kissinger was a historian and Bernard 
Brodie was a political scientist. 
One of the results of these different academic backgrounds of writers on the subject has 
been an ongoing debate about methodology - how to study the subject. Bernard 
Brodie, who more than anyone else helped to establish strategic studies as a subject in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, initially argued that strategy should be studied 
“scientifically”. He was concerned that strategy was “not receiving the scientific 
treatment it deserves either in the armed services or, certainly, outside them”. Writing 
in own article in a1949 entitled “Strategy as Science”, Brodie called for a 
methodological approach to the study of strategy similar to the one adopted by 
economics. Strategy, he argued, should be seen as ”an instrumental science for solving 
practical problems”. What he wanted was a much more rigorous, systematic form of 
analysis compared with the rather superficial narrow approach to security problems 
adopted by the military, who were preoccupied with tactics and technology. 
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As Brodie himself was later to recognize, however, the enthusiasm for science, which 
himself had helped to promote, meant that strategic studies in the 1950s ”developed a 
scientistic strain and overreached itself”. By the 1960’s Brodie was calling for a ”mid- 
course correction”. The conceptualization of strategy using economic models and 
theories had been taken further than he had expected. Brodie was concerned about the 
”astonishing lack of political sense” and the //ignorance of diplomatic and military 
history” that seemed to be evident amongst those writing on the subject. Significantly, 
Brodie’s worries were heeded and from the 1970s onwards when there was a leavening 
of the scientism by better comparative historical analysis. 
Apart this problem of methodology and the debate about science the academic 
approach to the subject also raised concerns about the neglect of operational military 
issues. For Brodie (echoing Clemenceau) strategy was too serious a business to be left 
to the generals. As strategic studies developed from the late 1940s onwards civilian 
analysts came to dominate the field. By the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  however, there was a growing 
feeling that many of the civilian strategists in their university departments and 
academic ”think tanks” were leaving out the essential understanding of matters 
military in their analyses and theorizing. For a new breed of strategists at the time 
operational issues had to be brought back in. Military science had become the ”missing 
discipline”. Writing in 1996 Richard K Betts argued that: ”if strategy is to integrate 
policy and operations, it must be devised not just by politically sensitive soldiers but by 
military sensitive civilians”. Just as Brodie had been Concerned about the overly narrow 
approach of the military in 1949, so Betts was concerned that the pendulum had swung 
too far in the opposite direction. Civilian strategists were neglecting the military side 
of strategy. 
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This concern with operational issues helped to revive an interest amongst strategists 
with the different "elements" or "dimensions" of strategy. In his study "On War" 
Clausewitz argued that "everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean 
that everything is very easy". Reflecting this sentiment, Clausewitz himself pointed out 
that strategy consisted of moral, physical, mathematical , geographical and statistical 
elements. Michael Howard, in a similar vein, refers to the social, logistical, operational 
and technological dimensions of strategy. This notion of strategy consisting of a broad, 
complex, pervasive and interpenetrating set of dimensions is also taken further in Colin 
Gray's recent study of Modern Strategy. Gray identifies three main categories ("People 
and Politics"; "Preparation for War"; and "War Proper") and seventeen separate 
dimensions of strategy. Under the "People and Politics'' heading he focuses on people, 
society, culture, politics and ethics. "Preparations for War" includes economics and 
logistics, organization, military administration, information and intelligence, strategic 
theory and doctrine, and technology. The dimensions of "War Proper" consists of 
military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary and time. Echoing 
Clausewitz, Gray argues that the study of strategy is "seriously incomplete" if it is 
considered in the absence of any one of these (interrelated) dimensions. 
Strategic Studies and the Classical Realist Tradition 
Apart from understanding the complexities of strategy, it is important to understand 
the philosophical underpinnings or assumptions of those who write about the subject. 
According to J C Garnett "despite differences of interpretation and emphasis.. . it is fair 
to say that most contemporary strategists in the Western World belong, in an important 
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sense, to the same intellectual tradition. Their minds are tuned to the same 
wavelengths; they share a c o m o n  set of assumptions about the nature of international 
political life, and the kind of reasoning which is appropriate to handling political- 
military problems”. In general, this seems to be just as true today, as in the mid 1970’s 
when Garnett made the point. ”Realism”, as a theory of political behaviour, remains 
pervasive in contemporary strategic writings (even though it holds a much less 
dominant position in the literature on international relations as whole). 
Although there are differences between ”Realists”, there are certain views and 
assumptions that most would agree upon. These can be best illustrated under the 
following headings: 
Humannature 
Anarchy and Power 
International Law, Morality and Institutions 
Human Nature 
Most realists are very pessimistic about human nature. Reflecting the views of 
philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, men are seen as ”inherently destructive, selfish, 
competitive and aggressive”. Hobbes accepted that human beings are capable of 
generosity, kindness and cooperation but the pride and egoism which is inherent in 
human nature means that mankind is also prone to conflict, violence and great evil. For 
realist writers one of the great tragedies of the human condition is that these destructive 
traits can never be irradicated. Reflecting this view, Herbert Butterfield argued that 
”behind the great conflicts of mankind is a terrible human predicament which lies at the 
heart of the story”. 
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Anarchy and Power 
Based on this rather dark view of the human condition, realists tend to view 
international relations in similar pessimistic terms. Conflict and war are seen as 
endemic in the international system and the future is likely to be much like the past. 
Just as individuals seek their own interests, so states (which realists focus their attention 
upon) are also engaged in a relentless competitive struggle. Unlike the way that 
conflicts are dealt with in domestic society, however, through the role of authoritative 
government, the clash between states are much more difficult to resolve. In the absence 
of world government, realists argue that states have to adopt a "self-help" approach to 
their interests and especially their security. Who wins in the constant struggles which 
take place is not who is right but, as Thycidides demonstrated in his account of The 
Pelopponesian Wars, who is most powerful. This stress on the central role of power in 
international relations is aptly summed up in Hobbes's description of the human 
condition as " a restless struggle for power which ceases only in death" 
Realists, therefore, tend to stress what they see as the harsh realities of world politics 
and are somewhat contemptuous of Kantian approaches which highlight the 
opportunities for "permanent peace". As Gordon Harland has argued: "Realism is a 
clear recognition of the limits of reason in politics: the acceptance of the fact that 
political realities are power realities and that power must be countered with power; that 
self-interest is the primary datum in the action of all groups and nations. In an 
I 




International Law, Moralitv and Institutions 
Given this "realpolitik" view of world policies, it is not surprising that that realists see 
a limited role, not only for "reason", but also for law, morality and institutions. In a 
domestic context, law can be an effective way for societies to deal with competing 
selfish interests. In an international system without effective government, states will 
agree to laws when it suits them, but will disregard them when their interests are 
threatened. When states want to break the rules, there is very little to stop them 
ultimately from doing it - apart from countervailing force. 
Similarly, realists do not believe that moral issues can significantly constrain the 
behaviour of states. Some realists (although not all) believe that very little attention 
should be given to moralizing about the state of world politics. They point to the 
absence of a universal moral code and more particularly to the disregard of 
constraining moral principles by states when they believe their vital interests are under 
threat. This is not to argue that realists are wholly insensitive to moral questions (see 
the section on "The Critics of Strategic Studies"). Indeed, many of them, like Niebuhr 
and Morgenthau agonized about the human condition. However, most realist writers 
are concerned to try and explain the way the world really is, rather than how it ought to 
be. Realists believe that their task is mainly to describe rather than prescribe. 
Realist view International institutions in much the same light as they view law and 
morality. Just as law and morality are unable to constraint state behaviour significantly 
when interests are threatened, so international institutions can only play a limited role 
in preventing conflict. Realists do not dismiss the opportunities for greater cooperation 
which institutions can create. However, they see these institutions as being set up by 
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states to serve their national interests. As long as they do this, the member states will 
support the institution, but when support for the institution threatens their interests, 
especially in the security sphere, they tend to abandon them. Realists point, in 
particular, to the fate of the League of Nations in the inter-war period and the 
limitations of the United Nations during the Cold War and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe in alleviating conflicts which occurred. 
WHAT CRITICISMS ARE MADE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES? 
Although the shared philosophical underpinnings of strategists have helped to give the 
subject intellectual coherence, many of the realist assumptions have been subjected to 
fierce criticisms. These criticisms have been discussed in detail elsewhere (Gray 1982), 
but the following brief discussion gives a flavour of the concern expressed by the 
opponents of strategic studies. Strategists are said to be: 
Obsessed with conflict and force 
Insufficiently concerned with ethical issues 
Not scholarly in their approach 
Part of the problem, not the solution 
State-centric 
Many critics argue that because the main focus of the subject is on the role of military 
power, strategists tend to be preoccupied by violence and war. Because their view of 
the world is conflict-oriented they tend to ignore the more co-operative, peaceful 
aspects of world politics. This leads critics to claim that strategists have a distorted, 
rather than realistic, view of the way the world is. Some critics even suggest that 
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strategists are fascinated by violence, and even take grim satisfaction in describing the 
darker side of the human condition. 
For their part, strategists accept that they are interested in (but not obsessed by) 
violence and conflict. In their own defence, however, they point out that just as a doctor 
of heart-disease does not claim to deal with all aspects of health, so they do not claim to 
be studying every aspect of international relations. They, therefore reject the view that 
they have a distorted, unrealistic, view of the world, and that they are fascinated, in an 
”unhealthy” sense by violence. 
The claim to moral neutrality, sometimes made by strategists, is another area of 
criticism. Strategists are seen to be ”clinical”, cool and unemotional” in the way they 
approach the study of war, despite the fact that, in the nuclear age, millions of lives are 
at risk in the calculations that take place about strategic policies. Emphasising the 
moral outrage felt by some, J R Newman described Herman Kahn’s book, 
Thermonuclear War, as ”a moral tract on mass murder, how to comment it, how to get 
away with it, how to justify it”. Philip Green, in his study of Deadlv Lopic, also accused 
strategists who wrote about nuclear deterrence as being ”egregiously guilty of avoiding 
the moral issue altogether, or misrepresenting it”. 
Although many strategists have justified the moral neutrality of their approach in terms 
of scholarly detachment, it is fair to say that some have been sensitive to this criticism. 
As a result, a number of studies of ethical issues have been written. These include 
Joseph Nye’s book on Nuclear Ethics, Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars and 
Steven P Lee’s study of Morality, Prudence and Nuclear Weapons. These book 
(together with the moral critical studies by writers like Green) now form an important 
part of the literature on strategic studies. 
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Another important criticism levelled against strategic studies is that it represents "a 
fundamental challenge to the values of liberal, humane scholarship, that define a 
University". The implication is that it is not a scholarly subject and should not be 
taught at University. This criticism has a number of related parts. Firstly, according to 
Philip Green, it is pseudo-scientific, using apparent scientific method to give it a 
spurious air of legitimacy. Secondly, because strategists often advise governments on a 
paid basis they are operating "in a manner incompatible with the integrity of 
scholarship". E P Thornton described the cosy relationship between strategists and 
government officials as "suspect, corrupt and at enmity with the universal principles of 
humane scholarship". And, thirdly, there have also been criticisms that strategists not 
only provide advice to governments, but they are also involved in policy advocacy - 
which is not part of scholarship. 
With a qualification on the issue of policy advocacy, strategists reject the view that 
their's is not a valid university subject. (See Box 2). They argue that the study of war 
and peace are issues of profound importance which can, and should be studied in a 
scholarly way. It is true that there have been attempts at developing a "Scientific" 
approach to the strategy (and some writers might have taken this too far) but the debate 
about methodology is not confirmed to strategic studies. The nature of "science" in a 
social science context remains a lively, ongoing debate. 
In general, strategists recognize the dangers of developing too cosy a relationship with 
officials when they advise governments on a paid basis. Like many other experts in 
their field, (eg. economists) however, they see no necessary inconsistency between 
scholarship and advice. Being a practical subject there are some benefits from analyzing 
strategic issues at close hand, providing that a "detached" approach is adopted. Policy 
advocacy, however, is a different matter. Some strategists do drift into the realm of 
advocating certain policies, but when they do so they are wearing their ”concerned 
citizens” hat rather than acting in an academic capacity. 
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Box 2 
Straterric Studies as a Universitv Subiect 
"The study of strategy in Universities may be defended on several different, 
yet complementary, grounds. In strictly academic terms, the subject poses 
sufficient intellectual challenge as to merit inclusion in, or even as, a course of 
study fully adequate to stretch mental resources. In, and of itself, that 
argument is sufficient to justify the inclusion of strategic studies in University 
curricula, but one can, and should, proceed to argue that the study of strategy 
is socially uselful .... Many views are defensible concerning the proper and 
appropriate duties of a university. This author chooses a liberal, permissive 
perspective. He sees value in a field of study that seeks truth and may have 
relevance to contemporary policy and, as a consequence, may contribute to the 
general well-being". 
C S Gray 
"In strategic studies the ability to argue logically and to follow a piece of 
strategic reasoning is very important, but even more important is the elusive, 
almost indefinable quality of political judgement which enables a man to 
evaluate a piece of analysis and locate it in a wider political framework". 
J C Garnett 
Another forceful criticism of strategic studies is that 'it is part of the problem, not the 
solution'. What opponents mean by this is that the Clausewitzean perspective of 
strategists which sees military power as a legitimate instrument of policy, helps to 
perpetuate a particular mindset amongst statesmen and their publics which encourages 
the use of force. It is this realist thinking, critics argue, which lay behind the 
development of theories of deterrence, limited war, and crisis management which were 
so dangerous during the Cold War. Anatol Rapoport is one writer who charges 
strategists with a direct responsibility for promoting a framework of thinking about 
security which is largely hostile to what he regards as the proper solution, namely 
disarmament. In a stinging attack he argues that "the most formidable obstacles to 
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disarmament are created by the strategists who place their strategic considerations 
above the needs of humanity as a whole, and who create or help maintain an 
intellectual climate in which disarmament appears to be unrealistic”. 
Linked to this criticism is the view that because strategists are so pessimistic about 
human nature and the chances of significant improvements in the conduct of 
international politics, they ignore the opportunities which exist for peaceful change. 
To see the past as a history of constant conflict and to suggest that the future will be the 
same is to help create a fatalistic impression that plans for human progress will always 
fail. More than this, by emphasizing mistrust, self-help and the importance of military 
power in an anarchic international system, is self-fulfilling. Given this “socially 
constructed” view of the world, it is not surprising that states will constantly find 
themselves in conflict with each other. 
Once again, strategists vigorously contest these criticisms. They argue that their ideas 
reflect (rather than create) the “reality” of world politics. The fact that most statesmen 
in positions of responsibility tend to share their “realist” assumptions is not due to an 
intellectual climate ”socially constructed” by academic strategists but the result of their 
own experiences as well as their individual understanding of history. The notion that 
strategic studies as a subject is ”a monstrous crime committed by self-interested 
strategists against the general public” is seen as absurd. Academic strategists may 
occasionally act as policy advisers but their influence over government decision-making 
has been much less than such critics suggest. 
On the question of ”peaceful change”, strategists do not dismiss the fact there are 
periodically opportunities for periods of peaceful coexistence. They are, however, very 
skeptical (to say the least) about the prospects for “perpetual peace” or a radical 
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transformation of the whole basis of world politics. Conflict, they believe can be 
mitigated (in part through effective strategy), but it is highly unlikely that it can be 
transcended completely. In such a context it is impossible to abolish the need for 
strategic studies. 
The emphasis on state's pursuing effective strategies (which take account of the realities 
of power) provides the basis for another criticism of strategists. This centers on the 
state-centric approach, which, it is argued, pervades strategic studies. According to 
this critique, strategists are so preoccupied by threats to the interests of states that they 
ignore security issues within the state. Many critical security theorists argue that the 
state is not the most appropriate referent for studying security. Rather, attention should 
be focused on the individual whose security is often threatened, rather than protected 
by the state. Other writers, who perceive the growing erosion of the state prefer to 
focus on "societal security" or even "global security" issues. 
Strategists would argue that while there has been a tendency to stress the role of the 
state, it is wholly untrue that they have neglected intra-state conflict. Clausewitz 
himself dealt with peoples wars and a considerable part of the strategic studies 
literature deals with revolutionary warfare. As wars of national disintegration (Bosnia, 
KOSOVO, Chechnya) have become more prevalent in the post-cold war era, more 
attention has also been given in the literature to these kind of conflicts. Despite this, 
strategists continue to argue that even with all the contemporary challenges to the 
modern state, it continues to be the major actor in world politics. Strategists therefore, 
offer no apologies for their continuing interest in the issues relating to state security. 
18 
WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC STUDIES AND 
SECURITY STUDIES? 
One of the main challenges to strategic studies since the end of the Cold War has come 
from those who argue that attention should be shifted away from the study of strategy 
to the study of security. According to this view "security", defined in terms of freedom 
from threats to core values", is a more appropriate concept for analysis in the 
contemporary world. The problem with strategy, it is argued, is that it is too narrow 
and increasingly less relevant at a time when major wars are declining, whereas threats 
to political I economic, social and environmental security interests are increasing. 
Defined more broadly, security, therefore, is seen, by some, to be of more valuable as an 
organizing framework for understanding the more complex, multi-dimensional risks of 
today. (See Buzan). 
Faced with this challenge, Richard K Betts, writing in 1996 asked the question "Should 
strategic studies survive?!" Betts conceded that security studies in the United States has 
been squeezing strategic studies out of the University curriculum. He is not opposed to 
security studies, but he makes two very important points. Firstly, it is appropriate to 
distinguish between "strategy" and "security" studies in order to recognize that 
"security" includes a wide range of topics, "as long as no doubt is left that security 
policy requires careful attention to war and strategy". In other words, military power 
remains a crucial part of security. And secondly, he argues that "expansive definitions 
of security quickly become synonymous with "interest" and "well-being", do not 
exclude anything in international relations or foreign policy, and this becomes 
indistinguishable from those fields or other sub-fields". 
I 
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The editors of this book accept the value of security studies while at the same time 
sharing these concerns about the coherence of the field. More importantly, however, we 
believe that "strategy" remains a distinctive and valuable area of academic study. 
Strategy is part of security studies, just as security studies is part of International 
Relations, which itself is part of Political Science. This can be expressed 
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Despite all of the changes which have occurred in world politics since the late 1980s 
there is in many respects an underlying continuity with earlier eras. The euphoria that 
a fundamental transformation of international relations was underway, has proved to 
be ill-founded. As we have seen from the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya (and 
many other conflicts) force and military power continue to be an important currency in 
the international system at the beginning of the twenty first century. Certainly 
important changes are taking place in world politics, associated with the twin forces of 
globalization and fragmentation, and wars between the great powersl for the moment at 
least, have slipped into the background. The sad fact remains, however, that the 
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utilization of military power as an instrument of political purpose and therefore, 
strategic studies, remains just a relevant today as it has been in the past. 
To reflect the continuing importance and vitality of the subject this book is organized 
into three main sections.. . 
CHAPTER 2 
FORCE AND MORALITY 
H. McCoubrey 
The idea of ethical constraint upon the waging of war and its embodiment in legal 
norms is of ancient origin but still seems profoundly paradoxical. War, as an 
ultimate collapse of 'normal' international relations, appears to be a situation in 
which the most ruthless use of force must prevail and in which ethical constraint can 
serve only as a potentially fatal self-inflicted impediment to effective action. If it was 
indeed the purpose of ethical and legal norms to obstruct and diminish the combat 
efficacy of fighting forces, such strictures would be fully justified and norms so 
conceived could not long endure. That, however, is neither their purpose nor their 
effect. The real foundation of ethical and legal constraint upon warfare can be found 
clearly stated in a much misrepresented passage in Carl von Clausewitz' classic work 
Vom Kriege, published posthumously in 1832. The great Prussian theorist wrote that, 
He who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed 
involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its 
application ... . From the social condition both of States in themselves and 
in their relations to each other ... War arises, and by it War is ... controlled 
and modified. But these things do not belong to War itself, they are only 
given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of War itself a 
principle of moderation would be an absurdity.' 
If war is analysed as a phenomenon in isolation a logic of illimitable force might 
indeed seem to be suggested. However, as Clausewitz indicates, wars and armed 
conflicts2 do not thus arise in isolation but occur in the real context of international 
relations, which imports expectations which not only condition reactions to armed 
conflict but themselves have real political and military effect. 
In the first place needless barbarity renders both the conduct and the ultimate 
resolution - the desired ‘end state’ - of conflict more difficult than it otherwise might 
be. As the late Colonel Klaus Kuhn commented, 
the quickest way of achieving and maintaining a lasting peace is to 
conduct hostilities humanely . ... It is evident that humanitarian 
considerations cannot be dissociated from the strategic concept of military 
leaders? 
The proscription of unnecessary barbarity is counselled not only by ethical and 
humanitarian considerations but also by reference to the response of other States to a 
belligerent Power and the inevitable tendency to a prolongation of conflict where 
fear of probable mistreatment renders a cornered enemy desperate. The idea is not 
new, it was asserted in the 5th Century BC by the Chinese tactician Sun Tzu in 
advising commanders ’Do not press a desperate foe too hard’: There is ample 
historical evidence to support the contention. In 1945 the forces of the Third Reich 
sought to resist the advancing Soviet army, whose fury was at least in part 
occasioned by prior German conduct, long after it was clear that all hope of success 
was gone, even as vast numbers hastened to surrender to the Allies in the west. In 
view of the ruthlessness and boundless contempt for all norms of constraint 
manifested by the Nazis themselves, it is pertinent to point out that the projected 
‘1000 year Reich’ actually endured for less than twelve years. Upon a much lesser 
scale it may also be noted that in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict Kuwait did not remain 
the ’19th Province of Iraq’ for even one year. 
It may be added that, as Colonel Kuhn emphasised, all wars must eventually 
end - if only through the economic exhaustion of the belligerents - and thereafter 
peaceful relations must in some form be resumed. This process is, ex hypothesi, never 
easy and the more brutal the conflict the more difficult post-war reconstruction will 
be. In strategic planning it is here that the question of the desired ’end state’ 
becomes a matter of paramount importance. It has been suggested elsewhere, in the 
particular context of peace support operations,5 that this is a much more important 
consideration than an arbitrary ’end date’ for operational commitments, not least 
because premature termination of operations may simply lead to a necessity for 
re-engagement in the short to medium term. 
It is thus contended that there are powerful ethical and practical arguments 
for norms of constraint in armed conflict. At the same time it must be borne in mind 
that norms governing the conduct of war, in distinction from those governing resort 
to armed force, are by their nature no more than mitigatory in effect. If it were to be 
pretended that either ethics or law could render war as such humane, the ‘absurdity’ 
to which Clausewitz referred would rapidly become all too evident. In short, 
humanitarian legal constraint upon armed conflict operates upon two levels, aiming 
firstly the to reduce or eliminate the occurrence of war and, where this proves 
impossible, to mitigate its consequences.. These are, and to maintain their viability 
must remain, pragmatic objectives rooted in the practical experience of warfare. 
The Structure of the International Laws of Armed Conflict 
The two broad functions of the laws of armed conflict are performed 
respectively by the jus ad bellurn and the jus in bello. The jus ad bellurn (lit. the lai:i 
towards war)6 governs and seeks to avert or limit resort to armed force in the 
conduct of international relations. The jus in bello (lit. the law in war) governs and 
seeks to moderate the actual conduct of hostilities. It should be made clear from the 
outset that that these sectors are distinct in both purpose and implication. The 
applicability of the jus in bello is not affected by the legitimacy or otherwise of the 
initial resort to armed force by either of the belligerents, if it were otherwise the door 
would be opened to a return to the worst excesses not of pre-modern 'just war' 
concepts as such but to its systematic historic abuses. 
The jus ad bellurn is now founded primarily upon the 1928 Pact of Paris and 
article 2(3)(4) of the UN Charter together with Chapter VII (articles 39-51) of the UN 
Charter. Under these provision resort to armed force is proscribed as a means of 
international dispute resolution, leaving as legitimate uses of armed force only 
action in self-defence against attack or enforcement action under UN Security 
Council authorisation. It is true that arguments are advanced for further exceptions 
in relation to 'humanitarian intervention', as was suggested in the 1999 Kosovo 
crisis, but these contentions are to be viewed with some caution and certainly to be 
construed very narrowly in the face of the fundamental norm of article 2(4). 
Where, despite these restraints, armed conflict breaks out the jus in bello becomes 
operative. It comprises two broad, and to a significant degree overlapping, sub- 
sectors known, respectively, for core groups of treaties as 'Hague' and 'Geneva' law. 
Hague law deals with methods and means of warfare and Geneva law with 
protection of the victims of armed conflict. It must, however, be emphasised that this 
is a distinction of convenience rather than one which is either absolute or inflexible. 
Both sets of norms rest ultimately upon a proscription of the infliction of (militarily) 
'unnecessary suffering' first set out expressly in the 1868 Declaration of St. 
Petersburg and the whole jus in bello provision is today categorised as 'international 
humanitarian law'.7 
The Background and Development of the ]us ad bellurn 
The development of the jus ad bellum may reasonably be seen as a progressive 
historic evolution of norms designed to counter escalating threats of destabilising 
conflict endangering the sustainability of international order. The developmental 
pattern has been episodic in character, punctuated by occasional violent 
discontinuities and in this sense might be described as revolutionary rather than 
evolutionary in nature. However, be that as it may, there has been a discernible 
continuity of principle in seeking to contain armed conflicts within parameters 
which are sustainable by existing international society. In this respect international 
law is much like any other law in so far as-a containment of violent confrontations is 
one of the basic 'law jobs', to borrow a phrase devised by Karl N. Llewellyn: 
performed by any legal system? The European medieval scholastic 'just war' 
concept, with ultimate legal origins in the jusfetiale of the ancient Roman Republic," 
was developed by such figures as St. Augustine of Hippo, St. Raymond of Penaforte, 
St. Thomas Aquinas and Johannes Tuetonicus" as a limitation of resort to armed 
force to certain grave causes, although it swiftly degenerated into a mere excuse for 
aggression. The scholastic jus ad bellum finally lost what remained of its credibility 
by the end of the 16th century with the dissolution of the late medieval European 
political order ultimately in the Thirty Years War. The end of this conflict, with the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia, is conventionally, if over-simply, taken to mark the 
beginning of the early modern era of public international legal development.'2 The 
shape of early modern public international law is commonly associated with the 
work of the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius and, in the present context, particularly 
with De Jure BeZZi ac Pacis. This is again a considerable over-simplification,13 and 
Grotius actually built, but did not always improve, upon work done in the previous 
century by the Spanish School14 and by Alberico Gentili at 0xf0rd.I~ The jus ad 
bellurn of the early modern era, up to 1914, was little more than a revised 'just war' 
theory, presented in a legalistic rather than ethical mode of discourse which was 
better suited to contemporary European the social contractarian ideology. 
This early modern system faltered in the Napoleonic era but finally collapsed 
only with the end of the First World War in 1918. This first 'modern' technological 
war proved so devastating that it generated the first sustained attempt to develop an 
effective global collective security system in the shape of the League of Nations. The 
failure of the League in the renewed global catastrophe of the Second World War is 
sometimes assumed to mean that the conceptual foundations and structures of the 
League doomed it from the outset. This is, however, a flawed judgement. Article 10, 
11 and 16 of the League Covenant set out a clear doctrine of collective security in a 
manner not greatly different from that provided for in the UN Charter, although the 
mechanisms for implementation were admittedly less well defined. The roots of the 
failure of the league lay, however, not in its constitution but in a failure of political 
will. Quite apart from the loss of US backing following the political eclipse of 
President Wilson in 1921, the major Powers amongst the League Members displayed 
a fatal lack of resolve in facing the aggressive totalitarian regimes of the 1930s to the 
point at which any reliance upon collective security collapsed and the drift toward 
renewed global war became irreversible. The League failed, in short, not because it 
could not work but because it was not made to do so. 
One basic principle was, however, established, not by the League Covenant 
but by the 1928 Pact of ParisI6 which provides by article 1 that, 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare ... that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one 
another. 
This basic principle attracted widespread formal acceptance and although 
comprehensively violated in the 1930s it was accepted as a fundamental norm of 
public international law in the drafting of the Charters of the International Military 
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo which included ‘crimes against peace’ in their 
jurisdiction at the trials of the major Axis war criminals. 
This principle is today affirmed unequivocally in article 2(3)(4) of the UN 
Charter which provide that, 
(3) All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered . 
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 
This established the fundamental point that armed force is not a legitimate mode of 
international dispute resolution and, by the same token, that armed conflict is no 
longer a lawful condition of international relations. Thus in 1990 whatever the 
merits, if any, of Iraq’s oil claims against Kuwait may have been,17 the invasion and 
occupation was unequivocally a violation of international law 
The basic proscription set out by article 2(4) is qualified by two essential 
exceptions. These are (i) the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in 
the face of armed attack preserved by article 51 of the UN Charter and (ii) action for 
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security authorised by the 
UN Security Council under article 42. These provisions are, for the present purpose, 
the key elements of the UN provision for collective security and defence set out by 
Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter. 
The primary provision for the maintenance of international peace and 
security is made by Chapter VII, comprising articles 39-51. Where a threat to or 
violation of the peace is anticipated or claimed to have occurred article 39 requires 
the Security Council to determine whether this is in fact the case. There are some 
grey areas here and just what constitutes a 'threat to the peace' was at one time a 
subject for debate." Originally there can be little doubt that the concept was limited 
to international, i.e. inter-State, aggression but later practice suggests that some 
internal use of force might fall within this category, at least where it threatens 
regional destabilisation, as for example in Kosovo in 1999.19 N.D. White suggests 
usefully that, 
the situations have at their core the use of armed force, either internal or 
international. The integrity of the concept has been maintained by many of 
the recent uses of the terms by the Security Council, covering issues such 
as threats of force (provocative action directed by Iraq against Kuwait), 
widespread violations of international humanitarian law (including 
'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia), massive humanitarian crises (caused by the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 which led to related problems in Burundi and 
Zaire in 1996), and breach of a Security Council arms embargo (relating to 
Rwanda) .*O 
If the Security Council does find a threat to or breach of the peace to have occurred it 
may under article 40 determine upon 'provisional measures' for the aversion of any 
escalation of the crisis. Where necessary the Council may impose non-military 
(primarily economic) sanctions under article 41 or military measures under article 
42. Article 42 provides that. 
Should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in 
Article 41 would prove inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. ... 
It must here be emphasised that articles 41 and 42 should not be understood as 
mandatorily sequential. It is entirely lawful in appropriate cases to proceed straight 
from article 39 to article 42, as is made clear by the provision of article 42 that it may 
be applied if the Council considers that article 41 sanctions 'would prove inadequate' 
(emphasis added). It may be added that any assumption that economic measures are 
necessarily the more 'humane' approach has been severely undermined by the 
experience of the post-1991 sanctions against Iraq?* The point remains significant 
even when allowance has been made for the fact that the sufferings of the Iraqi 
people in this context were to a large degree the fault of the Baghdad regime 
although, in this as in other matters, it proved adept at manipulating the western 
media. Military sanctions under article 42 were intended to be implemented by UN 
Forces drawn from, units held in readiness for such service by Member States under 
obligations assumed under article 43 of the Charter, along with air forces held under 
article 45 in immediate readiness for 'urgent ... enforcement action'. To provide 
strategic, but not tactical, direction for these Forces the UN Military Staff Committee 
was set up under article 47 of the Charter. In practice no article 43 and 45 Forces 
were thus held in readiness and although the UN Military Staff Committee was set 
up, its functions are necessarily limited to the advisory function provided for in 
article 47(1).22 It may in practice be said, perhaps a little harshly but nonetheless in 
essence truly, that the UN Military Staff Committee has become a general staff 
without art army. 
This original UN peace support vision was effectively derailed by the collapse 
after 1945 of the wartime inter-Allied consensus - which was in any event never so 
extensive as some appear to have believed - and its succession by Cold War tensions 
and the suspicions of the smaller Powers as to the uses to which a Great Power 
dominated Security Council might put readily available forces. It has been 
questioned whether in the absence of article 43 Forces the Security Council can ’take 
[military] action’ at all. This would, however, seem to be an excessively legalistic 
interpretation. UN ’Blue Helmet’ Forces are necessarily provided by Member States, 
whether in theory pursuant to an article 43 obligation or, in practice, upon a 
voluntary ad hoc basis.23 In this, as in a number of other respects, the application of 
the Charter provisions has been adapted to meet the practical exigencies of the 
circumstances in which it is called to function and this is indeed a vital factor in its 
effective continuance. 
The UN collective security system has never in fact functioned in quite the 
manner apparently intended by its drafters. The Cold War led to the development of 
a defacto mixed collective security and balance of (Super)power system. The 
Permanent Members’ veto in the Security Council - which was not a Cold war 
aberration but, as Cordell Hull a sine qua nun for major Power 
acceptance and backing of the Council - ensured that this would be the case. 
Conflicts in which the Cold War Superpowers either had or perceived themselves to 
have a major interest were by this means effectively removed from the Security 
Council’s remit. It was thus that so grave an international crisis as the Vietnam War 
was effectively excluded from the Security Council’s agenda. This mixed system 
endured to the end of the Cold War in the 1980s and served in part to mask a basic 
problem of structure and resourcing at the heart of the UN system in the absence of 
an effective implementation of articles 43 and 45 of the Charter. 
UN ‘Blue Helmet’ Forces have a substantial record of peace-keeping properly 
so-called, that is to say policing the implementation of a peace settlement. Peace 
enforcement operations, the restoration of security in a situation in which there is no 
’peace’ to ‘keep’, have proved much more problematic. There are two essential 
reasons for this, first the nature of the Forces themselves and secondly the nature of 
UN crisis management. As to the first, ad hoc multi-national forces created at short 
notice are inevitably prey to problems of command, control and interpretability, 
including the position of Force Commanders who must in effect negotiate the 
implementation of their orders with national contingent commanders in a manner 
unthinkable in almost any other military hierarchy. These inherent problems are 
compounded by the tendency of the UN Organisation to engage in inappropriate 
micro-management of ‘Blue Helmet’ operations. The consequences were seen in the 
fate of UNPROFOR in former-Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The Force was under - 
resourced, beset by command and control problems and burdened by ever-shifting 
and in some cases actually contradictory mandates. In this context it was less 
surprising that it faced grave difficulties in its operations than that it succeeded in 
holding a near impossible situation until the Dayton Peace Accords were in place. 
Paradoxically, having deployed a ’peace-keeping’ force in advance of the peace 
settlement, the UN then, post-Dayton, put in the much more robust NATO-led IFOR 
and SFOR Forces in effect in enforcement roles. 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the former-USSR the 
post-1945 mixed collective security /balance of power dissolved with a consequent 
massive increase in the peace-support demands placed upon the UN which the 
organisation lacked the capacity to sustain. The difficulties experienced by 
UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia, UNOSOM and UNITAFE in Somalia and the 
overwhelming disaster in the African Great Lakes region combined to demonstrate 
the need for a revised basis for effective peace support in the new era. 
The favoured option, most clearly set out in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Supplement 
to Agendu for has been resort to regional organisations and arrangements. The 
immediate examples of this were seen in the NATO-led Forces in the successive 
crises in former-Yugoslavia in the 1 9 9 0 ~ ~  IFOR, SFOR and KFOR. This regional 
approach is not as such legally innovatory and is in fact expressly provided for by 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Article 53 actually requires the Security Council to 
make use of regional organisations in peace support action ’where appropriate’. This 
latter caveat is of course the central issue. At the outset of the UN era, at the 
Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco meetings, there was intense debate upon the 
relative merits of globalism and regionalism in security structures. Ultimately the 
globalist perception was maintained but an important, although subordinate, role 
was admitted for regional organisations with the aim of enhancing the resources 
available for peace maintenance and enforcement whilst guarding against the 
self-evident danger of regional hegemonism. The resource-driven crisis in post-Cold 
War peace support has revived interest in the Chapter VIII mechanism and this will 
no doubt be an important element in the emerging 21st century global (and regional) 
peace support ar~hitecture.~~ It must, however, also be accepted that the very 
diversity of the character, objectives and capacities of the various organisations 
preclude this from approach from affording any simple or singular solution to global 
security problems. It is more the case that a range of options are offered whch may 
in appropriate cases greatly enhance the peace support options which may be available 
at need. 
The Background and Development of the Humanitarian Jus in Bello 
Attempts to mitigate the conduct of warfare through regulatory norms have a 
long, if rather variable history.28 The earliest surviving proscription, the ban upon 
‘poison weapons’, originated in the Graeco-Roman era, but most current regulations 
are, by the nature of their subject matter, of much more recent origin. The emphasis 
of medieval thought upon the law and ethics of warfare was directed 
overwhelmingly to the jus ad bellurn rather than to the jus in bello and, despite the 
counsel towards moderation offered by St. Augustine of the implication of 
’just war’ theory that at least one side must be presumed to be acting ’unjustly’ 
tended to discount humanitarianism in politically convenient practice. That this 
occasioned doubts cannot be denied, evidence is found in occasional Papal Interdicts 
following particularly brutal campaigns% and the disquiet expressed after the 
massacre of prisoners at Agincourt in 1415. The nearest the middle ages came to a 
genuine jus in bello was the jus armorurn (law of arms)31 which related more to 
chivalric fantasies than practical humanitarianism. There were even, unsuccessful, 
attempts at arms control in the period, for example the endeavour of the Second 
Lateran Council to ban the use of cross bows and arbalests. The early modern era of 
international law, after 1648, saw at the outset an era of limited dynastic and 
territorial wars between States which few ideological differences. In this context 
there developed what Jean Pictet has termed, with perhaps some exaggeration, a 
‘customary humanitarian law’ of armed conflict.” This, however, was destroyed by 
the scale and bitterness of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars at the 
turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. A nadir was reached in the middle of the 19th 
century with the 1855-6 Crimean War and the 1859 Franco-Austrian War and it was 
from these experiences that the modern international humanitarian laws of armed 
conflict developed. 
Modern international humanitarian law originated on the battlefield of 
Solferino in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859. A Swiss businessman, Henry Dunant, 
passing by shortly after the battle, arranged and financed medical rescue action by 
which many lives were saved and, significantly, did so impartially for French and 
Austrians alike although his own sympathies were markedly pro-French. 
Subsequently he published a pamphlet, Souvenir de Solferino (A Memory of 
Solferino),33 in which he advocated (i) the conclusion of a treaty for the protection of 
the wounded and sick in land warfare and (ii) the creation of an international 
organisation to supplement and assist the military medical services in time of war. 
These proposals came to fruition, respectively in the first, 1864, Geneva Convention 
for the protection of the wounded and sick and in the creation of the International 
Red Cross Organisation. Modern 'Geneva' law is found primarily in the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions. These make provision, respectively, for the wounded and sick 
on land, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war and civilians. 
These treaties are nearly universally ratified and their essential provisions can now 
claim the status of customary international law and as such are binding upon all 
States, whether or not they are formally Parties to the Conventions. Further 
provision for international armed conflict is made by 1977 Additional Protocol I 
which to a large extent simply elaborates existing principles, but it also makes 
further provision some of which has proved highly controversial and although the 
number of ratification's is increasing it cannot as yet (2000) be considered to have 
achieved customary status.3L 
For a variety of reasons, political and legal, the establishment of humanitarian 
norms in non-international armed conflicts, 'civil wars', has proved even more 
difficult than that of the equivalent provisions for international conflicts - even 
though the Lieber Code established by the Union side in the American Civil War 
was one of the early benchmarks in humanitarian legal development. Modern 
provision amounts to a reduced version of the provision for international conflicts 
and is found in article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 
Additional Protocol II thereto. 
'Hague' law took on its modern shape at roughly the same time as 'Geneva' 
law, although some of its provisions are amongst the oldest norms of public 
international law. The foundational treaty for modern purposes is an arms control 
measure, the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg. In its Preamble it set out the basic 
Doctrine of 'Unnecessary Suffering'. This principle underpins the whole of modern 
international humanitarian law, emphasising the aversion of miIitariIy unnecessary 
severity both in the adoption of methods and means of warfare and the protection of 
victims of armed conflict. 
Protection of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Modem provision for the protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked is 
now found principally in 1949 Geneva Conventions I and 11, dealing respectively 
with conflict on land and at sea, with supplementary provision made by 1977 
Additional Protocol I. The norm are essentially the same on land and at sea, subject 
to the obvious differences between the terrestrial and maritime media. The key 
principle is set out by article 12 which is in effect common to 1949 Geneva 
Conventions I and 11. It requires that the wounded and sick must be treated 
humanely and cared for according to their needs, with prioritisation in order of 
treatment determined solely by reference to medical need and not according to 
nationality, rank, gender, politics, religion or any other medically irrelevant factors. 
This basic principle is repeated and amplified in detailed by article lO(2) of 1977 
Additional Protocol I. 
As an obvious prerequisite for effective medical care all possible measures are 
required to be taken to search for and collect the wounded, sick and/or shipwrecked 
after military and naval engagements.% This immediately raises the difficult question 
of the interface between humanitarianism and necessity, there can be no duty to put 
a unit at unreasonable risk of its own destruction in conducting rescue work. The 
point can most plainly be illustrated by reference to naval warfare. Thus, H.M. Ships 
Dorsetshire and Maori after the sinking of K.M. Bismark in the Second World War 
were entitled to abandon rescue work upon sighting a possible U-Boat track. It is 
also accepted that the capacity of submarines to engage in search and rescue is very 
limited, granted both their capacity and their extreme vulnerability to attack when 
on the surface. The risk was demonstrated when U-156 was (unsuccessfully) 
attacked by an unidentified aircraft whilst seeking to assist survivors from the 
sinking of the troopship Laconia.36 Best modern practice is perhaps represented by 
the action of H.M.S. Conqueror after the sinking of AR.A. GeneraI Belgrano in the 1982 
Falklands Conflict, when, having sunk the major surface unit it departed the scene 
without attacking the smaller Argentine vessels leaving them to undertake rescue 
work unmolested. It must be added that although rescue may not always be 
possible, actual attack upon survivors hors de combat is clearly unlawful, now under 
article 12 and so held earlier in, e.g., the Llandovery Castle case (1926)37 and the Peleus 
case ( 1 9 4 5 ) ~ ~  
Once the wounded and sick have been collected it follows from article 12 of 
the first two 1949 Geneva Conventions that they must be given the most effective 
medical care which is practically available in accordance with their medical need. 
The requirement is broadly obvious in its implications but, again, the issue of 
practical possibility arises. Thus, wilful neglect and the creation of conditions 
exposing patients to contagion or infection are expressly forbidden by article(s) 12, 
but an obvious distinction may here be drawn between ’impossibility’ and ‘culpable 
neglect’. To take specific examples, it may be impossible to screen donated blood for 
HTV infection in a field hospital but to fail to undertake basic sterilisation of surgical 
instruments would be inexcusable 
Basic medical ethical standards are implicit in article 12 of the first two 1949 
Conventions and are spelt out in more detail by article 11 of 1977 Additional 
Protocol 1. In particular, battlefield medical procedures must concord with 
'generally accepted medical standards' and be 'indicated by the state of health of the 
person concerned'. The only exceptions to this are voluntary (neither coerced nor 
induced) donations of blood for transfusion or skin for grafting, donation of organs 
for transplanting are forbidden even if volunteered .39 This might, again, in practice 
require very difficult medical decisions in some cases but the provision is necessary 
to avert the medical atrocities which, especially in the case of 'ethnic and political' 
internees in the Third Reich, characterised the Second World War. 
Medical personnel are also protected as a necessary dimension of the care of 
their patients. Permanent medical personnel are protected at all times, auxiliary 
personnel, such as stretcher bearers, are protected whilst actually engaged in 
medical work:' They may not be penalised for carrying out their medical duties, 
including the treatment of enemy wounded, a point which is implicit in 1949 Geneva 
Convention I, article 12, and made express by 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 16. 
Any full time medical personnel and chaplains who fall into enemy hands are not 
technically 'captured' but may be 'retained' for the provision of care to prisoners of 
war of their own or allied forces, being then protected by 1949 Geneva Convention 
I11 to at least the same extent 'as if' they were prisoners of war. The position of 
medical personnel and chaplains at sea is somewhat different. Together with the 
officers and crews of a hospital ship, they may neither be captured nor 'retained' 
whilst at sea, whether or not there are wounded and sick on board the ship:' On 
land, however, such personnel, including any who have been brought to land after 
the sinking of a hospital ship, become subject to the relevant provisions of 1949 
Geneva Convention I. 
Medical institutions and transport are also protected. Fixed medical 
establishments and mobile medical units may not be attacked and must be respected 
and protected. They may come under enemy control but must then be permitted to 
continue with their medical work unless and until adequate provision is made by the 
enemy Power.42 Ambulances are similarly protected" This protection, like that of 
medical personnel, ceases only if units 'are used to commit outside their 
humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy' and even then warning should be 
given if this is practically possible.4 Such 'acts' do not include, inter alia, the 
presence in a hospital of small arms and ammunition taken from patient or, again, 
the carrying of small arrns by medical personnel.fi 
In an endeavour to facilitate their protection 1949 Geneva Convention I 
requires by article 19 that medical units be established so far as possible in places 
where they will not be imperilled by legitimate attacks upon military objectives. This 
means in particular that they must not be used as 'human shields' for potential 
military targets. If they are so used they are clearly placed at risk of 'collateral 
damage' which would then be the responsibility of those who had so misused them, 
provided that the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack 
was commensurate with the damage likely to be done. 
Hospital ships, usually requisitioned merchant ships may similarly not be 
attacked or captured.% The name and description of such ships must be notified to 
the other side not less than 10 days prior to their commencing operations. Hospital 
ships may be stopped and searched and may also be placed under the direction of a 
Commissioner (normally an enemy naval officer) or even detained for a period not 
exceeding seven days 'if the gravity of the circumstances so requires'." Warships of 
belligerent Parties may demand the surrender and hand-over of wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked on a hospital ship, so long as they are fit to be moved and the warship 
can itself provide adequate continuing medical treatment for them: which, in the 
nature of things, they normally could not. Protection is lost in the same way as for 
land medical ~ni t s .4~  
Only very basic provision is made for medical aircraft by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, primarily by Convention I, article 36 and Convention 11, article 39. 
Such aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of the wounded and sick or the 
transport of medical equipment must not be attacked but must be repeated and 
protected whilst flying on routes and at altitudes and times agreed in advance. More 
extensive provision is made by 1977 Additional Protocol I, 'articles 24-31. These 
include particular rules defined by the nature of the territory overflown, but the 
basic principles are the same as those governing other modes of medical transport. 
The Protective Emblems 
The Red Cross and Red Crescent (the Red Lion and Sun formerly used by Iran 
has been defacto abandoned) are recognised under 1949 Geneva Convention I, article 
38 and Convention 11, article 41 as protective emblems. They are used to identify 
units and personnel protected under the First and Second Conventions and are 
required to be worn or displayed by such personnel or units. Their improper use at 
any time is required to be penalised and in the UK is a criminal offence under the 
Geneva Conventions Act 1957, section 6. The emblems, of course, indicate rather 
than create protected status and do not function as a panacea against genuine 
accident. Thus, whilst (e.g.) a hospital should display the protective emblem it 
should not be attacked even if it does not do so if it is known or reasonably beZieved to be 
a hospital. An example of accidence may be seen in the sinking of the largest hospital 
ship ever lost in armed conflict, HMHS Britannic, a sister of the Titanic, in 1916 in a 
newly laid and undeclared minefield in the Aegean. The ship was displaying 
hospital ship colours but, despite Allied allegations of a major war crime, was the 
victim of a tragic accident. 
The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
The Red Cross emblem also gives its name to the International Red Cross 
organisation which similarly originated in the proposals made by Henry Dunant 
after the 1859 Battle of Solferino. It comprises national Societies, the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC). The organisation in its various dimensions undertakes 
much humanitarian work in armed conflict, including involvement in material 
humanitarian relief and in organising visits to prisoner of wear and other internment 
camps to check upon the conditions obtaining therein. The International Committee 
of the Red Cross also plays an important role in the continuing development of 
international humanitarian law through the medium of the international Red Cross 
conferences between the States Parties to the 1949 Geneva  convention^.^' 
Protection of Prisoners of War 
Prisoners of war, as combatants in the custody of the enemy, are amongst the 
victims of armed conflict most at risk. The fate of Soviet prisoners in Germany, and 
of Axis prisoners in the USSR which was not party to the relevant 1929 Geneva 
Convention, in the Second World War made the point graphically. More recently, 
the abuse of Coalition prisoners in Iraq during the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict served to 
emphasise both the continuing importance and difficulty of this matter. 
An obvious prerequisite for the implementation of protection is the 
determination of entitlement to prisoner of war (POW) status. The basic category is 
defined by 1949 Geneva Convention 111, article 4, as, 
Members of the armed forces of a Party in conflict as well as members of 
military of volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
Such forces must be under 'responsible' (i.e. hierarchically answerable) command, 
subject to a code of discipline which includes requirement to observe the laws of 
armed conflict, wear uniform or some other 'fixed distinctive sign' and carry their 
weapons openly. POW status is also accorded to a variety of analogous and support 
personnel under 1949 Geneva Convention 111, article 4A and 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, article 43. PoWs are, however, always military or equivalent personnel of 
the parties in conflict. Personnel from other, non-involved, countries who are in an 
area of conflict and who are interned upon security grounds are not PoWs but are 
treated 'as if' they are 'civilian internees' under 1949 Geneva Convention IV. This 
was the situation of the British military mission in Kuwait at the time of the 1990 
Iraqi invasion prior to British military involvement in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict. 
Spies and mercenaries are denied POW status upon captured by 1977 
Additional Protocol in which respect it almost certainly reflects established 
practice. Primafacie disentitlement from POW status does not, of course, entail denial 
of entitlement to due process. POW status should clearly not arbitrarily be denied 
without proper investigation, particularly by reference to 1977 Additional Protocol I, 
articles 45(3) and 75. 
Basic Principles of POW Protection 
1949 Geneva Convention III sets out a detailed code for the organisation and 
management of POW camps. It should be stressed at the outset that PoWs may not 
validly renounce the rights guaranteed to them by 1949 Geneva Convention 111, and 
if they are coerced into purporting to do so this will be ineffe~tive.~~ 
Under the Convention, article 12, PoWs are the responsibility of the detaining 
Power from the moment of their capture, this means that mistreatment cannot 3e 
dismissed as 'unfortunate local zeal'. It is the duty of States to repress such abuses 
and to punish their perpetrators. Once in the hands of the enemy the basic 
protections afforded to PoWs are summarised by articles 13-16 of the Third 
Convention. Article 13 requires that they must 'at all times be humanely treated' and 
any unlawful act or omission occasioning death or seriously endangering the health 
of a POW is a serious breach of the Convention. It also reinforces the medical 
treatment protections set out in 1949 Geneva Conventions I and I1 and forbids 
reprisals against PoWs and exposure of them to 'violence or intimidation and ... 
insults and public curiosity ...'. The treatment of downed Tornado pilots in Iraq 
during the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict was a manifest violation of this provision. Sensitive 
questions may arise in this context over media coverage of POW camps and scenes of 
surrender, and did so, e.g., during the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict. The best conclusion 
would seem to be that photographs of an individual prisoner might be considered 
demeaning, but photographs of an 'anonymous' mass of prisoners would seem 
unlikely to be so. 
Upon capture a POW may be questioned but under article 17 of 1949 Geneva 
Convention I11 is only required to give surname, forename(s), rank, date of birth and 
serial number, or the equivalent information. Article 18 of the Convention requires 
that PoWs be evacuated as soon as possible after capture to camps situated far 
enough from the combat zone to be out of danger, although this may, of course, be 
delayed when moving them would in itself involve unnecessary exposure to combat 
danger. Once located in a POW Camp (even if only a transit camp), the Convention 
requires by article 70 that a prisoner must, within one week, be enabled to write out 
a capture card according to a model set out in Annex IV B which will then be sent to 
the PoWs family and the International Committee of the Red Cross Central Tracing 
Agency in Geneva. 
There is no space in the present context for a detailed description of POW 
camp administration, except to emphasise that POW camps are in no sense penal 
institutions but are merely secure places of internment. Thus, subject to the proper 
exigencies of camp security, the religious, intellectual and recreational freedoms of 
prisoners are guaranteed by 1949 Geneva Convention 111 , articles 34-38. Prisoners of 
war may to varying degrees be required to work, although this limited to 
supervisory work in the case of NCOs and Officers may not be required to work but 
must be offered (supervisory) work if they so desire. In no case, however, may such 
work be directed to the war effort of the enemy. This point relates directly to, e.g., 
the POW slave labour employed in the Nazi rocket programme factories in the Harz 
Mountains during the Second World War. 
Prisoners of War are subject to penal and disciplinary sanctions under articles 
82-108 of the Third Convention, with the injunction that the latter should be applied 
in preference to the former whenever possible. An interesting question arises where 
a POW is suspected of having committed crimes prior to capture. The issue arose 
during the 1982 Anglo-Argentine Falklands Conflict in the so-called Astiz affair?3 
Captain Astiz, who was captured by British Forces at the retaking of South Georgia, 
was suspected of possible involvement in the 'disappearance' of French and Swedish 
citizens during the 'dirty war' of internal Argentine repression under the Galtieri 
regime. Article 85 of the Convention implicitly permits trial upon charges arising 
from events prior to capture but such proceedings must, of course, comply with 
requirements of due process. Granted the difficulty of obtaining witnesses, 
especially defence witnesses, in such cases in circumstances of armed conflict this is 
rarely if ever likely to be possible. In these circumstances it was not possible to hand 
Captain Astiz over to France or Sweden for trial, and it may be, at the very least, 
strongly doubted the UK even had jurisdiction to try him. He was in fact asked a 
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number of questions submitted by the French and Swedish authorities, all of which 
he, within his rights, refused substantively to answer. Captain Astiz was repatriated 
and eventually tried and acquitted in Argentina.% 
Provision for release of prisoners of war is made by articles 118-9 of the Third 
Convention. The general, and obvious, principle is that prisoners should be 
repatriated as soon as may be possible after the close of hostilities, except for those 
serving judicial sentences or facing trial in accordance with norms of due process. A 
problem does, however, arise in relation to PoWs who may not wish to be 
repatriated for fear of persecution upon their return. The issue arose at the end of the 
Second World War when Soviet citizens who had fought with German forces were 
sent to the USSR at the end of the war to face immediate execution?5 Although 
article 109 still requires early repatriation it has become accepted that enquiries 
should be made, under ICRC supervision, as to whether PoWs actually desire to be 
repatriated or wish to apply for refugee status?6 The ICRC involvement is important 
as a means of ensuring that PoWs are not coerced into declaring a desire to remain in 
enemy hands with consequent propaganda gains to a detaining Power. 
Protection of Civilians 
Civilians were the last category of victims to be brought within the formal 
‘Geneva’ remit, though 1949 Geneva Convention IV, although protection had been 
afforded prior to this, e.g. by the Land Warfare Regulations annexed to 1907 Hague 
Convention IV. The protection of civilians clearly illustrates the overlap between the 
’Hague’ and ’Geneva’ sectors in that a major part of the provision is concerned with 
targeting in bombardment and is as such considered below. Other provision in this 
area closely parallels relevant norms set out by 1949 Geneva Conventions I - III. 
The medical protection for civilian internees is set out in article 91 of 1949 
Geneva Convention IV and includes requirements of appropriate health provision. 
1977 Additional Protocol I, by article 8(a), effectively abolished any residual 
distinction between military and civilian patients. The regime set out for civilian 
internees by 1949 Geneva Convention 111, articles 70-141, is closely similar to that set 
out for prisoners of war by 1949 Geneva Convention I11 although made in some 
respects more lenient in form to take account of the general unfamiliarity of civilians 
with living under military discipline. These considerations include the keeping of 
family members t0gether.5~ 
Particular questions arise in connection with the governance of occupied 
territories. The basic principle is that an Occupying Power has only a temporary 
governing authority of necessity, a point emphasised by the Land Warfare 
Regulations annexed to 1907 Hague Convention IV, article 43, and it is further 
provided , by article 42, that occupation is a matter of military fact rather than 
technical definition or entitlement. This point is reinforced by the fact that, pursuant 
to the 1928 Pact of Paris and article 2(4) of the UN Charter, armed conquest has 
ceased to be a legitimate mode of territorial acquisition?8 Thus despite the, very 
dubious, territorial claims which it made over Kuwait during the 1990-91 Gulf 
Conflict, Iraq remained an Occupying Power in the Emirate and was fully bound by 
the law pertaining to occupation. 
It is generally the duty of an Occupying Power to ensure so far as possible the 
continuation of normal governance and facilities within the territory. Administrative 
and legal changes may be made by the Occupying Power, but only when this is 
objectively required by military necessity.59 Any such changes are not permitted to 
deny the protection of the 1949 Conventions to inhabitants of the territory" 
Facilities, including medical facilities, may be requisitioned for the use of the 
occupying forces but in the case of a civilian medical unit appropriate equivalent 
provision must be made for the displaced patients.61 Under no circumstances may 
the inhabitants of an occupied territory be required to swear allegiance to the 
Occupying Power6* or to serve in its armed forces.@ If people choose, without 
pressure or inducement, to serve in the enemy forces that will be a matter for them, 
although they will no doubt then be committing a criminal offence in the law of their 
home Power. 
Methods and Means of Warfare Target Selection and Bombardment 
The general principle is that bombardments must be directed against military 
objectives. These are usefully defined 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 52(2) as, 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage. 
This provision is not in itself formally customary law but it summarises principles 
deriving from, e.g., the 1907 Hague Land Warfare Regulations (annexed to 1907 
Hague Convention IV) which clearly do have customary status. This also means that 
a bombardment must not be indiscriminate (i.e. failing or unable to select between 
military and civilian targets - usefully summarised by 1977 Additional Protocol 1, 
article 51(2)). The general principles are set out in The Hague Land Warfare 
Regulations, articles 25,26 and 27 and re-emphasised by 1977 Additional Protocol I, 
articles 48, 51, 52 and 57. Terror attacks are specifically forbidden by article 51(2), 
essentially repeating a principle set out in article 22 of the 1923 Hague Draft Rules on 
Aerial Warfare which, whilst they never came formally into force, were accepted as a 
summary of existing customary principle.. Article 52(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I 
further states that in case of doubt a target should be presumed to be civilian. 
Modern questions arising upon these rules and principles include the matter 
of automated weapons which have a much more rapid response time, and therefore 
limited time for consideration, in comparison with the weapons systems of 1907 and 
even 1949. The point was illustrated by the shooting down of an Iranian airliner in a 
combat zone by USS Vincennes in a convoy protection action during the 1980-88 Gulf 
War. Although the management of the Vincennes was severely criticised by the 
subsequent Court Martial. the Commanding Officer was clearly faced with an 
unenviable choice between either risking the destruction of his ship by a hostile 
aircraft or risking the shooting down of a civil airlines - as in fact happened. 
The military implications were illustrated by the choice of high altitude 
bombing as the sole method of attack during the initial NATO campaign in the 1999 
Kosovo crisis. A number of serious questions arose from this, including the 
politically disastrous accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. It 
must also be remembered that 'human shield' tactics are unlawful and cannot as 
such serve to protect a legitimate military target. Examples may be seen in the use by 
Iraq of PoWs and civilian internees as 'shields' for military targets in the 1990-91 
Gulf Conflict. It was also claimed that Kosovar Albanians were being used as 
'shields' by the Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999. Note also the issue of 'collateral 
damage': some damage to nonmilitary targets may well be unavoidable, but all 
practical measures must be taken to minimise it, including calculations of the actual 
military advantage to be anticipated from the attack." 
Ruses of War and Perfidy 
r I 
Both involve deceiving the enemy in order to gain a military advantage. The 
former are lawful but the latter is not. A ruse of war is an attempt to mislead the 
enemy or to cause him to act recklessly which does not invite reliance upon any 
protected legal status or emblem. Examples would include: 
(i) The use of a false fourth funnel by the cruiser SMS Emden  in order to confuse 
identity with a British 'Town' class cruiser during a First World War raid on Penang. 
(ii) British deployment of propaganda to the effect that a much more powerful RN 
force, including HM Ships Renown and Ark Royal, was gathering off the river Plate 
following the engagement with KM Graf Spee. This deceit first impeded the German 
ship from coming forth and certainly contributed to the decision to scuttle the vessel. 
Perfidy means any act by which enemies are led to believe that they are 
entitled to or obliged to accord protection under international law. Examples might 
include false use of Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems or a white flag, feigning 
neutral or UN status, or sickness or injury. It might also include deceitful wearing of 
(false) uniform or feigning civilian status.& Many of these acts are unlawful per se. 
The ban upon perfidy as such is codified by art. 37 of 1977 AP I. It is important to be 
aware of the circumstances in which confidence is invited. The British officer killed 
by flanking fire from another enemy unit when responding to a white flag during 
the 1990-91 Gulf conflict was not a victim of 'perfidy' - he would of course have been 
so had the fire come from the unit displaying the white flag. 
Orders of 'No Quarter' 
Orders of 'no quarter', i.e. that there shall be no survivors from an enemy 
force, are banned by art. 40 of 1977 AP 1. It is also banned by art. 23(d) of the Land 
Warfare Regulations annexed to 1907 Hague Convention IV. The notorious World 
War I1 'Commando Order' under which German Forces were ordered not to take 
Allied Commandos prisoner was held by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg to have violated this provision. 
Reprisals 
These are prima facie unlawful acts undertaken in response to prior unlawful 
acts of the enemy. International humanitarian law places major restrictions upon 
belligerent reprisals especially in regard to persons protected under 'Geneva' Law.& 
Where reprisals may be lawful (i.e. not violating fundamental humanitarian norms) 
this should still not be taken as a counsel for a mere matching of atrocities. 
Arms Control 
The underlying principle of the law of arms control is the doctrine of 
'unnecessary suffering' set out in the Preamble to the 1868 Declaration of St. 
Peter~burg~~ which may be said also to embody an implicit doctrine of 'excessive 
cruelty'. It cannot, however, be said that these principles have been applied 
coherently or consistently and the resulting law is essentially a patchwork quilt of 
treaties reflecting successive foci of concern with real or supposed horror weapons. It 
must here be emphasised that this discussion concerns weapons which are 
categorically banned or restricted and it must be borne in mind, in the light of the 
rules upon bombardment outlined above, that certain uses are banned in respect of 
all weapons whether or not they are inherently lawful as such. The most important 
bans may readily be listed and comprise: 
Small calibre (less than 4 gr. weight) explosive projectiles (1868 
Declaration of St. Petersburg) 
Expanding Bullets, i.e. those without or with a perforated hard casing - 
'Dumdum bullets' (1899 Hague Declaration 3) 
Unanchored submarine contact mines (1907 Hague Convention VIII) 
Gas, Chemical and Biological Weapons use, reservations mean in effect 
first use, (1925 Geneva Gas Protocol) 
Bacteriological Weapons, including all use and stockpiling, (1972 UN 
Bacteriological Weapons Convention) 
Certain hostile macro-environmental modification weapons (1977 UN 
Environmental Modification Techniques Convention - ENMOD) 




(iv) Blinding laser weapons 
(v) 
Fragmentation weapons leaving fragments in the human body 
undetectable by X Rays (Protocol I) 
Indiscriminately used mines, booby traps and similar devices 
(Protocol 11) 
Incendiary Weapons directed against civilian populations 
Land Mines. Chemical weapons, including all use and stockpiling, 
(1992 UN Chemical Weapons Convention). 
The effectiveness of arms control is a somewhat controversial issue. Many 
significant bans, including those upon small-calibre explosive projectiles, dumdum 
bullets and chemical (gas) weapons have achieved a very large measure of efficacy. 
The latter in particular offers a useful case study. An attempt was made to ban such 
weapons at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference but this collapsed in the face of the use 
of gas warfare on the Western Front during the First World War.@ The horrors of 
this left a deep impression and the weapon also proved highly unreliable in so far as 
a change of wind direction could turn it back upon those who had launched it - as 
happened to a Bavarian infantry regiment in whch one Corporal Hitler was serving. 
It also failed ultimately in its use as a means of breaking the Western Front infantry 
deadlock, this being achieved later through the invention of the tank. The 
subsequent 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol has been a generally successful measure, 
violated on only a few occasions, notably by Italy in Ethiopian under Mussolini, by 
Japan in the second Sino-Japanese War (merging into World War I1 in the Far East) 
and by Iraq in the 1980-88 Gulf War.. This relative success may be out down to a 
combination of moral revulsion - with the associated diplomatic risks involved in 
use, the practical defects of the weapon on the battlefield and the probability of 
devastating retaliation in the case of its employment. 
The legal status of nuclear weapons was considered in 1996 by the 
International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion upon Nuclear Weapons. The 
Court declined to hold that nuclear weapons are unlawful per se, but held that most 
uses of such weapons would be so, inter alia upon grounds of indiscrimination., 
confirming that the general jus in bello applies to nuclear weapons as much as to any 
other armaments. The Court held, however, that use of nuclear weapons might be 
lawful in certain extreme circumstances, as, e.g., in case of imminent threat of 
national extinction. The opinion has been much criticised by a number of 
campaigning and non-governmental organisations as being too timid in its response, 
but in fact it appears to state accurately the law as it currently exists which is the 
proper limit of the Court's action under its Statute. There are some regional bans - 
e.g. the Treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco. In 1999 the issue again became 
prominent with the emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear capable military 
powers in the context of the dispute over Kashmir. The question of nuclear 
proliferation has also become a general concern since the collapse of the 
former-Soviet Union and a weakening of nuclear security in some areas of the 
former bloc. 
Conclusions: Laws of Armed Conflict into the 21st Century 
The laws of armed conflict, in both their jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
dimensions, evolve just as armed conflict does so itself. The basic norms are hardly 
subject to fundamental change in any currently conceivable circumstances, but new 
issues arise from time to time which may demand new provision - such as the 1977 
Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or new applications in 
changed circumstances. The post-Cold War reorientation of international peace 
support and enforcement mechanisms is an important example of this form of 
process at the point of transition from the 20th to the 21st century. Certain 
arguments pertaining to humanitarian intervention might be thought to suggest a 
need for radical reinterpretations of, or even amendments to, the UN Charter. The 
wisdom of this may however be doubted, since many of the claimed, and even 
actual, cases of 'humanitarian' provisions fall readily within the existing remit of 
action for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security - which 
the situations tend by their nature to threaten. Areas of change or expansion in 
international humanitarian law may demand attention, not least in the context of 
non-international armed conflicts including in particular in relation to the 
victimisation of civilians in processes of so-called 'ethnic cleansing'. It is unwise to 
make overly specific predictions about future patterns of armed conflict, which tend 
swiftly to be proved false in practice, but it may at least be suggested that these will 
be some of the issues which will influence the next phase of legal development in 
this area. 
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The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace 
Professor J.C. Garnett 
University of Wales 
Opening; Summaw 
Scholarship dealing with the causes of war is voluminous and multi-disciplinary. 
The aim of this chapter is fourfold. First, to describe and explain the most important 
theories that have been advanced by biologists, philosophers, political scientists and 
sociologists about why wars occur. Second, to group their ideas into categories 
which are intellectually manageable; third, to elaborate a series of analytical 
distinctions between different kinds of cause which will enable us to get a handle on 
the multitude of diverse explanations for war which have been suggested, and 
fourth, to show how different explanations of war give rise to different requirements 
or conditions for peace. Distinctions are drawn between ‘immediate’ and 
’underlying’ causes of war, between ’permissive’ and ’efficient’ causes, between 
’learned’ and ’instinctive’ causes, and between ’necessary’ and ’sufficient’ causes. 
The chapter pays particular attention to ’human nature’ and ’instinct’ explanations 
of war, but it also considers those psychological theories which emphasize 
‘misperception’ and ’frustration’ as causes of aggression. The ideas of those who 
find the causes of war in human collectives - states, tribes, ethnic groups etc, and 
those who favour ’systemic rather than ’unit’ explanations are examined in detail. 
The focus is on ideas rather than facts but historical examples are used at every 
opportunity to illustrate theoretical points. 
2 
Introduction 
Though ’strategy’ these days is as much concerned with the promotion of peace as it 
is with the conduct of war, the phenomenon of war remains a central concern. 
Previous generations might have seen virtues in war, for example, as an instrument 
of change or as a vehicle for encouraging heroic virtues, but these ideas have been 
rendered obsolete by the destructiveness of modern warfare. In the 20* Century 
abolishing war became a top priority and it is argued that the first step in this 
direction is to identify its causes. 
Historians sometimes argue that since wars are unique events, the causes of war are 
as numerous as the number of wars and nothing in general can be said about them. 
This chapter takes a different view. It seeks to identify similarities and patterns 
between the causes of one war and another so’that we can group causes under such 
.headings as ’human nature’, ’misperception’, ’the nature of states’ and ’the structure 
of the international system’. Its overall aim is twofold. First, to relate contemporary 
scholarship across a range of disciplines - biology, political science, philosophy, 
history, etc - to the problem of war causation, and second, to elaborate a number of 
distinctions which help us to identify different kinds of ‘cause’, e.g., ’underlying’ and 
’immediate’ causes, ’conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ motives. Throughout the chapter 
these distinctions are used to analyze the various causes of war and to discriminate 
between them. 
Since there is little scholarly agreement on what causes war attention is directed 
more towards explaining the debate than to answering the question in a decisive 
way. The arguments are more than academic because, if the cure for war is related 
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to its causes, then different causes will lead to different policy recommendations. If, 
for example, wars are caused by arms races then policies of disarmament and arms 
control will be judged appropriate solutions to the problem of war. On the other 
hand, if it is believed that wars are caused by despotic or authoritarian states then 
the way to peace lies in the spread of democracy. If the basic cause of war is deemed 
to be the 'international anarchy' which characterizes the current system of states then 
attempts to rid the world of war will be geared towards promoting 'system change' - 
perhaps in the direction of strengthened international law or a system of collective 
security or world government. 
Clearly, some explanations for war offer less hope for solutions than others. For 
example, those that locate war in a fundamentally flawed human nature suggest a 
more bleak future for the human race than those that locate the causes of war in 
'learned ' behaviour. If war is learned rather than instinctive then there is a 
possibility that it can be eliminated through social engineering. Three conclusions 
emerge from this analysis. First, that the search for a single cause appropriate to all 
wars is futile, and second, that since war comes in a variety of forms and has a 
multiplicity of causes, its elimination will almost certainly require simultaneous 
political action on a variety of levels, both domestic and international. Third, that a 
world-wide 'just' peace is unattainable. 
The Study of War 
In the field of International Relations no question has attracted more attention than 
‘Why war?’ The reason for this interest is that war is almost universally regarded/as 
a human disaster, a source of misery on a catastrophic scale, and, in the nuclear age, 
a threat to the entire human race. But it is worth noting that war has not always 
been viewed so negatively. In the 19C, for example, numerous writers identified 
virtues in war. Hegel believed that war preserved the ethical health of nations, and 
in a similar vein H. von Treitschke regarded war as ”the only remedy for ailing 
nations”. (Gowans 1914: 23). For him, war was one of the conditions for progress, 
the cut of the whip which prevents a country from going to sleep, forcing satisfied 
mediocrity to leave its apathy. This kind of thinking alerts us to the idea that war 
can be thought of as a purposive, functional thing. E.H. Carr regarded it as ’the 
midwife of change’ (1942: 3) ”Wars . . .. Break up and sweep away the half-rotted 
structures of an old social and political order”. They herald rapid technological 
progress, territorial change, strengthened group consciousness and economic 
development. However, the idea of war as a purposive, functional thing sits 
uneasily in an age which typically interprets war as an abnormal, pathological 
condition which threatens us all. 
Most investigators into the causes of war have not been motivated by idle curiosity 
or an aimless spirit of enquiry. They have studied war in order to abolish it. They 
have believed that the first step towards eliminating war is to identify its causes 
because, in much the same way that the cures for disease are related to the causes of 
disease, so the cures for war are to be found in its causes. So long as students of war 
do not allow their enthusiasm for prescription to affect their diagnostic skills no 
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harm is done, but there is a danger that researchers may be tempted to gloss over the 
more intractable causes of war in favour of those which suggest the possibility of 
solutions. 
Many social scientists recoil from the idea that though particular wars may be 
avoided, war is endemic in the human condition. The idea that war is inevitable is 
pretty difficult to swallow, psychologically speaking, and that may explain why 
pessimistic interpretations of the causes of war meet with resistance. Take, for 
example, the view that the root cause of war is to be found in human nature, that 
aggression and violence are genetically built into all human beings, that we do what 
we do because of what we are. Despite some scientific evidence in support of this 
idea, there is enormous resistance to it. Why? Because since human nature is fixed 
there is not much we can do about it. That is, for many, an intolerable counsel of 
despair even though it is a useful reminder that just because the elimination of war is 
desirable does not mean that it is therefore possible. 
Actually, even a gloomy interpretation of human nature and an admission of its 
intractability does not automatically lead to despair of ever being able to rid the 
world of war. Some would argue that wars are not caused by human nature; they 
are caused by human behaviour. 
And while it may not be possible to change human nature, it is certainly possible to 
modify human behaviour -by offering rewards, by making threats, by education 
programmes, by propaganda, etc. Richard Dawkins has pointed out that 'our genes 
may instruct us to be selfish but we are not necessarily compelled to obey them all 
our lives' "It may --be more difficult to learn altruism than it would be if we were 
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genetically programmed to be altruistic”, but we should try ”to teach generosity and 
altruism, because we are born selfish” (1976: 3). Civilized societies spend a great deal 
of energy on making people behave themselves despite their natures. The law, the 
police, schools and churches all play a part in modifying human behaviour in the 
domestic environment. At the international level the possibility of modifying state 
behaviour is also widely recognized. Diplomacy, force, trade, aid and propaganda 
are all instruments used by statesmen to affect the behaviour of the states they are 
dealing with. Deterrent strategists, for example, argue that even if human nature is 
fatally flawed ( and most of them think it is), states can still be deterred from 
aggression by the threat of unacceptable punishment in much the same way that 
many potential criminals can be deterred from robbing banks by the threat of 
imprisonment. 
What is interesting is that unlike those who believe that peace can best be promoted 
by removing the causes of war, nuclear deterrent strategists hardly care at all about 
why wars occur. Their policy is simply to make the conseauences of war so bad that 
nobody will dare fight even if they want to. In other words, the strategy of nuclear- 
deterrence is unique in that its effectiveness does not depend either on particular 
interpretations of why wars occur or on any virtuous conceptions of human nature. 
The only assumption that deterrent theorists make about human beings is the fairly 
uncontroversial one that on the whole people prefer to be alive than dead and hence 
are likely to be deterred from aggression by the threat of annihilation. 
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Difficulties in Studving; War 
Despite the enormous attention devoted to the question ‘Why war?’, no clear 
authoritative answer has emerged, and perhaps one never will. One of the reasons 
for this is that the term ’war’ is a blanket term which is used to describe very diverse 
activities. There are total wars and limited wars, regional wars and world wars, 
conventional wars and nuclear wars, high technology wars and low technology 
wars, inter-state wars and civil wars, insurgency wars and ethnic wars, and in recent 
years we have had wars fought by coalitions on behalf of the international 
community. It would be very surprising if these widely different activities - linked 
only by the fact of organized military violence - could be explained in the same way. 
Another reason for the absence of an authoritive answer is that the question ’ what 
are the causes of war?’ is a complicated, ’cluster’ question. Under its umbrella, as 
Suganami has pointed out, we may be asking a number of different questions. We 
may, for example, be asking ’What are the conditions which must be present for 
wars to occur?’, or we may be asking ‘under what circumstances have wars occurred 
most frequently?’, or we may be asking about how a particular war came 
about(1996: 4). Lumping these questions together inevitably leads to complicated 
and diverse answers. 
A third reason for complex answers to the question of war causation is that the 
concept of ’causation’ itself is fraught with philosophical difficulties. One may note 
that X is often a prelude to Y, but that i s  not at all the same as proving that X caused 
Y. Various writers, for example, noting that wars are often preceded by arms races 
between the belligerents, have claimed that arms races cause wars. They may do 
sometimes, but an automatic connection is less than proved. Arguably, human 
beings do not fight because they have weapons; they acquire weapons because they 
already wish to fight. And it is worth pointing out that not all arms races have led to 
war. Anglo French naval competition in the 19C led to the Entente Cordiale, and the 
Cold War arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union led to a 
deterrent stalemate and one of the most prolonged periods of peace in European 
history. 
Given the difficulties inherent in the problem of causation, some writers (particularly 
historians) have preferred to talk about the ’origins’ of wars rather than ’causes’. 
Their argument is that the best way of explaining why wars occur is to describe how 
they come about in terms of the background and events from which they spring. 
Thus, if we are investigating the causes of the Second World War, we need to look at 
the Treaty of Versailles, the world depression, the rise of Hitler, German 
rearmament, the foreign policies of Britain and France, etc. When we have done this 
we are well on the way to understanding why the Second World War occurred. 
Those who emphasize the ’origins’ of war hold the view that telling the story of how 
they are come about is as close as we can get to understanding why they come about. 
Historians who favour this very specific, ‘case-study’ approach to the identification 
of the causes of war tend to believe that since every war is a unique event with 
unique causes the causes of war are as numerous as the number of wars. Hence, 
providing an authoritative answer to the question ’ what are the causes of war?’ 
would involve a detailed examination of every war that has ever occurred. The 
uniqueness of every war means that there is nothing in general to be said about 
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them. For investigations concerned with the causes of individual wars this a fair 
point. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the uniqueness of individual wars, most 
political scientists see merit in shifting the level of analysis from the particular to the 
general so that we can see patterns and similarities between the causes of one war 
and another. At this more general level of analysis we may identify some causes 
which are common to many, if not all, wars. 
’Immediate‘ and ’Underlving’ Causes 
One of the most useful distinctions to be drawn between the various causes of war is 
that between ‘immediate’, proximate causes and ’underlying’, more fundamental 
causes. Immediate causes, the events which trigger wars, may be trivial, even 
accidental. For example, the spark which ignited the First World War was the 
assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand who was visiting Sarajevo 
and being driven in an open car. The death of the Archduke was a tragedy, but is 
was essentially a trivial event, and no one seriously believes that its occurrence 
provides an adequate explanation for the momentous events which followed. What 
is more, it was an ‘accident’ which might easily not have happened. If the duke’s 
chauffeur had not deviated from the planned route and then stopped the car in order 
to rectify his error, the assassin would not have had an opportunity to shoot the 
Archduke and his wife. The assassination was undoubtedly the immediate cause of 
the First World War, and it is true to say that if it had not happened thewar which 
broke out in 1914 would not have happened. But there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that a war would have occurred sooner or later. In 1914 war was in the air; 
Europe was divided by hostile alliance systems; tensions were rising; mobilization 
timetables were pressuring decision makers; an arms race was underway. In short, 
r 
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the background circumstances were highly inflammable and if the assassination of 
Franz Ferdinand had not set the powder keg alight, sooner or later something else 
would surely have provided the spark. Most commentators believe that a proper 
examination of the causes of the First World War should pay more attention to those 
underlying causes than to the immediate triggering events. 
Emphasis on underlying causes is a structural interpretation in the sense that it 
emphasizes that importance of international circumstances rather than deliberate 
policies in causing wars. It suggests that statesmen are not always in control of 
events; they sometimes find themselves caught up in a process which , despite their 
best intentions, pushes them to war. Suganami has pointed out that there are 
occasions when "the background conditions appear already so war prone that the 
particular path through which the actual war broke out seem only to have been one 
of a number of alternative routes through which a war like that could have been 
brought about". (1996: 195) 
Of course, this is not always the case. In some situations the setting seem relatively 
benign and responsibility for war is more easily allocated to the particular policies 
followed by the governments involved. Wars often come about as a result of 
aggressive, reckless, thoughtless and deliberate acts by statesmen. It would be 
impossible to discuss the causes of the Second World War without drawing attention 
to the persistently aggressive behaviour of Hitler and the weak, appeasing policies of 
Chamberlain. Similarly, the actions of Nasser in seizing the Suez Canal and Eden in 
responding to it with military action were critically important causes of the Suez 
war. The same point can be made about both the Falklands war and the Gulf war. 
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In the case of the Falklands, the Argentinian decision to invade South Georgia and 
Margaret Thatcher’s decision to resist seem at least as important as any ’structural’ 
causes which might be identified. In the case of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s 
decision to seize territory in Kuwait and the decision of Western governments not to 
allow him to get away with it were more obvious causes of the Gulf War than any 
background circumstances. 
’Efficient’ and ’Permissive’ Causes 
Another useful distinction, not too different from that between ’underlying’ and 
’immediate’ causes of war, is that which distinguishes between ‘efficient’ and 
’permissive’ causes. ’Efficient’ causes are connected to the particular circumstances 
surrounding individual wars. War may result because state A has something state B 
wants. In this situation the ’efficient’ 
cause of the war is the desire of state B. Historical examples abound. The efficient 
cause of the Gulf war between Iraq and Iran was the desire of Saddam Hussein to 
regain from Iran the Shatt-al-Arab waterway; the efficient case of the 1990 war 
between Iraq and the Western Coalition was Saddam’s desire to acquire Kuwaitan 
territory and resources which, rightly or wrongly, be believed should have belonged 
to Iraq. 
’Permissive’ causes of war are those features of the international system which, 
while not actively promoting war, nevertheless allow it to hamen. In this context, 
the fact that we live in a world of independent sovereign states with no authority 
above them and no institutions sufficiently powerful to regulate the relations 
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Kenneth Waltz is renowned for the emphasis which he puts on ‘permissive’ rather 
than ’efficient’ causes of war.(1959) Basically his argument is that though the causes 
of war are bewildering in their variety, the most persuasive explanation for it is to be 
found in international anarchy - the fact that in an ungovemed international system 
there is nothing to prevent it. And because there is nothing to prevent war there is, 
in international relations, a permanent expectation of violence and a permanent 
sense of insecurity which pushes states to behave aggressively despite whatever 
peaceful intentions they may have. Waltz uses Rousseau’s famous ‘stag hunt’ 
analogy (See Box 2) to show that warlike behaviour arises not primarily from any 
defect in human nature or states but from the predicament in which statesmen find 
themselves.(l959: 167-68). 
cannot be avoided for ever and is always just around the comer. 
In the face of systemic or structural inadequacy, war 
Kenneth Thompson has made the same point in a slightly different way. (1960: 261- 
276). He imagines a situation where, during the rush hour, someone waiting for a 
train on the platform of a metro-station finds himself being pushed by a surging 
crowd of fellow travelers towards the electrified line. Our passenger is a good man 
who means no harm. What should he do? The Christian ethic tells him to turn the 
other cheek, but if he does he will end up dead on the rail tracks. And so our good 
man kicks and struggles and fights to stay alive. He behaves in this aggressive way 
not because he is wicked or violent, but because he finds himself in an environment 
where he cannot afford to be good. The Sermon the Mount is not much use if you 
live in the jungle. And so it is with states; it is because they exist in a system where 
others behave badly that doing likewise is the only way to survive. 
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If the main cause of war is to be found in the anarchic international system in which 
sovereign states pursue their interests without the constraint of world government, 
then an essential condition of peace is the transformation of that system from one of 
competing states to a unified world ruled by a single authority sufficiently powerful 
to compel peaceful behaviour. The trouble with this recommendation is twofold. 
First, there is no practical way of implementing it. We did not choose to live in the 
world of independent states which emerged from the Peace of Westphilia in 1648 
and we cannot now choose not to live in it. Though the international system is 
constantly changing, for all practical purposes it is a given, something we have to 
accept as a fact of life. We are where we are, and whatever conditions of peace we 
may recommend must take that into account. The second reason for skepticism 
about the ’world government’ solution to the problem of war is that even if we 
achieved it we might not like it. World government might turn out to be world 
dictatorship and inter-state wars might simply become civil wars. 
Those who regard the ungoverned international system as the root cause of war 
often compare it with Hobbesian anarchy; but in reality the society of states bears 
little resemblance to Hobbes’ ’state of nature’. Although it is not an integrated 
society comparable to domestic society, it is neither chaotic, disorderly, nor wholly 
unpredictable, and states do not live in conditions of permanent terror. International 
society is a regulated, rule governed environment in which states can build upon 
their co rnon  interests, and in which international organizations, customs, habits, 
mores and laws built up over hundreds of years moderate and order their 
behaviour. Of course, no one would claim that the world of sovereign states is the 
best of all worlds; it may not even be the best of all possible worlds; but it is better 
r 
Though they are disposed to minimize its significance, even committed liberals 
admit that there is a genetic, instinctive element in human behaviour. We do not 
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than some imaginable alternatives - even better, perhaps, then world government - 
and we ought not to try to jettison it without being very sure that what succeeds it 
will be an improvement. 
Human Nature Explanations of War 
There is widespread agreement that one of the tlungs that distinguishes human 
beings from animals if that most of their behaviour is learned rather than instinctive. 
No one knows what the relative percentages are and there is an ongoing vigorous 
debate about the relative importance of ’nature’ versus ’nurture’ or ’heredity versus 
environment’ as determinants of human behaviour. Inevitably this debate has 
prompted the central question of whether war is an example of ‘innate’ or ’learned’ 
behaviour. If it is innate then we must accept it since in any reasonable timescale 
biological evolution is too slow to modify it. However, if it is learned then it can be 
unlearned and there is hope for us all. Liberal thinkers prefer to emphasize the 
importance of ’nurture’ and are naturally attracted to the idea that aggression and 
war can be tamed. Conservative thinkers tend to throw their weight behind ‘nature’ 
and are therefore skeptical about the possibilities of ridding the world of war. 
start with clean slates on which life’s experiences are written to make us what we 
are. We come with genetic baggage, biologically programmed, with built in drives 
and instincts, one of which, it is argued, is a predilection for aggression and violence. 
In a celebrated exchange of letters in 1932 both Einstein and Freud agreed that the 
roots of war were to be found in an elemental instinct for aggression and 
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destruction. Einstein thought that ‘man has in him an active instinct for hatred and 
destruction’, and Freud believed he had identified a ’death instinct’ which 
manifested itself in homicide and suicide.(Freud: 1932) In the 1960s ethological and 
socio-biological research brought new life to ’instinct’ theories of aggression. 
Konrad Lorenz argued, largely on the basis of his observations of the behaviour of 
birds and fish, that an aggressive instinct is embedded in the genetic makeup of all 
animals (including man), and that historically this instinct has been a prerequisite for 
survival.( 1976) Robert Ardrey, in ’The Territorial Imperative’ reached a similar 
conclusion and suggested a ’territorial’ instinct to run alongside Loren’s four 
instincts -hunger, fear, sex and aggression.(l966) Edward Wilson in ’On Human 
Nature’ noted that human beings are disposed to react with unreasoning hatred to 
perceived threats to their safety and possessions, and he argued that “we tend to fear 
deeply the actions of strangers and to solve conflict by aggression”.(l978: 119) 
Although Richard Dawkins in his book ’The Selfish Gene’ has shifted the level of 
analysis from the individual to the genes which help make him what he is, he too is 
under no illusions about human nature. His argument is that ”a predominant 
quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene 
selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour” .(1976: 2) 
“Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love and welfare of the 
species as a whole are concepts which simply do not make evolutionary 
sense”.(1976: 2-3) This analysis leads Dawkins to the bleak conclusion that ” if you 
wish.. .to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly 
towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature”.(1976: 3) 
The ’human nature’ explanation of war is a persuasive one, but at least two points 
need to be make about it. First, we need to ask whether the evidence produced by 
the study of animals is really relevant to the behaviour or human beings. The animal 
behaviourists say it is because man is simply a higher animal, connected to the rest 
of the animal kingdom by evolution. To deny that human beings have instincts in 
the same way that animals do is to deny the almost universally accepted principle of 
evolution which links all life on the planet. Even so, we cannot help wondering 
whether the kind of ’cross species’ generalization engaged in by biologists is valid. 
After all, human beings are very different from animals. They are more intelligent; 
they have a moral sense; they reflect about what they do; they plan ahead. Some 
would claim that these differences are so important that to all intents and purposes 
they lift man out of the animal world and reduce his instincts to no more than 
vestigial significance. A second point worth making about ’instinct’ and ’human 
nature’ explanations of war is one which Kenneth Waltz makes in his very 
influential book ’Man, The State and War’. Waltz admits that arguing that human 
nature causes war is not very helpful since if human nature causes war then, by the 
same token, it also causes everything else that human beings do. In his words, 
’human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the 
same token it was the cause of peace in 1910’.(1959: 28) In other words, human 
nature provides no more of an explanation for war than it does of any other kind of 
human activity. 
’Frustration’ Explanations of War 
Naturally, given their interests, biologists have concentrated their attention on 
‘instinctive’ rather than ‘learned’ behaviour, but social psychologists, while still 
17 
locating war in ‘man’, have offered explanations for its occurrence which rely less on 
instinct and more on socially programmed human behaviour. Typically, they argue 
that aggression is a result of frustration. When individuals find themselves thwarted 
in the achievement of their desires, goals and objectives, they experience frustration 
which causes pent-up resentment which has to find an outlet - and this frequently 
takes the form of aggressive behaviour which, in turn, has a cathartic effect of 
releasing tension and making those who engage in it feel better. Usually aggression 
is leveled at those who cause the frustration, but sometimes it is vented against 
innocents who become scapegoats. This psychological process of transferring 
aggression to a secondary group is called ’displacement’. Sometimes individuals 
project their frustrated desires and ambitions on to the group or collective, be it tribe 
or state, to which they belong. In the words of R. Niebuhr, ”the man in the street, 
with his lust for power and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and the 
necessities of social life, projects his 
lusts vicariously”. (1932: 93) 
upon his nation and indulges his anarchic 
There is a sense in which the ’Frustration-Aggression’ hypothesis, which emphasizes 
the connection between violence and the failure of human beings to achieve their 
objectives, is somewhat more optimistic than ’instinct’ theories of aggression 
because, though some degree of frustration in life is unavoidable, it may be possible 
either to channel aggression into harmless activities like sport (psychologists call this 
sublimation), or it may be possible to organize society in ways which minimize 
frustrations (sociologists call this social engineering). 
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’Misuerceution’ Explanations of War 
Accepting that wars cannot occur unless statesmen decide to wage them, there are 
many who believe that those decisions are often the result of misperception, 
misunderstanding, miscalculation and errors of judgment. Essentially, those who 
think this way regard wars as ‘mistakes’, the tragic consequences of failing to 
appreciate things as they are. This being the case, they are caused more by human 
frailty or fallibility rather than malice. Robert Jervis, building on the ideas of 
Kenneth Bodding,( 1956) has contributed enormously to our understanding of these 
psychological causes of war. He makes the point that in order to make sense of the 
world around us, all of us develop distorted or biased images of reality through 
which we filter the welter of information which bombards our senses. These 
‘images’, of reality are more important than reality itself when it comes to 
determining our behaviour; they act as a distorting lens which inhibits our ability to 
see reality as it is and predispose us to misjudgments and misunderstandings.(1976) 
Critically important misperceptions likely to lead to war include mistaken estimates 
of both enemy intentions and capabilities, inaccurate assessments of the military 
balance between adversaries, and failures to judge the risks and consequences of war 
properly. Quite frequently these kinds of misperceptions are made by both sides 
involved in a conflict. For example, Greg Cashman has argues that in the Gulf War 
”Saddam Hussein may have perceived a threat from Kuwait’s reluctance to allow 
Iraq to cancel its debts and its unwillingness to pump less oil. He may even have 
perceived a joint American-Israeli-British conspiracy to deny Iraq sophisticated 
weaponry.. . . On the other hand, leaders in virtually all of the Middle East capitals 
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Kuwait was invaded. Thus, while Iraqi leaders overestimated the degree of threat to 
their interests, their opponents underestimated the hostility of Iraq”.(1993: 63) But 
perhaps the most critical misperception of all was Saddam Hussein’s failure to 
anticipate Western resolve and the creation of a powerful military coalition against 
him. 
In the run-up to the Second World War Hitler mistakenly believed that Britain 
would not fight and Chamberlain mistakenly believed that Germany could be 
appeased by concessions. Other delusions and misconceptions which contributed to 
the outbreak of war in 1939 have been identified by AJP Taylor. Mussolini was 
“deluded” about the strength of Italy; the French believed that France herself was 
impregnable. Churchill believed that Britain could remain a great power despite the 
war, and Hitler ”supposed that Germany would contend with Soviet Russia and the 
United States for mastery of the world”.(Nelson and Olin 1979: 153-4) In Britain 
hardly anyone expected that German blitzkrieg tactics would bring France down in a 
matter of weeks, and throughout Europe people grossly overestimated the power of 
strategic bombing. Given this plethora of misunderstandings, misjudgments and 
misperceptions, it is easy to argue that statesman stumbled into the Second World 
War because they were out of touch with reality. 
Much the same point can be made about the Falklands war. Misperceptions 
abounded. Britain seriously misinterpreted Argentinian intentions in respect of 
invasion, and Argentina badly misjudged Britain’s determination to resist. For years 
the two government had been involved in intermittent negotiations about a possible 
transfer of sovereignty, and, though little progress had been made, the Conservative 
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government could not believe that the Argentine Junta would seize South Georgia 
before the possibilities of negotiation had been exhausted. What the British 
government failed to appreciate was the significance of the Malvinas in the 
Argentinian psyche and the domestic pressures to act which this put on 
President Galtieri and Dr. Costa Mendez. 
Argentina could not believe that at the end of the 20C a Euro-centric, post-colonial 
Britain was prepared to spill blood for the sake of a barren relic of empire 10,000 
miles away. 
For its part, the government of 
What is interesting about the misconceptions prevalent both in Germany before the 
Second World War and in Argentina before the Falklands War is that there is a sense 
in which both sets of misperceptions were understandable. The signals transmitted 
by the policy of appeasement may have suggested to Hitler that since he had got 
away with swallowing the Rhineland in 1936, and Austria and the Sudetanland in 
1938, he could probably get away with an aggression against Poland in 1939. In the 
case of the Falklands the casual pace of British diplomacy and the absence of any 
serious military capability in the area may have suggested to the Argentinians that 
Britain was not much interested in the fate of the Falkland Islands and was unlikely 
to defend them. Perhaps, in both of these cases, it was not so much that signals were 
misread but that the wrong simals were sent. Either way Britain’s enemies made 
serious miscalculations of her intentions and war resulted. 
If wars are caused by misperceptions, misunderstandings and muddled thinking, 
then conditions of peace include more clear thinking, better communications 
between countries, and education. This thought lies behind the UNESCO motto 
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‘Peace Through Understanding’, various ’education for peace’ proposals and the 
attempts which are frequently made to get potential adversaries round the 
conference table so that they can better understand each other. The basic idea is that 
if enemies can be brought to appreciate each other’s perspectives the disputes which 
divide them will dissolve because they will be seen to be either illusory or not 
sufficiently serious to justify war. Perhaps we can detect in this approach relics of 
the idea of a natural ’harmony of interests’ which would prevail if only 





Before we are persuaded by this idea that wars can be eliminated by removing 
misperceptions and misunderstandings, a word of warning is appropriate. First, it 
may not be possible to eradicate misperception from human affairs given the 
inherent cognitive weaknesses of the human mind. The need to simplify, the 
inability to empathize, the tendency to ethnocentrism, the reluctance to relinquish or 
recognize prejudices - all these familiar human weaknesses may make some degree 
of misperception inevitable. Herbert Butterfield recognized this point when he 
identified an ‘irreducible dilemma’ which lies in the very geometry of human 
conflict. Butterfield imagined a situation in which two potential enemies, both 
armed, face each other. Neither harbours any hostile intent but neither can be sure 
of the intentions of the other. ”You cannot enter into the other man’s counter fear” 
and ”it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot 
see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions 
that you have”.(1952: 21) Butterfield makes the point that the greatest war in 
history could be caused by statesmen who desperately want peace but whose 
cognitive limitations lead them to misinterpret each others intentions.(l952: 19). 
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(Discerning students will realize that Butterfield’s ’ultimate predicament’ has, in 
recent years, surfaced in the literature of Strategic Studies as ‘The Security 
Dilemma’). 
A second word of warning is appropriate because it has to be recognized that not all 
wars are caused by misperceptions and misunderstandings even though they may 
be surrounded by them. Some wars - perhaps most - are rooted in genuine 
disagreement and conflicting interests, and in these cases discussions between 
enemies simply promote a better understanding of the disputes which divide them. 
Indeed, in some situations improved understanding may actually exacerbate the 
divisions between adversaries. When it was suggested to him that international 
hatred and suspicion could be reduced by getting nations to understand one another 
better, Sir Evelyn Baring, British governer in Egypt between 1883 
and 1907 replied that ”the more they understand one another the more they will hate 
one another”.(Waltz 1959: 50) Perhaps it can be argued that for most of the 1930s 
Britain was at peace with Germany precisely because we did understand fitler. 
When, in September 1939, the penny finally dropped the first thing Britain did was 
to declare war on Germany. 
. . .-.. 
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Conscious and Unconscious Motives for War 
The trouble with all these explanations which locate the causes of war within ‘man’ 
is that those leaders and statesmen who actually declare wars would almost 
certainly offer quite different explanations for their decisions. Hitler, if he had been 
asked why he attacked Poland on September 1st 1939, is unlikely to have replied that 
he was acting instinctively, or that he was frustrated or a victim of rnisperception. 
He would almost certainly have offered rational, practical reasons to do with the 
plight of Germans in Danzig and the Polish corridor and the iniquitous way in 
which the politicians at Versailles had re-drawn the map of Europe to Germany’s 
disadvantage. This discrepancy between the explanations of war offered by 
practitioners and those suggested by philosophers and scientists suggests that it may 
be useful to distinguish between conscious and unconscious motives for war. 
. Statesmen have a Clausewitzian, ‘instrumental’, view of war. They regard it as a 
rational tool for the implementation of policy, a technique which is available for 
practitioners to use in appropriate circumstance for the pursuit of national interests. 
In other words, for a statesman war results from a calculated, purposive, conscious 
decision; but for the philosophers and scientists, trying to look behind the 
statesman’s goal orientated acts, war results from unconscious drives and 
weaknesses in the human psyche of which practitioners may be unaware but which 
nevertheless push them towards war. 
Those who regard war simply as an instrument of policy, a consequence of rational 
decisions taken in the national interest, underestimate the pressures and constraints 
- from public opinion, nationalist sentiment, alliance commitments, the momentum 
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of events, etc - which may push politicians towards war despite their reservations. 
They may also make the mistake of thinking that once the costs and consequences of 
war have been made clear to politicians they will refrain from it. Norman Angel1 
spent much of his life pointing out, quite rightly, that ‘wars do not pay’, that they are 
not in the national interest and that even the victors are usually losers.(l914) He 
thought that once this basic fact had been grasped wars would cease. Sir Norman 
failed to appreciate two things. First, that wars are not always a matter of rational 
calculation or ’cost-gain’ analysis. Sometimes wars are a kind of madness, 
explosions of violence far removed from rational policy. Herman Rauschning, for 
example, argued that the National Socialist Movement in Germany during the 1930s 
was impelled towards a war of destruction by its own inherent madness.(l939) The 
second weakness of Angell’s analysis is that although he was right to point out the 
disastrous economic consequences of war, he was probably wrong to conclude that 
waging war was therefore irrational and not in the national interest. Victors may be 
losers as a result of the wars which they fight, but refusing to fight may make them 
even bigger losers in the long run. Britain, a victor in the Second World War, 
emerged from it permanently weakened, but if Hitler had not been stopped Britain 
would probably have ended up in an even worse position. Waging war against 
Germany certainly ‘did not pay’, but it was still the rational choice of the least 
disastrous of two disastrous outcomes. 
’Grow’ Explanations of War 
Though embarked upon by individual human beings, war, by definition, is a group 
activity. It is waged by human collectives - factions, tribes, nations, states, even 
perhaps ‘civilizations‘. This has led some to shift the responsibility for war from 
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human beings to the groupings within which they live and to which they owe 
varyrng degrees of allegience. Those who argue in this way believe that there is 
nothing much wrong with human beings per se, but they are corrupted by the social 
structures in which they live. In the words of Nietzsche ‘Madness is the exception in 
individuals but the rule in groups’. Essentially the argument is that there is 
something about human collectives which encourages violence. 
Perhaps the trouble starts with the sense of difference which we all feel between ’us’ 
and ’them’, between those who belong to our collective grouping - be it tribe, state 
or nation -with whom we empathize and share a ’we’ feeling, and other groups 
with which we cannot identify easily. It is all too easy for a group to slide from 
recognizing that it is different from other groups to believing that it is superior to 
them. Hence, this sense of differentiation - what Suganami calls ’discriminatory 
sociability’ (1996: 55) - easily leads to group selfishness, inter-group conflict and 
ultimately war. As R. Neibuhr once observed “altruistic passion is sluiced into the 
reservoirs of nationalism with great ease, and made to flow beyond them with great 
diffidty”.(l932: 91) 
G. Le Bon was one of the earliest social psychologists to notice that the behaviour of 
social groups is different - and usually worse - than the behaviour of the individuals 
comprising them. He developed the idea of ‘crowd psychology’, that in a ’crowd’ a 
new entity or collective mind comes into being. He believed that in groups 
individuals lose their normal restraints, become more suggestible, more emotional 
and less rational. What is more, groups have reduced feelings of responsibility 
because the more responsibility is diffused in ‘crowds’ the less heavily it weighs on 
each individual. Since responsibility is everywhere (and therefore nowhere) blame 
cannot be allocated specifically and this frees human collectives from normal moral 
restraints.(l897: 41). This thought was neatly captured in the title of R. Neibuhr’s 
classic ‘Moral Man and Immoral Societv’, and Eric Hoffer, in discussing the appeal 
of mass movements makes the same point very graphically. ”When we lose our 
individual independence in the corporateness of a mass movement, we find a new 
freedom - freedom to hate, bully, lie, torture, murder and betray without shame or 
remorse”.( 1952: 118) 
Human beings have always lived in differentiated groups and it is unlikely that this 
will change in the foreseeable future. The interesting question is whether some 
groups are more war prone than others. In the context of inter-state wars, for 
example, can it be argued that capitalist states are more warlike than socialist states 
or vice versa? There is no clear answer to that question. Can we argue that 
democratic states are more peace-loving than authoritarian states? Again there is no 
clear answer. The historical evidence suggests that ”democracies fight as often as do 
other types of states”,(Kegley and Wittkopf 1997: 358) and, in recent years, as wars in 
the Gulf and the Former Yugoslavia have shown, democratic states have 
demonstrated some enthusiasm for wars of intervention in support of human rights. 
This current fashion for waging wars in support of liberal values does not augur 
well for a peaceful world. 
However, various observes have noted that democracies seldom, if ever, ficht each 
other. Michael Doyle, for example, has argued that liberal states are more peacefully 
in,lined towards each other because their governments are more constrained by 
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democratic institutions, because they share the same democratic values and because 
commercial interdependence between liberal states gives them a vested interest in 
peace. (1983 and 1986) If Doyle and those who share his views are right, one of 
the conditions of peace is the spread of democracy - a trend which has gathered pace 
particularly since the end of the Cold War. For the first time ever, almost half of the 
world’s governments are now democratic. However, the thesis that the spread of 
democracy will promote peace is plausible but no more than that, and it would be 
unwise to accept it uncritically. 
Wars ’within’ and bevond’ States 
Whether its decline is connected to the spread of democracy or not, inter-state 
violence now seems less of a problem that it used to. But intra-state war, particularly 
ethnic war - has become much more of a problem, and S.P. Huntington has alerted 
us to the prospect of war between ’civilizations’. Ethnic groups and tribes, once 
contained, even suppressed, within states have suddenly erupted on to the political 
scene, reviving ancient racial hatreds and creating mayhem in countries as diverse as 
Yugoslavia, Somalia and Indonesia. What is particularly horrifymg about ethnic 
wars is that people are brutalized and killed not because of anything they have done, 
not even because of their politics, but simply because of who thev are. That is what 
is so terrible about the persecution of the Tutsis in Rwanda, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, 
the Kurds in Iraq, the Muslims in Bosnia, and the Albanians in Kosovo. 
Ethnic wars are quite different from Clausewitzian politically motivated conflicts 
where the belligerents disagree about something and seek to resolve their 
disagreement by inter-state war - an activity conducted according to rules, both 
moral and legal. It may be going to far to describe such wars as rational and 
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civilized but there is a grain of sense in the thought. Ethnic wars are quite different. 
They are not about the pursuit of interests as normally understood. They are about 
malevolence and they are unrestrained by rules either legal or moral. 'Ethnic 
cleansing', like 'the final solution', is surely one of the most sinister phrases to enter 
the political vocabulary of the ILO'Century.'') 
One of the reasons for the recent upsurge of ethnic violence is surely to be found in 
the failure of modern states to hold the ring between warring factions. It is ironic 
that authoritarian governments, so frequently blamed for inter-state wars, were 
instrumental in preventing wars in countries like Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union. Hobbes' Leviathian may have its attractions if the alternative is genocidal 
violence. If the thousands of ethnic groups which exist in the world can no longer be 
contained within nation states then we face the break-up of international society into 
a myriad of micro groups. It has to be said that the consequence of 'Balkanization' 
on this scale are incalculable and unlikely to lead to a more peaceful world. 
Wars between states and wars between nations and tribes within states are 
depressingly familiar, but the idea that future conflicts of global politics will occur 
between civilizations is a new one. In a provocative and influential article in Foreign 
Affairs S.P. Huntington has predicted that the fundamental source of conflict in the 
years ahead will be cultural. "The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle 
lines of the future" (1993a: 22). In Europe, for example, as the ideological divisions 
of the Cold War disappeared, the age old cultural divisions between Western 
Christendom on the one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other 
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reappeared . As W. Wallace has suggested, “the most significant dividing line in 
Europe may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 
1500”(2). This cultural fault weaves its way from the Balkans to the Mediterranean 
and conflict along it is to be expected. 
Huntington argues that a civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of people and 
the broadest level of cultural identity people have”(1993a: 24) He has identified 
eight civilizations -Western, Japanese, African, Latin American, Confucian, Hindu, 
Islamic and Slavic Orthodox - all of which differ from each other in terms of their 
respective attitudes to democracy, free markets, liberalism, church-state relations 
and international intervention. The differences between civilizations on these issues 
is deeper than those between states and ideologies and in consequence consensus 
and agreement is difficult to achieve. Among the reasons for thinking inter- 
civilizational conflict is likely is that in many parts of the world ’Western’ values are 
being challenged, there is a resurgence of religion and fundamentalism which has 
widened the gulf between peoples, and the ’communications revolution’ has made 
people more aware of the differences which divide them. 
’Necessarv‘ and ’Sufficient’ Causes of War 
Various writers have found it useful to distinguish between ’necessary’ and 
‘sufficient’ causes of war.(3) A ’necessary’ condition of war is one which must be 
present if war is to occur. If war cannot break out without that condition existing 
then it is necessary condition. The existence of armaments is a necessary condition 
of war because without them no war could be fought. For wars to occur it is also 
necessary for human beings to be organized in discrete collectives - states, tribes, 
There is an element of tautology in the above analysis in the sense that if we define 
war as organized violence between groups then it is obvious that wars cannot occur 
if human beings are not organized in groups which have the capacity for organized 
violence, and it is equally obvious that wars cannot occur if there is a mechanism 
which prevents them. More controversially, as we have been (pp ), it has been 
suggested that one of the necessary conditions of war is that at least one of the 
parties to it must have a non-democratic government. 
A ’sufficient’ cause of war is one that, if present, guarantees the occurrence of war. 
A is a sufficient cause of B if B always occurs whenever A exists. If two states hate 
each other so much that neither can tolerate the independent existence of the other 
then that is a sufficient cause of war which makes was between them inevitable. But 
it is not a necessarv condition of war since many wars occw between states which do 
not share that degree of hatred and are perfectly content with each others’ continued 
existence as a independent states in international society. Clearly, a cause of war can 
be sufficient without being necessary, and the converse of this is also true - a cause 
can be necessary without being sufficient. For example, the existence of weapons is 
a necessary condition of war, but as we saw on p.. . .. it is not a sufficient cause of 
war since even the existence of high levels of armament does not always lead to war. 
ethnic groups, nations, factions etc. Equally, it is a necessary condition of war that 
there be no effective mechanism for preventing it. An effective world government 
for example, would make it impossible for inter-state wars to occur, and an all 
powerful state government would make it impossible for civil wars to occur. Thus, 
the absence of these mechanisms is a necessary condition of war. 
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The categories ’ necessary’ and ’ sufficient’ do not cover all the possible causes of 
war. We must not fall into the trap of thinking that the causes of war must be either 
necessary 
- nor sufficient. For example, the desire of statesmen to annex territory belonging to 
neighbouring states is a common cause of war but it is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient cause. It is not a necessary cause because many wars are fought for 
reasons which have nothing to do with territory, and it not a sufficient cause because 
the desire to annex territory may not be acted upon - perhaps because of deterrence. 
sufficient because there are many causes which are neither necessary 
Conclusion 
There is no shortage of ‘cures’ for the ‘disease’ of war. Some are bizarre - like, for 
example, Linus Pauling’s suggestion that since wars are caused by a vitamin 
deficiency we can eat our way out of aggression by swallowing the appropriate 
tablets. Others- like calls to change human nature, to reconstruct the state system, to 
equitably redistribute the world’s wealth, to abolish armaments, to ’re-educate’ 
mankind, etc, - follow with faultless logic from the various causes of war which 
scholars have identified; but since there is no prospect of implementing them in the 
foreseeable future there is sense in which they are not solutions at all. Henry Iv’s 
reputed comment on an equally impractical proposal for peace is still appropriate, ‘It 
is perfect’, the king said, ‘Perfect. I see no single flaw in it save one, namely, that no 
earthly prince would ever agree to it’,. Hedley Bull has rightly condemned such 
solutions as “a corruption of thinking about international relations and a distraction 
from its proper concerns”(l961: 26-27) 
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We have to begin by recognizing the limits of what is possible. Hopefully, we can 
then edge our way forward by improving our techniques of diplomacy, 
communication, crisis avoidance and crisis managements; by developing a conc: ~p t 
of enlizhtened self interest which is sensitive to the interests of others; by extending 
the scope of international law and building on existing moral constraints; by 
learning how to manage military power through responsible civil-military relations 
and sophisticated measures of arms control; by strengthening cooperation through 
international organizations and world trade. These are not spectacular, radical, or 
foolproof solutions to the problem of war, but they are practical steps which offer the 
possibility if not of abolishing war, at least of reducing its frequency, and perhaps 
also of limiting its destructiveness. 
Even if war could be abolished we need to remember that peace is not a panacea in 
which all human antagonisms are resolved. Peace is simply the absence of war, not 
the absence of conflict, and, as the Cold War demonstrated, it is just as possible to 
wage peace as it is to wage war. Though 'peace' and 'war' are usually regarded as 
opposites there is a sense in which both are aspects of the same thing - the conflict 
which is endemic in all social life. War is simply a special kind of conflict which 
differs from peace only by its violence nature. 
The fact that peace is not a panacea explains why, when confronted with the stark 
choice of peace or war, leaders sometimes choose war. Some kinds of peace - under 
dictatorships for example - may be worse than some kinds of war. In other words, 
although almost every one wants peace, almost no one (apart from strict pacifists) 
wants only peace or peace at any price. If it were otherwise the problem of war 
would disappear since as a last resort states can always avoid war by surrendering. 
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Capitulation might bring peace but it would almost certainly entail the loss of some 
of those other things that states want - like independence, justice, prosperity and 
freedom, and when it comes to the crunch states may think that these are worth 
fighting for. 
Ideally, of course, what people want is a worldwide a t  peace. Unfortunately, this 
is an unattainable dream. It would require agreement on whose justice is to prevail; 
it would require a fundamental redistribution of the worlds’ wealth from the Haves 
to the Have-nots; it would require religious and political movements - Muslins, 
Christians, Jews, Hindus, Communists, Capitalists - to tolerate each other; it would 
require an end to cultural imperialism and an agreement that differing cultural 
values are equally valid. It would probably require the disappearance of borders 
and differentiated societies with their ’them’ and ’us’ mentalities. In short, it would 
require human beings to behave in ways in which they have never behaved. It 
would, to quote one scholar,(4) “require an animal that is not what human beings 
are”. 
Since ‘Justice’ and ’peace’ do not go together statesmen will have to continue 
choosing between them. The pursuit of justice may require them to wage war, and 
the pursuit of peace may require them to put up with injustice. Arguably, during 
the Cold War years, Western politicians, by abandoning Eastern Europe to its fate 
under Communism, thought probably rightly that peace was more important than 
justice. Since the end of the Cold War they have tended to put justice before peace - 
witness the upsurge of violence caused by wars of intervention in support of human 
rights and democratic values. The critical question facing us now is whether, in 
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juggling the priorities of peace and justice, we have got the balance right, or whether 
our current enthusiasm for Western values and human rights implies an ever so 
slightly casual attitude to the problem of war. Perhaps, in the interests of peace, 











For a comprehensive and brilliant account of ethnic conflict up to 1985 see I 
Horowitz, D.L. (1985) Ethnic Groups in ConflictJBerkeley, Los Angles, 
London: University of California Press. 
Quoted by Huntington, S.P. (1993a), The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign 
Afairs, 73 (3) p.30 
See, for example, G. Quester, ‘War and Peace: Necessary and Sufficient 
Conditions’ in Matthews, R.O., Rubinoff, A.G., Stein, J.G. (1984) International 
Conflict and Conjict Management (Scarborough Ontario: Prentice-Hall) pp44- 
54. 
This comment by Professor Claude Phillips is quoted by Shaw, R.P.and 
Wong, Y. (1989) Genetic Seeds ofWdrfare : EvoIution, Nationalism and Patriotism 
(London: Unwin Hyman) p.207 
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Discussion Ouestions 
1. Which of the distinctions in Box I do you think is most useful for analyzing 
the causes of war? 
2. Do you think the spread of democracy will solve the problem of war? 
3. To which would you allocate priority, the pursuit of peace or the pursuit of 
justice? 





How convincing is the argument that wars are a result of misjudgment and 
mispercep tions? 
Is war inevitable? 
Do arms races cause wars? 
Is war an instrument of policy or an outburst of irrationality? 
BOX I 
Five distinctions which may help claify our thoughts about the causes of war. 
1. Between 'instinctive' and 'learned' behaviour 
2. Between 'immediate' and underlying' causes. 
3. Between 'efficient' and 'permissive' causes. 
4. Between 'conscious' and 'unconscious motives for ear. 
5. Between 'necessary' and 'sufficient' causes. 
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BOX 11 
Rousseau’s ’stag: hunt’ analom 
Rousseau imagines a situation in which several solitary and hungry 
hunters existing in ’a state of nature’ where there is neither law, 
morality nor government, happen to come together. Each of them 
recognizes that his hunger could be satisfied by a share of a stag, and so 
they ’agree’ to cooperate to catch one. In Rousseads words “If a deer 
was to be taken, everyone saw that in order to succeed, he must abide 
faithfully by his post; but if a hare happened to come within reach of 
any of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple, 
and, having seized his prey, cared very little if by so doing he caused 
his companions to miss theirs’’ 
J.J. Rousseau, ‘A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, in Cole 
G.D.H. 
Dent) p.87 
1993 edition, The Social Contract and Discourses (London: J.M. 
The point of the story is that in conditions of anarchy the hunter who 
grabbed the hare could not feel confident that one of his fellow hunters 
would not do likewise if  presented with the same opportunity, in which 
case he would go hungry. Given this predicament the sensible thing to 
do is to behave selfishly and seize the hare. 
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BOX I11 
Some statistics about war. 
Strategy in the Contemporary World 
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20fh and early 21St century “major” continental warfare, e.g.: 
World Wars I and I1 
Korea 
Mideast wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 (Bekaa Valley) 
India-Pakistan wars of 1965, 1971 
Iran-Iraq War 
Gulf War of 1991 
Ethiopian-Eritrean War of 2000 
Focus on operational and tactical levels of war; 
Some attention to theater strategy 
Little explicit discussion of grand strategy 
Emphasis on effects of technological change; interaction between technology, 
tactics, and doctrine 
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Outline 
I. The Problem: Coping with the Storm of Steel 
11. A Solution: Evolution of Modern Operations and Tactics 
111. Results: Increasing Variance in Combat Outcomes 
IV. The Future: Continued Divergence Between Skilled and 
Unskilled Performance 
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I. The Problem: Coping with the Storm of Steel 
Industrialization brings many important changes, e.g.: 
Increased size of armies 
Increased strategic mobility (railroads) 
Improved long-range communications (telegraph) 
Eventually, increased tacticaVoperationa1 mobility (internal combustion engine) 
Perhaps most important is radical increase in firepower 
Breachloading magazine rifle 
Machinegun 
Breachloading, recoil-absorbing, steel artillery 
Industrial-scale production of ammunition and weapons 
Though discussions of effects often focus on pre-World War I era, firepower’s range and net 
lethality have continued a pattern of progressive, rapid growth ever since 
Artillery range increased by factor of 10 from 1WO-2000 
Ground-attack aircraft range, payload increased by more than factor of 10 from 1900-2000 
Target acquisition for deep fires improved from primitive soundflash ranging, early aerial recce of 1915- 
18 to radio DF, accurate real-time aerial spotting by mid-1940s to SLARs, FLIRs, ELINT (etc) by 1990s 
Gun-armor race increasingly favors gun: penetration range for primary U.S. tank vs primary opponent, 
e.g., increased from <500m in 1945 to 1000m by 1970 to >3000m by 1990 
0 PGMs radically increased hit probabilities for exposed targets after ca. 1970 




111. Results: Increasing Variance in Combat Outcomes 
“Modern system” operations and tactics are effective, but highly complex, very difficult 
to implement 
Individual, custom decision making by each of thousands of jr. leaders 
Tight coordination between widely separated, moving units and multiple commanders 
Weapon types with widely varying mobility, vulnerability must be kept together over 
changing terrain, varying opposition 
Weapon types with widely varying maintenance, support, employment demands must be 
commanded by individual, jr., leaders 
Delicate balancing acts at operational level 
Unpopular political, organizational side effects: 
(I) Requires high military proficiency - difficult to square with short-service conscription 
systems, can heighten civil-military conflict 
(I) Requires autonomy for jr. and sr. leaders - difficult for repressive regimes to tolerate 
Elastic defenses yield territory early - problematic where border territory is 
economically or politically important 
Elastic defense demands disproportionate sacrifices from forward zone garrisons 
Consequence: some states can, but many cannot, implement properly 
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111. Results: Increasing Variance in Combat Outcomes (cont’d) 
As weapons become more lethal, consequences of failure to implement “modern system” 
become more severe: 
Lethality grows over time vs. targets in all postures, but lethality growth rate much slower 
0 Faster, longer range weapons make deep exploitation increasingly decisive when possible, 
vs. covered, concealed, dispersed targets than vs. massed, exposed ones 
but very difficult to achieve vs. deep, elastic defenses 
Result is growing gap between armies that can, and those that cannot, implement 
“modern system” methods 
0 Armies that can: largely shielded from worst effects of increasing lethality, range, speed, of 
hostile weapons 
Armies that cannot: fully exposed to increasing lethality, range, speed, of hostile weapons 
Where both sides implement “modern system” methods, tendency is toward extended war 
of material production - neither side able to force quick, decisive outcomes 
Where one side does, other does not, result is increasingly one-sided as century unfolds: 
Technology as a wedge, driving apart the real military capability of skilled and unskilled 
armies, but with much lesser effects against equally skilled opponents 
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IV. The Future: 
Cmtinued Divergence Between Skilled and Unskilled Performance 
Will an “RMA” change the pattern of 20th century land warfare? 
No: ongoing technological change will continue, even accellerate, longstanding trend toward 
divergence between skilled and unskilled performance 
New recce, surveillance, target acquisition, weapon guidance technologies remain far more effective vs. 
massed, exposed targets than vs. dispersed, concealed, intermingled ones 
Unlikely to change soon: increase in weapon lethality vs. dispersed, concealed, intermingled targets 
likely to remain slow for near-to-mid term 
Lethality gap thus likely to continue to grow; gap between real capability of armies that can and those 
that cannot implement modern-system methods for exploiting cover, concealment, and dispersion likely 
to increase 
0 Adequate exposure reduction becomes harder, more complex as weapon range increases and as 
multispectral sensing becomes more sophisticated and more widespread 
Thus adequate force employment becomes at once more important and harder - but still achievable for 
skilled militaries 
Technology’s effects are important, but have varied dramatically with targets’ tactics, doctrine, and 
skills throughout 20th century - and will continue to do so in early 2 1 st 
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BEYOND THE SEA: 
NAVAL, STRATEGY FOR A WORLD WITHOUT NAVIES 
by Sam J. Tangredim 
In the contemporary world, there are no navies. 
On the surface, that might seem an over-dramatic statement; one must concede 
that there indeed is a navy. The United States Navy is now the only, and possibly the last 
global navy. In effect, it has become the world’s navy. 
This situation is both a reflection of resource capabilities and the result of victory. 
The specifics of both will be discussed later, but certain implications need to be identified 
up front-implications that can be expressed in the form of questions. If, in fact, there is 
but one navy, does naval warfare-traditionally defined-still exist? Have maritime 
operations become but a spoke in the purple umbrella of joint military operations, without 
its own logic and grammar? And what has become of sea power, the near legendary 
capacity for transoceanic power for which all the great nations of the world once thirsted? 
If decisive war at sea between opposing fleets is a near impossibility, of what actual use 
is a navy? In the contemporary world of globalization, post-industrialization, instant 
communications, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, is there any 
point of discussing naval strategy at all? 
To answer these questions requires a blend of theory, historical observations, and 
assessment of defense decision-making--all tinged with what could be facetiously 
For the purpose of ‘value explicitness,’ it should be acknowledged that the author is an active duty officer 
with a natural bias towards things naval. However, the views expressed are solely those of the author and 
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referred to as a ‘deconstructionist’ approach.’ The first step in this chapter is to examine 
exactly what is a navy. This is followed by an evaluation of the phenomenon that some 
are calling a “revolution in naval affairs.” The evaluation, in tum, requires a look at the 
relationship of sea power to land power (and other forms of military power) in the 21’‘ 
century. Such a 2 1 St century intellectual voyage also requires some discussion of the 
impact of globalization, the topic du jour. Finally, the chapter identifies some of the 
emerging concepts of naval operations that are on the cutting-edge of the U.S. Navy’s 
continuing force structure debates. The c o m o n  theme is that the role of the 21” century 
navy is no longer tied to the physical ocean, but now lies ‘beyond the sea.y2 
What is a Navy? 
The answer to the above question is dependent on the difference between a navy 
as an officially defined organization and naval operations as a military function. From 
the narrow perspective of organization, the obvious, but only partially correct answer is 
that a navy is a military force that operates primarily at sea. 
From this point of view, it easy to categorize naval warfare as but one comer of 
overall joint military operations: ‘the army fights on land, the air force fights in the air, 
and the navy fights at sea.’ Of course, even this simplistic formula is made more 
complex by the fact that naval forces of the United States also consist of the United States 
Marine Corps, as well as sea-based strike aviation and a host of other land-oriented 
do not represent the official views of the United States Navy or any other agency of the United States 
government. ’ This is not meant to be actual deconstructionism, which has been transformed from a method of literary 
criticism to a philosophy that rejects absolute truth. Rather, it is in keeping with the fuzzier definition of ‘a 
challenge to the established meaning of a term.’ 
* The phrase ‘beyond the sea’ was used as the title of a proposed strategic vision, developed by members of 
the Strategy and Concepts Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that was never actually 
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functions. Yet, it is still somehow comforting for a ‘purple-suited’ joint planner to be 
able to divide up the battlefield into such equal pieces of the ‘jointness’ pie. It is an 
image in sync with the reigning ideology of the Department of Defense: jointness defined 
as the relative equivalence of all missions and services. 
In this image, aircraft carriers are simply alternative air fields; naval aviation 
consists ofjust more sorties in the Air Tasking Order (ATO); surface combatants are 
floating armored vehicles with missile batteries; submarines are stealthy intelligence 
platforms that can get closer to the target than satellites; and amphibious ships are-well- 
-something the Army doesn’t want to buy. Conceptually, naval warfare and land 
operations are the same, only wetter. Naval combat ends at the water’s edge (or a little 
bit beyond); land combat starts there. 
But there is a significant difference between the functioning of navies and land- 
based military forces. Unlike other forms of military power, naval forces are primarily 
and uniquely designed to control the flow of contact through the dominant mediums of 
human interaction and exchange, rather than directly control territory or areas of human 
habitation. 
In short, armies are designed to control territory; navies are designed to control 
access. 
Fighting in a multiplicity of mediums--the undersea depths, the surface of the sea, 
the air, littoral regions, space, and the infosphere-navies contest for the control of 
interactions, rather than populations. The classical naval struggle for ‘sea control’ is for 
dominance of oceans--which are, in fact, mediums that humans use, but can not 
adopted. Credit for the phrase and many of the ideas behind it belong to CDR Randall G. Bowdish, USN 
and CDR Craig Faller, USN. 
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permanently inhabit. Once dominated, these oceans can provide the access to the areas 
where humans live as well as control links between these areas and the rest of the globe. 
The difference between this concept and the organizational view is more than 
semantics. To occupy territory requires one to close with the enemy, defeat them, and 
garrison their state (to a lessor or greater extent). This, of course, is only a partial victory 
and results in temporary peace. Complete victory (and a longer peace) involves getting 
the enemy to adopt your own political values, thereby making politically-motivated 
conflict unlikely. 
Controlling access, however, involves the cutting off of the enemy state from the 
world. The fruits of being a nation-state-formalized trade relationships, interactions 
with other ideas and cultures, even the underlying motivation for nationalism itself+an 
not exist without interaction with the rest of the international system. These interactions 
require access to the fluid mediums of communications and exchange. Such access can 
be checked by physical blockades, interdiction, actual combat or ‘cybemar,’ or 
intimidated by nearby military presence. 
Due to the earth’s geography, the physical properties of gravity, and the less- 
physical restraints of common international law, all of these things are most easily be 
done by military forces (actually naval forces) located within the fluid mediums of 
exchange. To cut off access does not necessarily require closing with enemy or the 
occupying their territory- at least not for a sea power nation. The 17*-century political 
philosopher Sir Francis Bacon got it right when he said that a sea power could “take as 
much or as little of war as it desires.” 
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Of course, readers with a critical eye could point out that an ‘state of access- 
denial’ in which the machinations of an aggressor are merely blocked does not appear to 
lead to long-term peace any more than occupation? A timely illustration is the brooding 
presence of Saddam Hussein, apparently unconverted by sanctions or periodic air strikes 
on his military. However, this can be countered by the one huge example of an ‘access 
denial’ strategy that really worked: the containment of the Soviet Union. 
As stated, armies are designed to control territory; navies are designed to control 
access. A navy is that portion of military forces that operates in the mediums which 
humans use for communications, transportation and exchange but cannot normally 
inhabit. Its prime purpose is to ensure or deny access. Its effect on territories and 
population is generally indirect, however, the freedom of operation that the law of the sea 
permits in the international commons of the ocean provides for independent and direct 
effects in the littoral regions to the ever-increasing range that technology allows naval 
weapons (which includes sea-based aviation) to reach. 
Under this ‘deconstructionist’ definition, organizations wearing other uniforms, 
but operating within the mediums of communications and exchange, can be seen as naval 
in function or tone. This obvious contradicts the organizational definition and 
~~ 
The term ‘access denial’ has come to be used by some as synonymous with ‘anti-access’ strategies, 
methods which regional powers might use to prevent U.S. power projection forces from entering their 
region. The meaning of ‘area denial’ in this chapter reverses the emphasis and refers to the U.S. Navy’s 
ability to cut off the access of a potential opponent to the rest of the world. Discussions of anti-access 
strategies can be found in Thomas G. Mahnken, “America’s Next War,” The Washineton Ouarterly 16:3 
(Summer 1993), pp. 171-184; Mahnken, “Deny U.S. Access?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedines 124:9 
(September 1998), pp. 36-39; CAPT Sam J. Tangredi, USN, “The Fall & Rise ofNaval Forward Presence,” 
United States Naval Institute Proceedines 1266 (May 2000), pp. 29-32; and Tangredi, All Possible Wars?: 
Towards a Consensus View of the Future Securitv Environment, McNair Paper 63 (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, forthcoming), pp. (to be provided). 
For the purposes of this argument, the US. Air Force is considered a navy that wants to act as an army. 
The air is a fluid medium of exchange. However, air power theory is primarily focussed on strategic 
bombing to destroy the enemy’s will to fight, or (in the more recent world of smaller-scale contingencies) 




challenges some of the current jointness dogma. If, in fact, armies and navies perform 
completely different functions-territory control and access control--that overlap only on 
the margins, can there really be a ‘joint concept of operations’ that equally integrates 
both? Or is the search for ‘absolute’ jointness a Congressionally-driven fantasy that 
simply obscures the dynamically changing balance between territory and access control 
that the U.S. military had mastered during the Cold War? Others in the past have pointed 
to cultural differences between soldiers and sailors (and Marines and airmen), as a 
potential inhibitor of an increasing spirit of joint ~ervice .~ But perhaps jointness properly 
has a different form than simply organizational interoperability or unification of 
command. Under the functional definition-and a broad interpretation of what constitutes 
naval forces--the traditional delineation between land power and sea power begins to 
blur. 
Why No Other Navies? 
Let’s go back to our opening statement that there are no navies, and ask why. 
Of course we are defining navies as ocean going fleets capable of sustained out- 
of-area power projection operations. Most nations have given up maintaining fleets 
capable of sustained out-of-area operations in distant regions. As of the year 2000, all 
other ‘navies’ are essentially regional or coastal-the equivalent of the U.S. Coast Guard- 
and theory is why strategic bombing fails to achieve successful results, except in certain cases. Of course, 
it is true that strategic bombing could ultimately achieve its objectives; after everything is bombed to debris 
and most of the population killed, offending actions generally stop. This could be said to be the theory of 
nuclear war once embraced with vigor by air power proponents. 
Of note is R4DM J.C. Wylie, USN, “Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor,” United States Naval Institute 
Proceediny 83:s (August 1957), pp. 81 1-817, and Carl Builder, -(Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989). 
This broad definition includes military operations in space and cyberspace, both of which are mediums of 
communications, transformation and exchange similar to the oceans. Admittedly, the current division of 
roles and missions of the U.S. Department of Division assigns significant or primary responsibility to joint 
commands or Services other than the United States Navy. However, that in no way lessens the fact that 
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-with the exception of the fleets of the United Kingdom and France, both long-term U.S. 
allies? And even these two ocean-going navies are shadows of their former selves, 
capable of extended deployments in relatively small numbers. Several other NATO 
nations, notably Italy and Spain possess at-sea aviation capabilities. The former Soviet 
fleet, once sole challenger to American sea power, is a defeated and ruined hulk. Its 
successor, the Russian Navy, is left with but a handful of seaworthy vessels. Other 
countries, notably China and India, are building up their naval capabilities, but sustained 
out-of-area operations are far beyond their reach. 
An obvious reason for the demise of navies is economics. Navies require 
tremendous resources. The main economic inhibitors are the cost of maintaining the 
logistic capabilities required by an ocean-going fleet, and the cost of the modern naval 
technology to make such a fleet combat credible in the modem world. Most nations 
simply cannot or do not want to afford it. But perhaps even more important is the general 
lack of a naval threat to the security of most nations, and hence the motivation to afford 
an ocean-going navy. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the global naval 
competition that pitted the United States and other NATO navies, along with other allies, 
against the expanding Soviet Navy. With this Western victory and the fact that the U.S. 
intended to keep a superpower-sized navy, there seemed little reason for most nations to 
maintain an ocean-going navy at all. 
The result is that the U.S. Navy can be considered a ‘globalized’ as well as global 
navy. In essence, it is no longer solely the United States’ navy; it has become the world’s 
operations in those mediums are essentially naval in nature. See discussion in CDR Sam J. Tangredi, USN, 
“Space is an Ocean,” United States Naval Institute Proceedinw 125:l (January 1999), pp. 52-53. 
‘With 93 cutters (warship equivalents) and 209 aircraft, the United States Coast Guard is itself larger than 
the naval forces of most nations. 
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navy-delivering the security of access function across the entire world system. When 
Kuwaiti oil tankers required escort to transit the Arabian Gulf in the midst of the Iran- 
Iraq war, the U.S. Navy was the force of choice. When Asian tiger economies-such as 
that of Taiwan-are shaken by the bellicose posturing of a neighbor, it is the movement 
of U.S. naval forces into the region of potential crisis-such as the Taiwan Straits-that 
provides the prime means of psychological re-stabilization. Recent studies have 
attempted to quantify this stabilization effect on markets.’ 
Moreover, with the exception of the ‘states formerly known as rog~es , ’~  and the 
Chinese Communist Party, no one expects much harm from the United States Navy. 
Japan, which is potentially America’s number one economic rival, even allows the U.S. 
to homeport both a carrier battle group (CVBG) and amphibious ready group (ARG) in 
its own port cities-and pays for the infrastructure to do so. When building its own 
ships, Japan routinely licenses technology used by the U.S. Navy. Russia, with a military 
still vaguely suspicious of the West, has conducted post-Cold War exercises with NATO 
(and U.S.) naval forces. It would probably conduct more except for the disastrous state 
of its navy and the desire to hide the real low state of its readiness (made evident in the 
Kursk rescue attempt). The U.S. Navy is welcomed to ports around the globe, and the 
forward naval presence of U.S. warships is readily accepted-if not advocated-by most 
’ See Ron Brown et al., Forward Engagement Reauirements for U.S. Naval Forces: New Aaalvtical 
ADDroaches, Report NPS-OR-97-011PR (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 23 July 1997), and 
the summary of efforts in Sally Newman, “Political and Economic Implications of Global Naval Presence,” 
in Naval Forward Presence: Present Status. Future ProsDects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, November 1997), pp. 47-59. 
that the Clinton Administration would no longer use the term ‘rogue states,’ but that “henceforth nasty, 
untrustworthy, missile-equipped countries would be known as ‘states of concern.”’ This would appear to 
be a reaction to a recent meeting of the South and North Korean heads of state. See Steven Mufson, 
“What’s In A Name? U.S. Drops Term ‘Rogue State,’ WashinHon Post, June 20,2000, p. 16. However, 
the term ‘rogue state’ is ubiquitous within the analytical literature. 
The Washington Post reported that on June 19,2000, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright announced 
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nations as a sound policy for maintaining regional security. This, again, dissuades most 
states from making considerable investment in navies.” 
Of course, this gives the United States certain advantages in the same way that the 
internationalization of the dollar or the U.S.-led computer industry does in other 
‘markets.’ It allows the United States to set the rules and protocols of yet another slice of 
the many processes involved in “the expansion of cross-border networks and fl OWS” that 
is currently being defined a globalization.” But this is not an unprecedented state of 
affairs. The Royal Navy gave the British Empire a similar advantage during long periods 
of the 18* and 1 gth centuries. What is different is an evolution in naval technology that 
now allows naval forces to apply power directly to land. Whereas directly influencing 
events on land formerly required occupation by armies, technology now allows navies to 
expand the regions to which they control access. 
Extending the Effects of Access Control 
Earlier it was argued that navies and armies overlap on the margins. For the U.S. 
Navy, this ‘margin’ is growing ever wider as the reach of American naval forces keep 
extending over land. Moving from the theoretical to the operational, it is apparent that 
U.S. naval forces are now capable of achieving objectives that previously required the 
independent introduction of land forces and land-based air forces into theaters of 
operation. And these naval capabilities are continuing to grow. Sea-based forces, when 
combined with space-based reconnaissance and information network assets, hold an ever- 
’’ Curent Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig discusses this concept of ‘dissuasion’ in Danzig, The Bic 
- Three: Our Greatest Securitv Risks and How to Address Them (New York, Center for International 
Political Economy, February 1999). pp. 22-24. 
9 
10 
increasing potentiaI to-in the words of former Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Jay 
Johnston-“influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea-anytime, 
anywhere.”12 
The most recent evidence of this growing potential is the use of sea-based cruise 
missiles to attack and neutralize sites connected with terrorism and with the development 
of weapons or mass destruction (WMD). The 1998 Tomahawk attack against Bin 
Laden’s terrorist network headquarters in Afghanistan appears the first use of naval 
power as the sole means of striking targets in a land-locked country. Metaphorically, this 
represents the projection of power from the margins of the maritime world-described as 
“rimlands” in earlier geopolitical theory-into the very ‘heartland’ of global terrorism. 
‘Heartlands’ were previously the exclusive province of armies. 
At the same time, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has acknowledged the 
common-sense approach of focusing the joint quest for theater-wide ballistic missile 
defenses on upgrades to the already existent AEGIS system. Utilizing the inherent 
mobility of ships at sea would allow for rapid positioning of robust air and missile 
defenses within littoral regions under potential threat from “heartland’’ adversaries. 
Over the past years, both experimentation and actual intervention-such as 
Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti-have demonstrated the advantages of 
commanding Joint Task Force operations from command-configured ships at sea. As 
information, communications technologies and space systems simultaneously advance, 
I *  Definition from Ellen L. Frost, “Globalization and Security: An Overview,” in Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, The Global Centurv: Globalization. World Politics and U.S. National Securitv 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, forthcoming), p. 2. 
Proceedings 123:ll (November 1997), pp. 48-50. 
Admiral Jay Johnson, USN, “Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21” Century,” U. S. Naval Institute 12 
I0 
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the reach of such command platforms-particular under a network centric 
approach-appears virtually unlimited. 
But all these developments represent merely the tip of the iceberg of the ever- 
increasing capacity of forces “from the sea” to direct their effect-producing efforts and 
energies onto land. They do not yet represent a replacement of an army’s capability to 
occupy territory. However, this extension of access control and denial is made possible 
by the intertwining of two threads that allow for a landward tilt to naval strategy: an 
evolution in naval technology that extends the reach of naval forces, and a ‘revolution in 
naval affairs’ in which the U.S. Navy become the world’s navy. 
Evolution and Revolution in Naval Affairs 
Unlike much of the “hype” surrounding the highly touted cyber-based revolution 
in military affairs (RMA)-a revolution that may have altered the nature of weapons 
systems, but not yet altered the nature of war itself-the reality of recent naval 
developments is quietly apparent. They have altered the nature of war on land by 
providing and increasing the asymmetrical means by which forces of the United 
States-using the oceans as its operating base-can remaih actively engaged in deterring 
or defeating potential regional crises. 
These developments are not based primarily on a single unanticipated 
technological change, but on continuing evohtions in technologies that combine with an 
American strategic objective that has remained constant since her founding. This 
objective-to use our natural position as a maritime power to ensure our defense and 
prosperity while encouraging peace and democracy worldwide-has previously been a 
continuing impetus to the development of American sea power. 
1 1  
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Progressive evolutions in naval technologies are increasing the direct effects of 
sea-based weapons into battles on land. There have been steady improvements in both 
the range and precision of ordnance and the range and self- sustainability of platforms. 
Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles can strike targets at ever increasing distances. 
Warships-particularly nuclear-powered aircraft carriers-have increased range and 
weapons payload. Amphibious forces-tied together through the doctrinal framework of 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)--can strike from further distances and 
can sustain a greater variety of operations for a longer period of time. Advances in 
supporting technologies, such as navigation systems, allow for more precise usage of 
both advanced and so-called “legacy” weapons systems. Faster speeds in information 
processing systems provide for multiple sortie rates. 
Over the past three years, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, USN and Art Garska 
have developed the term “network centric warfare” to describe a methodology for 
utilizing these ongoing advances in naval and informational technology. l3 Network- 
centric warfare, a term already being adopted by the other Services-most notably the 
Air Force, is defined as “the strong networking of a well-informed but geographically 
dispersed force.” As the concept of network centric warfare becomes further defined, the 
expected products of this approach are greater precision in effects and faster speed of 
response. Again, this represents a continuing evolution in the use of technologies to 
enable naval forces to achieve direct influence on events on land. 
l3 See Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin 
and Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124:l (January 1998), pp. 28-35, and David S. Alperts, John 
J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information 
Superiority, 2”d. ed. (Washington, DC: DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, August 1999). 
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What makes recent developments truly revolutionary is that the influence of sea 
power on land is no longer indirect, but can now be direct and potentially decisive. The 
technological evolutions plus our continuing objective of maximizing our natural access 
to and from the sea have a synergistic effect. Technology enables the policy objective; 
the policy objective encourages the technological developments. The one additional 
element needed to make sea power sharpen its focus beyond the littoral and into the 
heartland was historical opportunity. And that occurred with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and its Navy in 1991. 
In effect, the Mahanian concept of decisive engagement was obviated. The 
‘prerequisite’ for access control--command of the seas-was now in the hand of the 
world’s remaining navy. There was no need to conduct war at sea in order to later 
conduct an access denial warfiom the sea.14 
From “. . .From the Sea” to Beyond the Sea 
The United States Navy did come to recognize this real American “revolution in 
military affairs” at the end of the Cold War and radically altered its strategic vision In 
1992, The Maritime Strategy, with its emphasis on submarine and anti-submarine combat 
and carrier strikes, was replaced by ... From the Sea, which shifted the naval focus to 
littoral warfare and direct effects on events ashore.15 
l4 Recent criticisms on the writings of Mahan focus on his supposed fixation on decisive fleet-on-fleet 
engagements as the means of establishing sea power and dominating the oceans. It seems more likely that 
his emphasis on decisive engagements was simply a concern as to the prerequisite for domination in an era 
in which there were competing navies of comparable strength. Mahan also discussed other means of 
establishing sea control, but more importantly, he did not foresee the post-Cold War world in which there 
are effectively no global navies other than that of the United States. In effect, the decisive ‘fleet-on-fleet’ 
engagement was the Cold War, which was settled without actual ‘blue water’ combat. 
Is In 1994, ... From the Sea was augmented by Forward ...fL om the sea, which reemphasized the important 
role of naval forward presence to deterrence and crisis response. However, ... From the Sea remains the 
definitive statement of the Navy’s current strategic vision. 
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Analysis of the ... From the Sea vision have appeared elsewhere and will not be 
repeated here.16 But what should be noted is that while the Navy held back from an 
extensive reexamination of the relationship between sea power and land power-for the 
reasons of bureaucratic politics--there is a growing body of literature that suggests that if 
the United States were to seriously implement a joint . . .From the Sea strategy, sea power 
will become the Zandpower of the twenty-first century. This is based on the convergence 
of the ‘revolution in naval affairs’--which allows the U.S. Navy to look ‘beyond the sea’- 
-with three strategic factors unique to the United States: (1) its geographic location and 
extensive international interests, (2) its natural aversion to military casualties in less-than- 
vital conflicts, and (3) the effects of globalization that appear to make access more 
important than territorial control. 
For purpose of identification, this growing body of literature could be referred to 
as the ‘Monterey school’ since many of the proponents have current or former links with 
the Naval Postgraduate School. Jan Breemer has identified the revolutionary supplanting 
of land power by sea power as “the end of naval strategy,” implying that maritime 
operations have become the underlying basis for all joint ~trategy.’~ James J. Wirtz has 
alternatively described this as a “golden age for American naval strategy.’71g Threads of 
this logic can be traced back to such late-Cold War studies as James J. Tritten’s 
l6 See Edward A. Smith, Jr., “What ‘...From the Sea’ Didn’t Say,” Naval War College Review 48:l (Winter 
1995), pp. 9-33; Smith, “...From the Sea: The Process of Defining a New Role for Naval Forces in the 
Post-Cold War World,” in Peter Trubowitz, Emily 0. Goldman, and Edward Rhoda, ed., The Politics of 
Strategic Adiustment: Ideas, Institutions. and Interests (New York Columbia University Press, 1998), and 
“...From the Sea and Back Again: Naval Power in the Second American Century,” Naval War ColleFe 
Review 52:2 (Spring 1999), pp. 13-54. 
Power,” Strateeic Review 22:2 (Spring 1994), pp. 40-53. 
Studies Ouarterlv 5:4 (Autumn 1999), pp.43-60. 
Jan S .  Breemer, “The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Naval 
James J. Wirtz, “QDR 2001: The Navy and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” National Securitv 
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examination of whether “naval warfare is uniq~e.’’’~ Again, the common theme is of a 
technological/historical change that allows the U.S. Navy to skip the prerequisite of 
establishing sea power, and go directly to the task of directly effecting events ashore. 
Rather than merely replicating their arguments, it is better to enhance their 
premise by pointing to an additional phenomenon of the changed international system: 
globalization. 
The Influence of Sea Power on Globalization 
The process of globalization has a secret that thus far has been unexamined. In 
terms of access control or denial, sea power gives a nation-state a great advantage in 
harnessing the process called globalization. 
If, as previously described, globalization is a “process of expansion of cross- 
border networks and flows,” then naval forces, broadly defined, are both the potential 
protectors and potential inhibitors of such a process of expansion. The traditional 
language of sea power--with its concern for the ‘sea lines of communications’ (SLOCs), 
blockades, fleet-in-being, and naval presence--may seem like a quaint ‘legacy’ dialog to 
those schooled in information technology and e-commerce. But though it may not use 
the same grammar, it uses the same logic. 
The traditional goal of sea power is unfettered access to the world’s common 
transportation route for raw materials and manufactured products, as well as access to the 
actual markets and sources of materials themselves. The emerging concept of the ‘new 
economy’ revolves around access to the world’s common electronic information routes- 




such as the internet-and the sources of information, as well as the potential markets for 
value added to the information. Like every other such shaping process, globalization, at 
its very heart, involves a struggle for economic and political power-a struggle for access 
to the fruits of the process. 
This ‘struggle’ includes access to the infosphere, access to financial markets, 
access to raw materials (of which information is one), access to the means of production, 
and access to the market population. And just as a ‘hacker’ can use ‘information warfare’ 
to delay, disrupt, distort or deny access to the infosphere, more traditional military 
forces-and primarily those forces that operateJi.om with the mediums of interaction-- 
can deny access to the sources of the production of wealth. The maintenance of a force 
that can operate from within the mediums--i.e., a navy--is a form of insurance that such 
physical access could not be cut by other military force-at least not without a war. And 
as previously pointed out, navies are the means of access denial to opponents or rivals. 
While operating with the ‘global commons’ of the sea, their movement is protected and 
sanctioned in peacetime by international law. 
As stated, armies are designed to control territory; navies are designed to control 
uccess. If globalization is really breaking down the territorial barriers of our 
world-which is what most of ‘proponents9 of globalization suggest-then access to 
information, markets or resources is becoming even more important to the world’s 
political economy than control of territory, no matter how fertile or resource-filled, or 
populations, no matter how productive. This would suggest that navies are becoming 
more important as well. But, as we stated in the beginning, there is only one navy. 
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As the sole global navy, the U.S. Navy can-within polite limits in times of 
peace-determine the when, where, and how of the world maritime exchange. This 
represents the direct influence of (United States) sea power on the overall globalization 
process. Because of the United States commitment to global trade and access (at least on 
a theoretically even basis), what is good for the United States is generally good for all 
other trading states, and the day-to-day impact of sea power on the globalization 
phenomenon appears transparent. But, if ‘push came to shove,’ there is no alternative 
maritime security ‘service.’ This ensures that U.S. influence can never be quite 
‘outvoted.’ Like the U.S. dollar in international commerce, and the use of English 
language in the development of information technology, the U.S. Navy provides a 
dominant standard that ensures American predominance. Rome or Britain in former days 
asked for just such an advantage from their navies. 
By protecting the access to this open market to all those who accept international 
law, the U.S. Navy provides a common security function on a global basis. In reality, it 
provides the ‘protocols’ and security structure of the maritime ‘internet;’ which, in terms 
of international trade in goods, remains the ultimate ‘internetted’ exchange. Naval 
strategy in the contemporary world is all about controlling such access. The effects of 
this access goes far beyond the sea. 
Force Structure for the World’s Navy 
For readers who still find the opening sentences of this chapter too dramatic, 
consider the enormous disparity between the sole global navy and the other fleets that 
some might still refer to as navies. 
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The U.S. Navy simultaneously operates major fleets in the Mediterranean, 
Arabian Sea, western Pacific, eastern Pacific and Atlantic, as well as well as individual 
ships and squadrons in almost every other clime or locale. In terms of mission 
capabilities, the U.S. Navy is capable of carrying out the entire spectrum of imaginable 
naval missions, from support to civil authorities-which is the euphemism for counter- 
drug trafficking patrols and domestic disaster relief assistance-to thermonuclear war. In 
its mission of forward presence, the U.S. Navy conducts the routine and near-continuous 
deployment of combat capable naval forces to the crisis regions of the world. 
Organizationally, the Navy possesses an air arm comparable to the entire air forces of 
most nations, as well as surface and undersea vessels and-as part of the overall 
Department of the Navy-its own amphibious-capable land army of almost 200,000 elite 
troops. Its reach extends from the very depths, or at least as deep as its deep 
submergence vehicles can reach, into space with specialized satellites in earth orbit. U.S. 
naval officers have walked on the moon. 
With the exception of Russia, China, and the ‘states formerly referred to as 
rogues,’ almost all national navies utilize concepts and procedures derived from or 
similar to those of the U.S. Navy. This ensures a certain degree of interoperability; even 
those navies that can not establish an electronic link with U.S. tactical information 
networks are generally well versed with Allied Tactical Publication 1, the NATO signal 
book for naval operations. 
The U.S. Navy routinely conducts combined exercises and operations, and policy 
discussions with almost every other fleet. Operations range from NATO’s highly 
integrated Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and Standing Naval 
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Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED); to frequent exercises with Latin American 
and Asian navies, and Australia; to passing exercises with friendly coastal navies, such as 
Oman; to even occasional exercises with Black Sea navies, including Russia. A biannual 
seminar, known as the International Seapower Symposium, brings high level 
representatives from almost every naval staff-including Russia and China-to the Naval 
War College in Newport for discussions of naval policies. The backdrop is familiar to 
them; many of the world’s senior naval officers are graduates of the U.S. Naval War 
College. Bilateral talks between the Chief of Naval Operations’ staff and its foreign 
counterparts occur almost every week. 
Forward presence-the continual deployment of naval forces to potential regions 
of crisis-places the Navy in the forefront of the proverbial ‘global security market.’ 
Like the best of global corporations, the U.S. Navy maintains ‘representatives’ in the 
immediate vicinity of its significant ‘customers.’ Not a day goes by in which U.S. Naval 
forces can not strike in some fashion at the forces of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan 
Milosevic, international terrorists, or maritime drug traffickers, to name but a few 
potential threats to international security. 
But will the U.S. Navy’s force structure ensure such dominance in the future? 
Are the Navy’s future programs designed to deal with future globalization effects? Are 
other platforms, platform mixes, operational concepts needed? It is one thing to talk of 
theories of sea power, but implementing any naval strategy requires forces and resources. 




Well, there are some issues that may cloud this image of a ‘golden age.’ One of 
the public concerns expressed by both Congress and the Navy leadership is the overall 
size of the Navy and the number of ships in the fleet. With the end of the Cold War, the 
Navy, along with her sister Services faced substantial reductions. Overall U.S. defense 
spend was reduced by over one-third. Depending how one calculates fleet size, the U.S. 
Navy was reduced by almost one-half. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration 
pushed towards a 600 ship Navy, although that actual number was programmed, but not 
reached. The latest defense structure review, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 
called for a fleet size of slightly above 300 ships (current size is 316), which was deemed 
sufficient until 20 15. 
However, the significant number of SSCs in which the Clinton administration has 
chosen to become involved has increased the operational tempo of the Services severely 
enough to cause great strains in the force. A fleet of 3 16 ships does not have a large 
enough rotation base to provide a carrier battle group (CVBG) and an amphibious ready 
group (ARG) for all three of the critical theaters of interest (Mediterranean, Arabian Gulf, 
Western Pacific) simultaneously, as requested by the Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) of 
the Unified Commands. While almost one-third of the Navy is forward deployed for a 
period of six months, the rest of the fleet is in overhaul or training for deployment. 
Instead of being able to provide this “3 .O presence,” naval deployment presence (1 
CVBG and 1 ARG per theater), worldwide presence varies between 2.5 to 2.7. To 
maintain 3.0 presence would require a fleet of approximately 360 ships.*’ 
2o Department of Defense, ReDort to Conyess on Naval Vessel Force Structure Requirements, 26 June 
2000, p. 4. 
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The fleet reduction was achieved by decommissioning ships earlier in their life- 
span and reducing the ship construction budget. However, the current ship construction 
level can no longer replace ships that are reaching their normal decommissioning age. If 
ship construction is not increased, the Navy will inevitably fall below 300 ships by 
2010.2l 
This shortage can become particularly acute if globalization trends increase the 
requirements for naval presence, engagement and contingency operations.22 Although it 
may be possible to increase the length of ship deployments and reduce their maintenance 
times, this has a deleterious effect on both equipment readiness levels and personnel 
retention. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has recent endorsed the Navy’s proposal 
for the 360-ship fleet?3 However, currently there is no strong Congressional support for 
the budget increase required and such an increase is doubtful. 
But perhaps fleet size is ultimately less critical than its actual composition. A 
large fleet of smaller, less capable ships is not necessarily as effective as a smaller fleet of 
more powerful ships. Additionally, individual ship characteristics need to include 
increased levels of protection against WMD (primarily chemical and biological weapons) 
as these weapons proliferate. The current configuration of the Navy seeks to balance 
combat firepower With multi-mission capability and the requirements for naval forward 
presence. However, the ‘rightsizing’ (downsizing) of the 1990s has resulted in the 
divestiture of naval capabilities on the ‘low end’ of the balance. The search for a 
capabilities-size balance in a globalized world would require an assessment of desired 
I 
21 Chuck McCutcheon, “The Navy Pushes for More,” Air Force Mayazine 83:7 (July 2000), p. 57. 
22 It should be acknowledged that the total Navy is composed of units other than ships and aircraft 
squadrons, such as Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units, 
Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) commando teams, and others. They will not be addressed in this chapter. 
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ship characteristics, and might indicate the value of new ship concepts. The following 
short survey barely scratches the surface of issues requiring considerable detailed 
analysis. 
Aircraft Carriers. The large through-deck carrier capable of operating 
‘conventional take off and landing’ aircraft is a virtual US. monopoly in capability. No 
other nation operates such ships, although all other potential ‘blue water’ navies formerly 
aspired to do 
operating such floating airfields-question their survivability in an anti-access 
environment. 
However, critics-focussed on the enormous cost of building and 
While the expense of carrier construction is undeniable, their survivability in an 
anti-access environment would seem much greater than overseas land bases (assuming 
prudent employment), and their capability to remain on station is obviously much greater 
than long-range aircraft. If direct engagement and presence is required in a ‘not-yet-hot- 
war’ environment, they are unparalleled assets. The key advantage is great 
flexibility-an airfield that can move at relatively high speeds and defend itself by 
maneuver as well as strike. An aircraft carrier is re-locatable American temtory which is 
readily used in demonstrating American interest and resolve. Its disadvantage is the 
vulnerability to submarines-a problem that has existed under previous conditions and 
can only be mitigated through the combined-arms operations that has been the existing 
“Cohen Admits Navy’s Force Size Is Stressing Sailors and Marines,” Inside the Pentao,on, June 29,2000, ’ k e  Soviet Navy built smaller carriers and eventually constructed several large carrier hulls, but were 
unable to perfect comparable carrier operations. The French Navy has recently constructed a large nuclear- 
powered aircraft carrier, the RFS Charles De Gaulle. However, she has had numerous design and 
construction problems, and sea trials indicate she is not yet operational. 
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fleet concept.25 The type of aircraft that can be operated and the sortie rate are less than 
that of overseas land bases, but a combination of carrier operations and long-range 
aircraft (Air Force bombers) would seem to have the greatest capacity for probing and 
breaking through anti-access defenses. 
The Navy’s recent report to Congress calls for a force of 15 carriers to provide 3.0 
worldwide peacetime presence. Such a force could not be built or maintained without a 
substantial increase in the Navy’s budget. The bottom line appears that evolutionary 
improvements in carrier design make such a platform desirable in a globalized future, but 
cost reduction--for what is in effect a self-sustaining overseas air base--is problematic. 
Perhaps the most substantial increase in efficiency could come about by their use as a 
joint command and control center for overseas land operations. 
Aviation Squadrons. The overall U.S. Navy aviation program has focussed on 
improving relatively short-range strike aircraft, such as the F/A-18. A globalized anti- 
access environment would appear to call for longer range and greater relative stealth in 
such aircraft. Additionally, internetted defenses would seem a prime target for electronic 
warfare aircraft, an expertise that appears primarily resident in the Navy and Marine 
Corps EA-6B Prowler squadrons. 
Recent regional interventions have made the shortage in existing EA-6Bs very 
evident, and it is surprising that the Navy has not pursued an increase/enhancement of 
electronic warfare aviation systems with greater alacrity or apparent interest. To be 
25 Critics maintain that carriers are vulnerable to ballistic and air or ground-launched cruise missiles, but 
these are easier to defend against by combined arms fleet operations than submarines. Largely this is due 
to the physical properties of the operating mediums. Unless ballistic missile warheads were enhanced with 
terminal homing-a major technological advance, or massive saturation attacks were directed against 
individual ships-a costly and inefficient strategy, conventionally-armed ballistic missiles would not be 
serious threats against maneuvering warships. Obviously, nuclear weapons are a greater magnitude of 
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effective in regional conflict in a globalized world, electronic/cyber warfare can not be 
confined only to space or ground assets-at least not without giving up a certain degree 
of precision and local effectiveness. 
Attack Submarines.26 With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear attack 
submarine (SSN) inventory was cut dramatically from a force of about 100 to a planned 
force slightly above 50. This represented the perception that the former-Soviet 
submarine force-much of which is no longer operational-represented a much reduced 
threat. 
Recently, however, the Navy has argued that the planned submarine force will not 
be large enough to cany out all the engagement and intelligence operations required by 
the CINCs, along with providing two submarines as part of every deploying carrier battle 
group. The latter is organizational choice by the U.S. Navy, rather than a joint 
requirement. But, in any event, studies of joint requirements have specified the number 
of 68 SSNs as the desired force 
Due to their stealth and flexibility, submarines would appear to be a priority asset 
for a globalized world, particularly in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) role as well as 'blue water' sea control. 
Surface Combatants. During the Cold War, surface combatants-the generalized 
term for cruisers, destroyers and frigates-were deliberately multi-purpose designs 
optimized for war at sea, as opposed to land attack or strikes against land targets--which 
could be considered warfiorn the sea. But with the absence of a global naval threat, 
threat-as they would be against any target. Cruise missile attacks at sea require real-time targeting data or '' Nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which are national deterrence assets subject to arms 
control limitations are not addressed in this chapter. 
roximity, both of which are difficult to obtain against an alerted fleet. 
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surface combatants are currently prized for their current capability to launch the nearly- 
ubiquitous Tomahawk land attack cruise missile (TLAM), and their developing capability 
of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). 
Both missions would appear to retain their relevance in a highly globalized world. 
In fact, theater ballistic missile defense could be the greatest asset in demand during 
future periods of potential crises. The advantage of naval TBMD is the fact that it is 
rapidly and highly mobile, but with near indefinite on-station time, and that it uses an 
already existing air defense combat system that might be capable of future upgrades for 
cruise missile defense. 
The current Navy program includes the development of DD2 1 , a destroyer-sized 
platform designed specifically for land attack. As conceived, DD21 would require a 
drastically reduced crew size than the current DDG-5 1 class, possess but a modest self- 
defense capability, and take much of its targeting data from off-ship sensors. However, 
with of its relatively large size, it would appear to be giving up survivability without a 
significant improvement in strike capability over existing assets. An alternative in a 
dense anti-access environment might be a significantly smaller vessel with similar 
characteristics, such as the ‘streetfighter’ proposal described below. 
AmDhibious Warships. When the Navy shifted fiom its Cold War “Maritime 
Strategy,” to the littoral focus “From the Sea.. .” strategy, greater emphasis was placed on 
modernization and new concepts of operation for the amphibious fleet. This, in turn, 
seemed to herald an ever-increasing integration between the Navy and Marine Corps. 
But these developments have cooled recently, reflecting a return to the Navy’s traditional 
reluctance to prioritize assets for a ‘Marine’ fleet. Modem assets, such as the LPD-17 
~~ 
27 “Cohen Admits.. .”,” p. 1 
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class are being developed to replace older, more specialized amphibious ships (most of 
which are already decommissioned) and achieve the 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) lift requirement mandated by Congress. However, certain previous-held 
capabilities, such as the ability to pump fuel directly to forces operating ashore, are being 
quietly discarded. If a globalized world require a greater number of interventions in the 
littoral regions-where most of the world’s cities are located-it would seem prudent to 
increase rather than decrease such combat-capable maritime support for land operations. 
Patrol Combatants. Since they are not independent, sea going vessels and possess 
very light armament, it is very difficult to deploy the current small class of patrol 
combatants to theaters of crisis in a timely fashion. Used almost exclusively as Special 
Operations Force (SOF) assets, the Patrol Combatants are not integrated into fleet littoral 
ops. But if a globalized world requires greater near-shore engagement, such vessels 
would seem to have a significant role. Two possible solutions for increasing this 
capability would be: (1) constructing patrol combatants to be able to fit in the well decks 
of the current and future amphibious fleet, or (2) develop a more lethal, more survivable 
combatant with greater sea-keeping capabilities-similar in concept to the ‘streetfighter’ 
described below. 
There are a number of concepts recently proposed that may prove to be useful 
adjustments to fleet structure under the requirements of the future. With the exception of 
network-centric warfare, which has been frequently discussed but is still in the 
conceptual stages, these proposals have not been adopted in future Navy programs. 
Arsenal Ship/Arsenal Sub. An ‘arsenal ship’ consisting primarily of a large 
number of vertical launch tubes and a small crew, requiring targeting data and protection 
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from other naval platforms was a proposal particularly intriguing to the late-Admiral 
Jeremy M. Boorda, formerly Chief of Naval Operations. Although official scrutiny of the 
proposal did not long survive Admiral Boorda’s demise, a variant that has gained 
increasing popularity among defense analysts and Congress is the ‘arsenal sub.’ The 
prototypical variant is a converted Trident SSBN that replaces the ballistic missile tubes 
with multiple cruise missile tubes capable of firing TLAMs. Although arms control 
limits creates some complications, the use of an existing submarine hull could provide 
such an ‘SSGN’ at a much lower cost than new construction. The advantage of an SSGN 
over a surface arsenal ship is its obvious stealth characteristics, which would seem 
particularly valuable in a globalized worldanti-access environment. The Navy’s recent 
Reuort to Congress on Naval Vessel Force Structure Requirements identifies the SSGN 
proposal as being “under consideration.” 
Network Centric Warfare. As previously discussed, the concept of network 
centric warfare (NCW) could be described as a shift in focus away from ‘platforms’ to 
‘network.’ Network-centric operations promises to increase the value of individual units 
by providing a more effective informational linkages and a common operational picture, 
that, in turn, allow for the optimization of weapons and effects. Conceptually developed 
by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, current President of the Naval War College, 
NCW is clearly in sync with globalization trends concerning information. One area of 
concern is the increased vulnerability that a tight tactical internet could have if any of the 
access nodes were penetrated by an enemy. 
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Littoral Supremacy Ship. Suggested in the writings of retired Admiral Bill 
the littoral supremacy ship is a proposed Owens2’ and elaborated upon by 
combination between surface combatant and amphibious warship that is optimized for 
land attack. Vertical launch tubes installed in an amphibious-type hull (with well deck 
and flight deck) could be stocked with TLAM missiles, substantially increasing the 
number of Tomahawk shooters in the fleet. The tubes could also be used for enhanced 
air defense weapons, or shorter-range fire support missiles to provide fires for troops 
engaged in combat ashore.30 The advantage of the proposal is the potential for a 
reduction in different ship types assigned to the fleet, thereby achieving economies of 
scale in construction, maintenance, and training. Although still a vessel of considerable 
size, capable of operating ‘vertical or short take-off and landing’ (VSTOL) aircraft, the 
littoral supremacy ship would sacrifice ‘blue water’ warfighting capability for land attack 
and self-defense weaponry. Ultimately, it is postulated on the belief that the U.S. Navy 
will remain unchallenged in the oceans. The littoral supremacy ship concept has not yet 
been seriously examined by the U.S. Navy. 
Mobile Offshore Base (MOB). First proposed in the late 1960s, the concept of a 
Mobile Offshore Base consisting of a series of connected offshore oil platform-like 
structures has been periodically reexamined. It recently attracted renewed interest 
through Admiral Owens and several studies and proposals developed by potential MOB 
28 VADM William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 166-169. 
29 See discussion in CDR Sam J. Tangredi, USN, “A Ship for All Reasons,” U. S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings 125/9 (September 1999), pp. 92-95. 
tubes. Ostensibly a cost reduction decision, the elimination of vertical launch capabilities in the 
amphibious fleet was probably prompted by potential funding threats to DD-21, the future land attack 
destroyer. But it was a missed opportunity for enhancing fleet striking power at a very modest overall cost. 
The littoral supremacy ship is the potential alternative to a strictly specialized surface fleet. 
The LPD-17 ship class currently under construction was originally designed to have such vertical launch 30 
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b~ilders.~’ The technological difficulties in linking oil platform structures in a relatively 
moderate sea-state are challenging, but not insurmountable. The goal would be a 
composite platform capable of being used as an air base capable of operations by almost 
all aircraft in the U.S. Air Force inventory. In contrast to the 80-100 marinized aircraft 
that can be operated off today’s largest aircraft carriers, the proposed MOB might be 
capable of operating over 300 aircraft, including large transports requiring a long runway. 
MOBS would be constructed at sea in the major deployment hubs, or off areas of 
long term crisis. In effect, they would provide the same capacity as an overseas air base 
ashore without the force protection requirement (such as anti-terrorism defenses) or 
vulnerability of a fixed land target. Unlike an aircraft carrier, the MOB could move only 
at very slow speeds (less than 5 knots), and would probably require disassembly to make 
a major relocation. 
The advantage of the MOB proposal is the vast size and aircraft sortie rate 
generation it could bring to areas of long-term American commitment. It would be an 
asset that satisfied numerous joint service requirements. However, it would probably still 
require naval battle group assets for its defense, and obviously lacks the flexibility and 
survivability characteristics of an actual carrier. 
If a globalized world required a continuing American presence in an area where 
land bases were not readily available or subject to an anti-access threat, the MOB could 
prove a viable alternative to land basing. However, because its funding is seen as a 
competitor for the fbture resources of the aircraft carrier fleet, MOB development is 
currently opposed by the Navy’s leadership. Although a ‘joint asset,’ no other Service 
has indicated serious support for the concept. 
31 Owens, pp. 162-166. 
29 
30 
St~-eetfighter.~~ A recent conception also championed by Admiral Cebrowski, 
‘streetfighter’ would be a small surface combatant optimized for near-shore land attack.33 
Under the proposal, ‘streetfighter’ would be an offensive platform with a small crew, 
relying on speed, stealth, and point-defense weaponry for self protection. Such a ship 
could be purchased in large numbers, thereby allowing it to be ‘more expendable’ than 
larger, ‘capital’ ships. The historical analogy is the World War Two Patrol Torpedo (PT) 
boats that operated in the Pacific island archipelagoes. Much more technologically 
sophisticated that their predecessors, ‘ streetfighters’ would be armed with land attack 
missiles (and possibly long-range guns), rely on remote targeting data for its strikes and 
be supported for logistics and repair by a sea-going mother-ship (possibly similar to the 
littoral supremacy ship). Thus far, ‘streetfighter’ has received a lukewarm reception by 
the majority of naval leaders. 
Counter-Mine Warfare. Beyond any doubt, counter-mine warfare is currently the 
weakest capability in the U.S. fleet inventory. The historical reason is that in the Cold 
War the mission was relegated to Allied navies (particularly NATO allies) that could not 
afford to construct large ocean-going ships, but could best spend their resources by 
specializing in a specific function. But with the Cold War over, this ‘specialization 
agreement’ is in doubt. And the US.  Navy operates in regions in which NATO allies 
may not venture. 
’* Recently the term “Corsair” has been used in place of “Streetfighter” in Naval War College briefings on 
this concept. 
See public discussion in VADM A.K. Cebrowski, USN and CAPT Wayne B. Hughes, USN (Ret.), 
“Rebalancing the Fleet,” U. S .  Naval Institute Proceedings 125/11 (November 1999), pp. 3 1-34; LCDR 
Dave Weeks, USNR, “A Combatant for the Littorals,” U. S .  Naval Institute Proceedinm 125/11 (November 
1999), pp. 26-30; and CAPT Wayne B. Hughes, USN (Ret.), “22 Questions for Streetfighter,” U. S. Naval 




Since sea mines are one of the cheapest anti-access weapons readily available on 
the open market, recent trends would require the U.S. Navy to formalize the counter-mine 
‘specialization agreement’ or increase its capability at mine hunting and clearing, a 
capability that was sorely taxed in the Gulf War. This issue is not a pressing one for a 
navy that operates in the deep ‘blue water’ of the oceans, where mines can not normally 
be placed. But it becomes critical as a prerequisite for littoral operations. This capability 
has not increased at the same rate as the U.S. Navy’s interest in and commitment to 
littoral warfare. 
Future naval programs are focussed on developing “organic” mine-hunting 
capabilities that could be added to multipurpose surface combatants and submarines. But 
this simply adds yet another mission to ships that are already tasked with strike, theater 
ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and fleet air defense. Unless a 
significant increase in surface combatants and submarines is programmed, it would seem 
prudent to make what is a comparative modest investment in additional specialized 
surface and air mine-huntindmine-clearing platforms. In order to develop a long-term 
advocate for this critical mission, it may be appropriate to assign it to another community 
than surface or submarine warfare, such as to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). 
Combat Logistics Shim. As part of its ‘rightsizing’/downsizing, the Navy elected 
to convert most of its logistics assets into civilian-manned ships operated by the Maritime 
Sealift Command (MSC). Although the long-term cost reductions may be modest, in the 




But the logistic fleet is mainstay of all global capabilities. One area of significant 
reduction that might prove a problem for land attack operations was the complete 
elimination of destroyer tenders and repair ships, as well as most submarine tenders. The 
logic of this move was that repair of forward-deployed ships could be performed in 
overseas ports using foreign assets. But the availability of such foreign assets during 
wartime is uncertain, and much of the specialized repair needs of US.  warships can only 
be obtained at relatively high cost. But more importantly, the decommissioned tenders 
were the only potential means of reloading vertical launch tubes in the deployed theaters. 
As of today, expended magazines require surface combatants to steam back to the United 
States for reload. This may be a considerable bottleneck to long-range land attack 
missions in an extended conflict. 
Evaluating the above alternative force structure concepts in detail would be a 
most complex, but worthy challenge. 
Conclusions: The Ultimate ‘Jointness’ 
Here’s where we tie the above discussions together. Since naval forces are 
conceptually structured to ensure or deny global access and interactions, they would 
appear to be of increasing importance in the contemporary, apparently ‘globalizing’ 
world. Benefiting fiom continuing evolutions in naval technology, the United States 
Navy-as the dominant ‘world’s navy--has shifted its strategic vision towards using its 
control over access to directly effect events on land. Such a shift is made possible by the 
elimination of any serious challenge to American sea control, which represents a true 
‘revolution in naval affairs.’ This allows the USN to focus ‘beyond the sea,’ which is a 
logical development because the functional definition of naval power is to be the military 
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instrument within the fluid mediums of interaction, communications and exchange. As 
these fluid mediums expand to include space and cyberspace, it is natural to utilize naval 
forces (no matter what uniform they wear) to control access. 
The focus ‘beyond the sea’ represents a shrinking of the ‘margin’ between armies 
and navies and the potential subsuming of land power into sea power. This trend wave 
has been broached by the writings of the ‘Monterey’ school. 
Such a blend would have undeniable effects on the way that future naval strategy 
is perceived. It could as likely lead to an end to ‘joint strategy,’ as it is currently 
practiced, as to an ‘end’ of naval strategy. In fact, these effects could be conceived as 
leading to ‘ultimate jointness,’ as the United States adapts its military to best utilize its 
unique naval advantages in a globalizing world. 
Within the Navy, these developments should prompt a renewed examination of a 
myriad of alternative force structure concepts. This chapter has barely scratched the 
surface of the potential alternatives. Seriously examining an alternative concept does not 
necessarily lead to adopting significant changes. However, adaptation to a changing 
international security environment can not come about without it. A ‘let a thousand 
flowers bloom’ approach might best be inspired by recognizing a ‘deconstructionist’, 
functional approach, rather than the organization definition as to what is a navy. 
In the contemporary world there are no navies. But that does not mean that there 
might be not be a re-creation of navies in the future. There may even be some return to 
naval strategy as it is traditionally conceived: strategy for military forces fighting at sea. 
But in being forced to develop a naval strategy for an era without navies, the US. Navy is 
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now poised to take naval warfare beyond the constraints of ‘time and tide’ and apply the 
advantages of sea power not merelyfiorn the sea, but truly beyond the sea. 
34 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter traces the d 
Air Power: Theory and Practice 
Timothy Garden 
velopm nt f air power thinking from th rlie t 
days of flight to modern times. It argues that the prophets of air power were 
often flawed in their predictions. Air power technology developed rapidly and 
in unpredictable directions. Army and Navy leaders saw the new air systems 
as little more than extensions of their surface capabilities, and therefore lacked 
the imagination to develop new methods of fighting. Experience in war forced 
some military commanders to realise that control of the air was necessary for 
victory. Strategic bombing was central to the thinking of professional airmen, 
but was unable to offer certain victory until the development of atomic 
weapons. Eventually, missiles became more useful as nuclear delivery systems 
than manned aircraft. At the end of the 20th Century, air power underwent a 
radical reappraisal after its successful application in a number of limited war 
campaigns. Precision air delivered weaponry offered politicians an easier 
option for prosecuting wars. 
Introduction 
The history of warfare has been a progressive search for technological 
advantage. Weapons have been progressively developed for ever greater range. 
Both on land and at sea, the advantage has gone to the side who could see 
furthest, and then bring firepower to bear on the adversary. Armies would seek 
high ground; navies would post lookouts at the top of their ships' masts. Guns 
were given greater and greater range. The advent of flying machines changed 
the nature of warfare for all time. In a period of less than a century, military use 
of the air has moved from tethered balloons to cruise missiles using satellite- 
based navigation systems. The third dimension of warfare has encompassed 
space itself. The novelty of the technology has given many problems for those 
who attempted to develop air power thinking . Often they predicted 
capabilities which were then beyond the science of the day. Centuries of 
maritime and land fighting experience held back the development of a new 
three-dimensional doctrine. The first advocates of the use of air power had to 
fight difficult institutional battles to gain sufficient resources. 
In the early days, aircraft, both heavier and lighter than air, were seen as no 
more than giving extra tactical height to the military commander for his surface 
battle. Yet the ability to threaten deep behind the frontline was rapidly realised, 
and governments feared that they would be unable to defend their cities against 
bombs dropped from aircraft or airshps. Limited experience of such attacks in 
World War One was extrapolated by theorists to claim that the bomber was the 
war winning capability of the future. In the event, defensive measures, lack of 
bombing accuracy and civilian resilience meant that World War Two had to be 
fought by a more traditional and prolonged all arms campaign. It was not until 
the last days of that war in 1945 that the use of an atomic bomb changed the 
calculus of warfare. From the nuclear devastation of Hiroshma onwards, it 
became possible to guarantee the total destruction of cities from the air. 
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The period from the end of World War Two until 1989 was dominated by the 
potential for a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Each, with its allies, fielded increasing numbers of atomic weapons that in the 
early days would be delivered by aircraft. In later years, missiles became the 
preferred delivery system. This period of Cold War was prevented from 
becoming a hot fighting war by the absolute assurance that nuclear weapons 
delivered from above would leave no winner. Air power played the key role in 
making war between major powers unwinnable. 
Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have been less prominent in 
strategic thinking. Smaller more traditional wars have become the focus of 
international interest. The United Nations has from time to time been moved to 
right international wrongs such as the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. A 
new approach to warfare has been developed through these experiences in the 
last decade of the 20th Century. Air power has become much more precise in its 
application using conventional weaponry. This has allowed powers to exert 
force without risking either large casualties to their own forces or to non- 
combatants in the target zone. Air power has become the weapon of first choice: 
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to be used ahead of, and perhaps instead of, surface forces. After a century, the 
world is looking at the use of military force in a new way through the 
capabilities of air systems. 
{{BOX 1 KEY CONCEPTS }} 
A New Military Capability 
First uses of air power 
Man has dreamt of flying like the birds for all of history. Yet, it was not until 
1783 that the Montgolfier brothers in France first overcame gravity in their hot 
air balloon. By 1794, at the Battle of Fleurus, the French Generals were able to 
direct the operation from their aerial headquarters. Tethered balloons were 
developed over the next hundred years to provide useful artillery spotting 
lookouts. The major limitation of such balloons was their lack of directional 
control. They had either to be captive with a tethering line, or allowed to drift 
with the wind. The first dirigible airship was flown by Henri Giffard in France 
in 1852. Airships continued to be developed for both civil and military use as 
the internal combustion engine gave a more effective power source. In 
Germany, Count von Zeppelin made great advances, which were to provide his 
country with a significant military airship capability. Nevertheless, airships 
were to remain slow moving and vulnerable as they had to displace large 
volumes of air to provide the lift for their engines and payload. Speed would 
require the development of heavier than air flying machines. 
{{Table 1 Air Power Milestones}} 
Controlled powered heavier-than-air flight was realised at Kitty Hawk, North 
Carolina on 17 December 1903 by the Wright Brothers. Military interest was 
variable, but enthusiasts ensured that airplane technological development was 
rapid. Louis Bleriot flew across the English Channel in 1909 showing that 
England was no longer safe as an island nation. In 1911, a Curtiss biplane was 
successfully launched from and landed back on a warship. That year was to see 
the first use of air power in war. Italy was at war with Libya, and began using 
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aircraft and airships for aerial reconnaissance. By the following year, hand held 
bombs were being dropped on desert troops below. 
Air Powerin World War One 
The French followed these trends closely and took the lead in developing air 
commands. At the outbreak of World War One they had some 138 military 
aircraft, and had also been building them for Russia. Germany had 
concentrated its early development work on airships for military use, but it too 
was building heavier-than-air machines, and had 232 by 1914. The United 
States showed remarkably little interest in military aviation developments, 
which was why the Wright brothers spent their time selling their machines in 
Europe. The British reorganised their air capabilities into an army specialist 
force, the Royal Flying Corps, and subsequently added the Royal Navy Air 
Service in early 1914. In July 1914, shortly after war was declared, the 37 
airplanes of the Royal Flying Corps flew across the Channel to France. The 
primary role of these aircraft was reconnaissance, and they rapidly proved their 
worth to the land commanders. In the first big battle of the war at Mons, 
General Sir John French reported that the Royal Flying Corps had provided 
crucial information on enemy movements. It was however for artillery spotting 
that the new air capabilities were most used in the early days of the war. 
Inevitably, when German aircraft found themselves near French or British 
aircraft, small arms fire was exchanged. This led to each side developing 
armaments for their aircraft. From 1915 onwards, the use of forward facing 
machine guns, which fired through propeller blades, allowed fighter tactics to 
be developed. Tactical formations of aircraft had their genesis in cavalry 
manoeuvres, and air to air combat became an activity in its own right. The 
importance of attempting to control the airspace above them was becoming 
obvious to commanders, and they needed to give higher priority to this task if 
they were not to be vulnerable to enemy air reconnaissance and artillery 
spotting. In many ways, the development of air power progressed ever more 
rapidly in the maritime environment. Reconnaissance developed into anti- 
submarine warfare. Air defence fighters were needed to protect cargo ships 
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from attack. The British Navy developed its own bomber force to destroy the 
Zeppelin threat by bombing their bases in Germany. 
Although of relatively limited military effectiveness, the most significant air 
power development of the war was to be that of strategic bombing. Targets 
were both military and civilian, and the greatest shock was to Britain, which, as 
an island nation, had long felt secure from enemy attack. As a consequence, the 
Zeppelin and Gotha raids on London had a disproportionate effect on future air 
power thinking. Some 9000 bombs were dropped by German airships and 
aircraft on Britain during the whole of the war, killing some 1413 people and 
wounding a further 3408. The British public clamour was for air defence at 
home and retaliatory strikes on Germany. 
Air Forces need a separate organisation 
The development of air power during World War One was extraordinarily 
rapid, but was not particularly well thought through. Army and Navy 
commanders had no experience of what the new technology could offer. It was 
also expensive in terms of cost of equipment and also in its need for trained 
manpower. Arguments over funding priorities further hampered 
developments. This was unacceptable to the British Government, who felt 
uniquely threatened by this novel military capability. These organisational 
problems led to the establishment of the first separate military arm for air 
power, the Royal Air Force, in Britain in 1918. Winston Churchill, who was the 
politician in charge of the Royal Navy, was quick to understand the importance 
of an independent system for managing air assets. He pushed forward the 
establishment of a new Air Ministry to manage all aircraft equipment 
procurement. 
In World War One, air power was used in virtually all of its modem military 
roles, which were to be greatly developed subsequently. There was no time for 
theorists to discuss optimum strategies for incorporating this new capability 
into traditional warfighting doctrines. The airmen of the time had a high 
casualty rate, which meant there were few available to fight the institutional 
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battles. By the end of the war, of the 175,000 military aircraft built by France, 
Germany and Britain, some 116,250 had been destroyed. 
Between the Wars 
Air Power Prophets in the Wilderness 
With the end of the Great War, there was little general interest in learning the 
air power lessons of the conflict. The expectation that this had been a war to 
end war meant that military spending was rapidly scaled down everywhere. In 
Britain, there was debate as to whether the new Royal Air Force was necessary 
in peacetime. Certainly, there was little sympathy for spending money on this 
expensive part of the military establishment. The RAF was reduced within 6 
months of the Armistice from 188 operational squadrons to just 23, of which 
fewer than half could be deployed. Hugh Trenchard, who had served with the 
Royal Flying Corps, and had risen to be Chief of the Air Staff of the new RAF, 
became the custodian of British air power thinking throughout the 1920's. He 
was a strong believer in offensive air power,' and of the importance of the 
bomber in any future wars. However, in the absence of any planning for major 
wars, he was better able to promote the RAF in the role of imperial policing. 
Britain had a large empire to control, but was short of money to fund the 
necessary troops. Trenchard was able to offer lus small and relatively 
inexpensive force as a cost effective way to keep dissident rebels in check. In 
Iraq in 1921, five RAF squadrons were used to replace a ground force of 33 
battalions. 
{{Box 2 Churchill on Air Power}} 
In this period of peace, it was the ideas of an Italian General, Giulo Douhet, 
which captured the imagination strategic thinkers. His book, The Command of 
the Air, was published in 1921 and translated into English two years later. He 
declared that in future wars whichever side could win in the air would achieve 
victory. He argued that aircraft had extended the traditional battlefield to 
include civilian populations, and that attacks should be made on national 
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institutions and infrastructure. The effect of such bombing would undermine 
the population's will to fight as well as disrupting its means to fight. To this 
advocacy of strategic bombing, he also added the importance of attacking an 
enemy's air power capability when it was on the ground and vulnerable. His 
ideas were echoed widely by those who had been involved in the air operations 
of World War One. 
In the United States, General Billy Mitchell was making himself well known 
with the public, but unpopular with his military colleagues, for his strong 
advocacy of air power. In 1921, he provided a practical demonstration of the 
sinking of a captured warship by air attack, followed two years later by two 
more high profile test attacks and sinkings. But it would be another 20 years, 
before the United States discovered at Pearl Harbour that it was as vulnerable 
as Billy Mitchell had predicted. He railed, as successive airmen have, against 
the inefficiencies of air power being shared between the Army and the Navy. 
He was court-martialed in 1925 (Douhet had suffered a similar fate in 1916), but 
undoubtedly motivated the US Navy towards the development of aircraft 
carriers. 
If the victorious powers of World War One were investing little in military air 
power, this was not true elsewhere in the world. The defeated Germany was 
notionally constrained in the development of military capability. However, the 
importance of air power was recognised and was developed initially secretly in 
co-operation with the Soviets. The Luftwaffe came in to being in 1935 as an 
independent service with a different philosophy from the strategic bombing 
doctrine of the Trenchard, Mitchell and Douhet. The Luftwaffe was primarily 
trained and equipped to attack enemy forces in the air and on the ground and 
at sea. It was designed to concentrate firepower to disrupt and destroy the 
opponent's military capability. The German doctrine of blitzkrieg required early 
and massive air power to be brought to bear on the enemy's combat forces. 
Japan developed its own military air capability, which was used to great effect 
against China from 1931 onwards. In particular, by 1937 they had a capability 
for long range bombing missions. They developed a technique for forward 
refuelling airfields to extend the range of their fighter aircraft. 
Civil Aviation and Minor Wars Drive Progress 
For the USA and the rest of Europe, the advances in air power technology in the 
inter-war period were driven more by the growing civil interest and 
enthusiasm for flying than by the worries of air-minded strategists. Air races 
accelerated the developments in engines and airframes. Altitude record 
breaking attempts were just as important. In 1920, the USA had acheved 33,000 
feet and in 1938, Italy held the record at 56,000 feet. Similar progress was made 
in extending the range of aircraft: the French achieved just under 2000 miles in 
1925, while the British had broken 7000 miles by 1938. Everywhere was 
potentially within bombing range. There were also real operations for nations 
to test their new capabilities. The Japanese air operations ;rgainst the Chinese 
received little attention in Europe, but allowed the Japanese to develop their air 
doctrine significantly before World War Two. Of greater significance was the 
Spanish Civil war from 1936 to 1939. As well as the Spanish air force, Soviet, 
German and Italian air power was in action. The Soviet force was some 1500 
aircraft, but they were inaccurate as bombers and also vulnerable to German 
fighters. The German Luftwaffe exercised their doctrine of joint operations in 
support of ground forces to great effect. They were also able to bring in new 
tactics where necessary. Tactical battle formation flying rapidly replaced tight 
display formations. Air power was integrated into ground operations with the 
use of forward air controllers. Concentration of strategic bombing for maximum 
effect was tested. 
As war broke out in 1939, Germany was better prepared with good aircraft and 
experienced crews who had developed air power as a key part of their military 
doctrine. In Britain, the late build up of capability, and the focus on bombers, 
had left the air defences less than comprehensive. Nor was there much 
agreement within the RAF, or beyond, on the most effective employment of 
these scarce resources. 
World War Two: Air Power affects every campaign 
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Learning by Combat Experience 
In the six years from 1939-1945, every theory of air power was put to the test 
and modified, and all the main roles of modern air warfare were exhaustively 
exercised. World War Two was a new type of war in terms of communications, 
speed and extent. Air power had made every civilian potentially vulnerable, 
and had taken away the safety of dispersal and distance. Yet the promises of 
technology were often found wanting, and each new technological 
development was matched rapidly by a counter move. Radar made air defence 
practical, but was soon degraded by counter-measures. 
In popular images of the war, the Battle of Britain remains the most memorable 
of air campaigns. Britain had only limited numbers of air defence fighters. In 
August 1940, the German bombers and escorting fighters outnumbered the 
defenders by about 3 to 1. Following their philosophy of using air power to 
attack military capability, the German bombers targeted ports, airfields and 
British fighters. The RAF senior leadership was divided over the best defensive 
tactics. By the end of the month, Germany was targeting the radar stations and 
command centres successfully. German offensive counter-air operations were 
working, and the British air defence system was being defeated. On 7 
September 1940, Germany, believing it had won control of the air switched its 
bombers to strategic targeting of London. This allowed the British air defence 
system to rebuild and fight back. Future strategists have taken the lesson that 
air superiority lasts only as long as enough air effort is devoted to it. Unlike the 
permanent seizing of ground by advancing armies, the battle for airspace 
control must be continued day after day. 
A less well publicised, but as important, aspect of the air war was the Battle of 
the Atlantic. Britain was dependent on supplies being delivered by convoys 
across the Atlantic. German submarines were increasingly successful in sinking 
these ships. Allied air cover was able to reduce these losses considerably, but it 
was difficult to obtain the priority for scarce air power resources. The strategic 
bombing of Germany was believed to be a more important task for long range 
assets. 
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The strategic bombing campaign encapsulates many of the weaknesses of the 
strategic thinking of the inter-War years. Proponents had overstated the 
psychological effect on populations, and had also expected far more technical 
capability from bombing systems than was achievable. The nature of the 
bombing escalated as the war continued. The British began the war by 
dropping leaflets and ended it by destroying cities. Again there were 
differences of view between Commanders over which targets, military, 
industrial or civilian were likely to be more productive in winning the war. The 
poor bombing accuracy compounded the difficulties. Arthur Harris, the 
Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, was an ardent proponent of the 
area bombing campaign, but found himself increasingly in dispute with the 
RAF leadership who sought more precision attacks against what they assessed 
as key targets. 
On the other side of the world, the Japanese showed that it was possible to use 
air power to provide tactical surprise. The attack on the US fleet at Pearl 
Harbour in 1941, and the subsequent Japanese victories in the Philippines and 
Singapore showed how well they had developed their offensive air power 
capability. In strategic terms, the results were less helpful: the United States 
entered the war and ultimately defeated the Japanese. The industrial might of 
the USA was able to outproduce Japan and Germany. By 1945 the US could 
field 18,000 aircraft against fewer than 5000 Japanese. 
Air Power Leaders 
All the combatants were learning that control of airspace was vital to survival, 
but that air power did not provide the magic path to quick victory. It was at its 
most effective when operating closely with the appropriate surface forces. Air 
power could provide extended reconnaissance, defend against enemy air 
attack, disrupt enemy supply lines, halt an enemy advance, and take out a 
difficult target. The concentration of firepower in time and space that was 
possible could be very effective in turning a ground battle. However, aircraft 
could not hold territory or maintain the continuous presence of armies. Nor 
could they transport the weight and volume of cargo of surface ships. Combat 
air power was expensive, always scarce but always needed. The setting of both 
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strategic and tactical priorities for air assets was the most important aspect, and 
it took time to learn through mistakes. 
While military thinkers are more vocal in peacetime, it is clear that there were 
some whose ideas were key to air power utilisation in World War Two. 
Winston Churchill perhaps gets too little credit for his lifetime appreciation of 
what air power means to warfare. It was he that had been at the centre of 
British air power developments in the previous war. He had warned of the 
implications of German air power for British security in the 1930's. As Prime 
Minister he was able to determine both strategic priorities and the aircraft 
production to support those tasks. In Germany, Hermann Goring had been a 
famous operational air commander in the First World War, and rose to be the 
first and only Marshal of the Reich under Hitler. While this helped the 
Luftwaffe greatly with resources, Goring lacked the vision of Churchill, and the 
Luftwaffe remained tactical rather than strategic. The Soviets had faken air 
power seriously from the early days of the revolution. However, the Soviet Air 
Force suffered greatly from the loss of experience when Stalin purged the Red 
Army Command in 1937. It was further undermined by the priority that Hitler 
gave to its destruction in 1941. Stalin drew the lessons for the post war 
importance of strategic air power. In Japan, Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto had 
progressed from chief of navy aviation to become Commander-in-Chief. He 
had been instrumental in the design of the Japanese aircraft carrier fleet, and 
was the driving force behind Japan's approach to maritime air power in the 
Pacific. 
World War Two marked the birth of the USA as the air power nation. It had 
been surprisingly indifferent to pre-War air power enthusiasts, and had 
contributed little in the development of strategic thinking. Billy Mitchell's failed 
attempts to obtain a separate air force had left air doctrine as no more than a 
part of either army or navy force development. Nevertheless, in a later parallel 
to Trenchard's career, General Hap Arnold rose through the US army ranks to 
become the father of the US Air Force. He was a follower of Douhet and the key 
air power adviser to President Roosevelt. Winning the war in the air required 
enormous and sustained industrial production capacity, a pool of well educated 
recruits as airmen and a strong research base to develop new technologies. The 
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USA was ideally placed geographically, economically and culturally to meet 
these criteria. It has maintained its pre-eminence ever since. 
In the closing days of the war, the Douhet theorists were given a new lease of 
life as the US dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. The nuclear age was born 
and air power now appeared the ultimate guarantor of victory. 
Air Power through the Cold War 
Air Power and nuclear deterrence 
If the atomic bomb was to dominate strategic thinking for the next half century, 
the jet engine and the missile were also set to transform the mechanics of air 
power. All three technological developments had been deployed in the latter 
days of World War Two, but there was limited experience on which to 
extrapolate the potential consequences for air power. Despite the whole range 
of air power tasks having contributed to the war effort, the post-war focus for 
the victorious powers was on development of nuclear weapon delivery 
capabilities. Yet very rapidly, a non combat form of air power was to prove 
critical in the growing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West. 
Berlin, blockaded by the Soviets in 1948, was sustained by a unique allied air 
transport re-supply operation throughout . 
{{Table 2 Air Power Roles}} 
The Korean War (1950-1953) was a reminder that conventional wars with 
limited aims remained possible in the nuclear age. Jet aircraft were available in 
numbers for the first time, but had to operate in a confined airspace. A limited 
war meant political constraints on targets, and as a result strategic bombing of 
China was ruled out. The lessons of joint operations were re-learned, and for 
the United States there was a large expansion in their recently (1947) 
independent air force. Again, the value of flexible air support to troops on the 
ground was demonstrated in what was a very difficult ground campaign. The 
helicopter was beginning to be used as a useful improvement to mobility in the 
difficult terrain found in a series of such limited wars. The British undertook 
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operations in Malaya and the French in Indochina. The Israelis were developing 
a serious air force to defend their newly independent country. However all 
three nations were reminded of their limitations in the Suez operation of 1956. 
Yet for the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom the key air 
power role was that of the nuclear bomber. Resources were poured into aircraft 
and weapon development and production. Conventional weapons were of 
secondary importance in the battle for funding, despite the growing experience 
of the need for limited war capability. In the US, General Hap Arnold wrote a 
memo in 1945 arguing that in future the only defence possible was to field an 
overwhelming strategic offensive force as a deterrent to any aggressor. He 
outlined many of the detailed arrangements that were to shape strategic nuclear 
forces throughout the Cold War. Academic and political thinking about 
deterrence was also developing in parallel, and is covered in the next Chapter. 
On the military side, General Curtis Le May, who commanded the USAF 
Strategic Air Command from 1948 to 1957, built a vast strategic bomber force 
which far exceeded the capability of any other nation. He shaped the detailed 
arrangements which ensured that the theoretical constructs of nuclear 
deterrence could work in practice. The Soviets and the British also progressed 
in the 1950s, followed in turn by the French and Chinese, with developing long 
range nuclear bombers. and providing the air defences to protect them from 
pre-emptive destruction. 
Deterrence theorists, such as Thomas Schelling, explored arcane game theory in 
deriving the required force structure. The RAND Corporation in the USA was 
greatly influential in the development of Cold War air power thinking. The 
logic that deterrence depended on the nation being able to ride out a first 
nuclear attack, and yet still launch a devastating retaliatory nuclear attack 
became widely accepted. This led to a requirement for large nuclear forces 
widely dispersed, and a comprehensive national air defence system. Yet even as 
the bomber forces were being build, another technology was offering more 
assurance of a second strike capability. Offensive missiles, both air-breathing 
and rocket powered, had been used by Germany against Britain in the 1940s. In 
1959, Bernard Brodie argued in a RAND study, that inter-continental ballistic 
missiles could provide greater assurance of nuclear retaliation than manned 
aircraft; but that a mixture of systems was even better. In the United States, 
Robert McNamara brought to the post of Secretary of Defense in 1961 a keen 
analytical mind. He started the trend for thinking in capability terms when 
making investment decisions. The nuclear powers have in the years since 
moved from reliance on manned bombers for nuclear delivery towards greater 
use of missiles based in silos on land and in submarines at sea. Indeed, the 
United Kingdom by 1998 had abandoned all its other nuclear delivery systems. 
{{Box 3 Air Power Prophesies}} 
Limited Conventional Wars 
As the Cold War deepened, the focus of air power thinking, in the five declared 
nuclear powers, continued to be centred on strategic nuclear weapon delivery. 
In 1957, the United States was beaten by the USSR in the race to place a satellite 
into orbit around the earth. In 1962, the USA reacted strongly over the 
deployment of Soviet nuclear capable missiles to Cuba. The building and 
maintenance of a credible deterrent capability exercised both the USA and the 
USSR throughout the 1960s. It can be argued that more thinking about the 
lessons of air power in limited wars would have helped the Americans in 
Vietnam and the Russians in Afghanistan. The Vietnam war (1964-75) was a 
savage reminder of the limitations of air power in fighting a guerrilla campaign. 
It was, however, a period of intense development in conventional air warfare 
tactics and technologies. Airmobility with helicopter gunship support brought a 
new level of integration between ground and air forces. While the massive scale 
of US air power could achieve tactical victories, the strategic victory was more 
difficult. Escalation of conventional strategic bombing was seen as the way to 
bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table. Yet again, air power theorists 
were taught the lesson that conventional bombing does little to make your 
enemy more amenable. The series of bombing campaigns from 1964 to 1968 
added up to 300,000 missions and 643,000 tons of bombs dropped on North 
Vietnam. The North Vietnamese continued to fight. By the end of the Vietnam 
war, technological developments allowed much more precise attacks with 
much lower vulnerability for the bombers. Nevertheless, in the end the US 
withdrew its forces from Vietnam. Air power theorists continued to argue that 
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the defeat was because of the political constraints rather than military 
inadequacy. However, Korea had already shown the need for operational plans 
in limited war to take into account the political reality. 
If Vietnam and Afghanistan reminded the two superpowers of the limitations 
of air power in long campaigns lasting years, Israel showed the world the 
importance of air supremacy in much shorter wars. It had given priority to 
developing a modern air force which was rightly feared by its Arab neighbours. 
The Yom Kippur war of 1973 lasted only 18 days but provided a wealth of air 
warfare data of the effectiveness of modern air weapon systems in a classic set 
piece battle for national survival. The British and Argentineans also learned the 
strengths and weaknesses of their air power capabilities during the Falklands 
conflict of 1982. It was a remarkable achievement for the UK, with its very small 
aircraft carrier force, to wage a successful war at a range of some 8000 miles 
from home. Subsequently, maritime air power advocates have used this conflict 
as a strong argument for the continuing importance of carrier-borne air power. 
Yet the costs remain high and the examples of utility often ambiguous. 
While the sporadic examples of real fighting during the Cold War provided 
justification to air power enthusiasts for a whole range of capabilities, it 
continued to be the potential NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe 
which determined force structures and technologies. The relatively simple 
deterrence policy of massive retaliation grew into NATO's adoption of the more 
complex "Flexible Response", in which the credibility of ultimate nuclear use 
was enhanced by options to fight a conventional or tactical nuclear war. This 
allowed operational planners to build up complex scenarios which justified 
procurement of advanced air weapons systems, which would also be useful in 
other conventional wars. 
By the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, air and space military systems had 
developed beyond the imagination of the early flying pioneers. Satellites could 
provide imagery of anywhere on Earth, could allow worldwide 
communications and give a three dimensional accurate location to any military 
unit. Missiles could threaten virtually instantaneous destruction over the whole 
of the globe. Bombers could make precision attacks with an assurance of no 
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error. Fighters could shoot down the enemy without ever seeing him. Air-to-air 
refuelling had extended the range of missions across the oceans. Ground attack 
aircraft and helicopters had become easier to direct than artillery. Defensive 
and offensive counter-measures reflected the exciting technologcal growth of 
domestic economies. Yet with the end of the Cold War, the theoretical edifice of 
air power was now much more questionable. 
The Air Power Decade 1990 -2000 
Lessons from the Gulf War 
NATO nations raced to reduce their military spending as the threat from the 
Soviet Union disappeared. There was little agreement on the necessary level 
that would be needed in the future. Indeed, there were predictions that, 
without the common threat of the Warsaw Pact, defence would revert to 
minimum national needs. However in August 1990, before most governments 
had completed their post Cold War defence reappraisals, Iraq invaded Kuwait. 
This was a clear breach of international law and was also in an area of 
considerable economic interest to the major powers. The United Nations 
imposed economic sanctions, intense diplomacy was undertaken, and t h s  was 
underpinned by the build up of a US-led military coalition of 29 countries in the 
theatre. Following failure of diplomatic solutions to the crisis, an air campaign 
(Operation Desert Storm) was launched against Iraqi forces on 17 January 1991. 
Although massive ground forces had been assembled nearby in Saudi Arabia, 
the force commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, continued a purely air 
offensive operation for 6 weeks. Precision weapons were used extensively 
against infrastructure targets. Attacks were orchestrated with appropriate air 
defence systems, refuelling tanker aircraft and a mix of offensive capabilities. 
Cruise missiles, with terrain mapping navigation, were used in quantity. 
Massive area bombing was used against armour in the desert. 
On the 24 February, Schwarzkopf assessed the Iraq forces as sufficiently 
degraded to launch the ground campaign. It was still assumed that there would 
be a difficult fight to free Kuwait. In the event, the Iraqi forces were routed and 
Kuwait freed in under 4 days. Air power advocates had found a new role. They 
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claimed that modern precision air system in overwhelming numbers would in 
future win wars, leaving ground forces the easier task of moving in afterwards 
to secure territory. However, even in the Gulf, it was a limited victory. Air 
operations of various kinds continued against Iraq for the rest of the decade. 
While the scale of the coalition for the Gulf War was impressive, it was clear to 
all that the success depended on American technology, numbers, doctrine and 
leadership. The USA had emerged from the Cold War as a military power 
unmatched by any other nation. It was investing much more in defence 
research and particularly in aerospace and information systems. It appeared 
that US air power would be the dominant factor in military thinking. However, 
the very public success in achieving war a i m  with few casualties in the Gulf 
had implications for future operations. US forces were withdrawn from Somalia 
when 18 of their troops were killed. In the worsening Balkan crisis, the US 
preferred air strikes to promote agreement in Bosnia rather than contributing 
troops on the ground. 
{{Table 3 The modem air campaign}} 
Humanitarian Interventions 
The 1990s saw a series of operations, mainly under UN auspices, to try to 
restore order in failing states around the world. Air power had few answers to 
mass killings in civil wars in Africa. Where agreements were achieved, such as 
in Bosnia, the peace could only be maintained by the long term presence of 
international ground forces. Yet the decade was to finish with a war that was 
even more important to the air power dominance school of thought. Having 
come to an uneasy settlement over ethnic divisions in Bosnia, the focus moved 
to Kosovo. Serbia was increasing its repression of the ethnic Albanian 
community in this province; the UN and OSCE tried unsuccessfully to negotiate 
an acceptable peace agreement. For the first time NATO nations agreed, 
without a formal UN resolution, to use military means to solve a growing 
humanitarian crisis within a sovereign state's boundaries. The instrument of 
choice was explicitly solely air power. NATO leaders, when they launched an 
air offensive on 24 March 1999 against Serbian forces, ruled out an offensive 
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ground campaign. Air power was being used to bring the Serbian leadership 
back to the negotiating table. Over 23,000 bombs were dropped in the ten weeks 
of operations. From the 38,000 NATO missions flown, there was not a single 
casualty to the alliance forces. On the other hand, a combination of political 
constraints on targets, limited poor weather capability and good Serbian 
defensive measures meant that the military effectiveness of this prolonged air 
operation was limited. Nevertheless a peace settlement was made in the June, 
before ground operations became necessary. Again a large international force 
was needed to police the settlement in Kosovo. Shortly afterwards, Russia 
followed NATO's example of the use of air power in its rather less surgical 
approach to quelling rebellion in Chechnya. 
While air power studies have concentrated on the offensive operations in the 
Gulf and the Balkans, a growing need for humanitarian intervention worldwide 
has had other implications. Rapid response to sudden crises requires 
deployable forces. Nations are restructuring their military capabilities to 
provide such forces more easily. Strategic airlift and helicopter lift have in a 
much quieter way contributed greatly to international responses to crises in 
Africa and Asia. Planners in defence ministries around the world finished the 
decade with a much clearer view of the need for the full range of air power 
capabilities than they had had in 1990. 
{{ Box 4 Air Power Characteristics}} 
Conclusion 
The twentieth century was one of extraordin ry progress in the application of 
air power. Most air power forecasters failed to make the right projections. This 
was scarcely surprising as the technologies advanced rapidly, the tactical 
implications were poorly understood and the strategic context changed. Air 
power enthusiasts often overstated the capabilities of their systems, and found 
it difficult to make their case for resources in opposition to their land and 
maritime colleagues. Successful air power nations needed a good technological 
and industrial base, as well as institutional understanding of what air power 
could offer. 
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The surges in practical military utilisation of air power took place in fighting 
wars of the 20th century. Theorising was extensive in the periods of peace, but 
was often based on unjustified extrapolation of available data. Airmen were 
attached to the thinking of Douhet, who saw the control of the air and the 
bomber as the ultimate weapon system. Yet for much of the century, support of 
ground forces was the more effective task for air systems. 
Currently, the United States has an overwhelming military capability which is, 
to a large extent, based on its modern air power forces. It can carry out 
precision offensive operations on a world-wide basis from its home territory. It 
can deliver conventional or nuclear weapons from aircraft or from submarines. 
It also has the most advanced space and information capabilities, and it 
outspends all other nations on military research, procurement and deployment. 
Given this focus of air power, it will be inevitably be a prime influence for all 
other nations, when looking at their own forces. 
Analysts argue whether the air campaign for Kosovo has set a precedent which 
will mean many more such humanitarian interventions. Some believe the 
political difficulties of maintaining NATO cohesion mean that it will not be 
repeated, and that only UN authorised operations will be possible. These are 
more likely to be at the lower intensity end of the spectrum and thus be less 
dependent on combat air power. There are still however areas where serious 
conflict is possible. The division of the Korean peninsular remains. India and 
Pakistan remain fiercely confrontational over Kashmir, and are both nuclear 
capable. China has the potential to cause difficulty, particularly over Taiwan. 
Russia is not yet a stable market economy. Ethnic problems erupt without 
warning, and sometimes with great ferocity. In any of the possible scenarios, air 
power is almost certain to have a part to play. However, the costs of air systems 
remain a problem for all governments including the United States. There are 
signs that regional co-operation at providing air capabilities may be the pattern 
of the future. NATO nations clubbed together to procure an expensive airborne 
early warning system in the past. European nations are looking at how they 
might provide such capabilities as intelligence satellites and strategic airlift on a 
co-operative basis. 
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Air power has become an increasing attractive option for western nations, 
which wish to minimise the risk of casualties to their own forces. This will 
increase the pressure for the developing air systems and tactics which keep the 
operator out of harm's way. Unmanned air vehicles will provide some solutions 
as will greater stand off range for weapon systems. However, the increasing 
concern about unintended collateral damage will ensure that the man or 
woman is kept firmly in the decision-making loop. 
Military air power began as a form of support for armies and navies. It grew to 
have strategic influence on its own. Many of the problems of development have 
come from the division of labour between armies, navies and, latterly, air 
forces. Recognising this, the most recent moves have been towards joint 
military organisations, which are designed. to makes most efficient use of all 
resources. This comes just at the time when doctrine seem to be moving more 
towards the independent use of air power for serious.operations. 
Summary Points 
Any successful military operation requires effective control of the air. 
Control of the air is only retained by continuous effort 
skilled manpower. 
Air power relies on advanced technologies, industrial production and 
most important factor for success. 
Air power is expensive and setting resource priorities correctly is the 
Air power cannot hold territory. 
Air power provides many politically attractive options for constrained 
limited operations. 
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Air power must be co-ordinated with sea and land power for 
greatest effect. 
Guide to Further Reading 
Brodie, B., Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: University Press 1965) a 
thoughtful history and commentary on the development of air power thinking 
from the early days to nuclear bombers. 
Douhet,G., The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942) the 
English translation of the most influential early air power writer. All students of 
air power should read this book. 
Gooch, J., Airpower: Theory and Practice (London: Cass 1995) a collection of 
pieces on air power thinking in different nations and useful case studies. 
Hallion, R.P., Air Power Confronts an Unstable World (London: Brassey's 1997) an 
interesting collection of essays from current air power experts on the use of air 
power in promoting international security in the modern world. 
Higham, R., Air Power: a Concise History (New York: St Martin's 1972) a very 
logical explanation of the first sixty years of air power thinking and practice. 
Mason, T., Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey's 1994) a book 
which addresses the development of air power, but looks particularly at its 
applications after the Cold War. 
Murray, W., Lujlwaffe (Baltimore: N&A 1985) this is a valuable analysis of the 
different approach to air power thinking which occurred in Germany after 
World War One. 
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Terraine, J., The Right ofthe Line (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1985) a 
comprehensive and readable history of the Royal Air Force in Europe in World 
War Two. 
Warden 111, J.A., The Air Campaign (Washington: Brassey's 1991) the book on the 
Gulf War by the air planner credited with the development of the new air 
doctrine which has shaped current thinking. 
British Air P o z w  Doctrine AP3000 (London: MOD 1999) a well written official 
manual of current UK air power doctrine. This small volume provides an easily 
understood reader in all aspects of air warfare. 
Discussion Questions 
1. Which air power roles can be currently undertaken by unmanned systems, 
and will more be covered in the future? 
2. Is it a good thing that navies and armies operate their own air power 
systems as well as having an independent air force? 
3. Does the experience of the 1990s show that air power is now the main 
military arm, and that armies have been relegated to a policing role? 
4. How can the limitations of air power be overcome? 
5. If "rogue states" can threaten mass destruction with long range missiles, are 
air power resources better allocated to defence or offence? 
6. What air power capabilities might the United Nations need for humanitarian 
relief operations, and should they be permanently allocated to the UN? 
7. Do aircraft carriers have an increasing or decreasing role in the future? 
8. Which space systems contribute to air power effectiveness? 
9. Is there still a useful role for non-precision bombs? 
10. Should nuclear weapon delivery systems be limited to missiles? 
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Box 1 Key Concepts 
Air Power 
The ability to project military force in air or space by orfYom a plafform or missile 
operating above the surface of the earth. A i r  plaf form are defined as any aircraft, 
helicopter or unmanned air vehicle. 
(as defined in British Air  Power Doctrine) 
Command of the Air 
To have command of the air means to be in a position to prevent the enernyfrornjlying 
while retaining the ability tofIy onesezf. 
(as defined by Douhet in The Command of the Air) 
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Box 2 Churchill on Air Power 
We are sure that ifi after a prolonged spell of peace, war on a grand scale suddenly broke 
out again, the Power which had the most intensive study of aerial warfare would start 
with an enormous initial advantage, and the Power that neglected this form of active 
defence might well find itself fatally situated. 
Proceeding on this assumption, we contend that the British policy is to develop the 
independent conception of the air as an art, an arm and a service; and this method alone 
will secure that qualitative ascendancy and superiority which the safety of the country 
requires. We think that to keep this new arm, with its measureless possibilities, in 
perpetual thraldom to the army or navy, and confined solely to ancilla y and auxilia y 
duties in relation to these two older services, will be to rob it of its most important 
devel opmen t s . 
Winston S. Churchill 1921 
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Box 3 Air Power Prophesies 
In the air are no streets, no channels, no point where one can say of an antagonist: ' I f  
he wants to reach my capital he must come by here' In the air all directions lead 
everywhere. 
H. G. Wells 1908 
Unlike artillery an airfleet can conduct extensive operations farfiom, and 
independently 05 both Army and Navy. As far  as at present can be foreseen there is 
absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. 
J.C.Smuts 1917 
Future wars between civilised nations will be struggles for life in which entire 
populations, together with their industrial resources, will be thrown into the scale. 
Evolution has brought about the creation of airfleets to meet the demands of such 
warfdre. 
Sir Frederick Sykes 191 9 
The air arm is the arm not of a rich people, but of a young people, ardent, bold 
inventive, who love space and height. I t  is therefore an arm eminently suited to us 
Italians. The importance it has attained and its infzuence on the general character of war 
are favourable to us; it is the arm best suited to the genius of our race. 
Guilio Douhef 1928 
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I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth 
that can prevent himfrom being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will 
always get through. 
Stanley Baldwin 1932 
I t  is entirely possible that the progressive development of the air arm, especially with the 
concurrent development of atomic explosive, guided missiles and other modern devices 
will reduce the requirement for, or employment ofi mass armies and navies. 
Hap Arnold 1946 
The idea that superior air power can in some way be a substitute for hard slogging and 
professional skill on the ground in this sort of war [Korea] is beguiling but illuso y. 
Sir John Slessor 1954 
We have to assume, on the basis of Korean and World War II experience, that air forces, 
like naval forces, will play an ancilla y role to ground forces. 
Bernard Brodie 1959 
Air power, when measured in terms of oufput per dollar or life invested, is the cheapest, 
most effective method offighting in human histo y - and the advent of precision makes 
it even cheaper. 
John A. Warden III 1997 
Box 4 Air Power Characteristics 
Strengths 
Flexibility - can be used for a wide range of tasks 
Speed - the fastest way to bring military force to bear 
Ubiquity - not constrained by geography 
Reach - can operate over immense distances 
Surprise - can arrive from anywhere at any time 
Politically attractive - low casualty risk and ease of disengagement 
Limitations 
High Cost - equipment and al;crew are expensive in time and 
Vulnerability - dependent on complex base support on the ground 
sea, and on adequate self-defence in the air 




































Montgolfier brothers' balloon flight 
Giffard airship flight 
Wright brothers heavier than air powered flight 
F.W.Lanchester publishes aerodynamics theory 
Wright Model "A" bought as first military aircraft 
Ely takes off in a Curtiss biplane from a ship 
Lt Gavotti drops bombs on Turks from aircraft 
UK deploys anti-aircraft guns to army 
Fokker produce forward firing interrupter aircraft gun 
Curtiss aerial torpedo is deployed as pilotless aircraft 
Formation of first independent air force by the UK 
Cierva produces autogyro 
Bennett flies over North Pole 
Whittle patents the jet engine 
Von Braun demonstrates liquid fuelled rocket for 
German army 
Watson-Watt radar successfully demonstrated 
Focke-Achgellis helicopter maiden flight 
Hindenburg airship disaster 
He 178 jet aircraft maiden flight in Germany 
Battle of Britain 
Butement invents proximity fuse 
Radar targeting deployed with H2S system 
Pearl Harbour surprise air attack by Japanese 
Chaff used by RAF to counter German radar defences 
V-1 cruise missile and V-2 ballistic missile attacks on UK 
Atomic bomb tested and subsequently dropped on Japan 
Yeager breaks sound barrier in X-1 rocket aircraft 
US B-50 bomber flies non-stop around the world 
Berlin airlift 
Korean War - jet fighters in combat 
Test of first H-bomb by USA 










US tests first anti-missile missile 
USS Enterprise, first nuclear powered aircraft carrier, 
commissioned 
Apollo 10 mission completes manned landing on moon 
Laser seeker heads used on bombs in Vietnam war 
US Tomahawk cruise missile tested 
Falklands conflict includes 80010nm strategic bombing 
missions 
Gulf War introduces prolonged air campaign doctrine 
Kosovo air campaign conducted without ground force option 
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Table 2 Air Power Roles 
Airborne early warning and control 
Air interdiction 
Air reconnaissance and surveillance 
Air to air refuelling 
Anti-submarine warfare 
Anti-surface ship operations 
Combat search and rescue 
Close air support 
Defensive counter-air operations 
Electronic warfare 
Offensive counter-air operations 
Strategic airlift 
Strategic bombing 
Suppression of enemy air defences 
Tactical air transport 
Table 3 The Modem Joint Air Campaign 
The modern air campaign requires hundreds of aircraft from many nations to 
be co-ordinated in time and space to achieve the mission. Typically AWACS 
aircraft will act as the aerial command post keeping a watch for hostile threats 
in the air. The airfields and aircraft carriers from where the missions are 
launched will all require their own air defence screens of missiles, guns and air 
defence fighters. The targets for the attack will have been identified by 
reconnaissance satellites, aircraft and drones. Attacking aircraft will carry their 
own self defence systems, but will rely heavily on electronic warfare support 
aircraft, defence suppression missions using anti-radiation missiles, and combat 
air patrol fighters. The bombers identify their targets with television, radar or 
infra red sensors, or will be assisted by laser designation teams on the ground 
or in the air. The weapons will be guided to the target by laser, television or 
satellite positioning systems. To extend the range of attack missions and to keep 
fighters on patrol, large numbers of air-to-air refuelling tankers will circle in 
nearby friendly airspace. Helicopters will be on standby to rescue any downed 
aircrew. Once an attack is completed, the reconnaissance force will be retasked 
to make an assessment of the damage caused and whether the target needs to 
be attacked again. Naval forces may provide carrier-borne air power and 
submarine launched cruise missiles. The army may be operating air defence 
missiles, attack helicopters or controlling incoming bombers with laser 
designation. 
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Arms Control and Disarmament 
John Baylis 
The record of Arms Control and Disarmament in the post-cold war era has been 
a confusing one. In the early 1990s considerable euphoria existed over the 
opportunities which existed for a major surge forward in arms limitation 
agreements. The START I and START I1 treaties, the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) agreement, and significant unilateral reductions in Short-Range 
nuclear forces seemed to launch a new "golden age" in arms control after the 
disappointments and frustrations of the cold war and pre cold war years. The 
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the signing of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and discussions on a START I11 
agreement appeared to confirm this judgment. At the same time, however, 
critics of these agreements have questioned their value in an era of friendly 
relations between the great powers and their sustainability should the climate of 
international relations change. Difficulties over renegotiating CFE limits to meet 
changing geo-strategic circumstances, unhappiness in Russia and China over US 
proposals for a National Missile Defence (NMD) system, together with attempts 
to modify the 1972 ABM Treaty, and a refusal by the US Senate to ratify the CBT 
agreement in 1999, reflected a skepticism in some quarters that arms control 
could be any more successful in the future than it had been in the past. 
This debate about the utility of arms control and disarmament policies to reduce 
the risks of war and contribute to more peaceful international relations is the 
main focus of this chapter. The first section sets out to define what is meant by 
arms control and disarmament and to look at the different approaches which 
each involves. This is followed by an examination of the historical record to test 
the claim by critics that there is no evidence that arms limitation agreements 
have ever had a significant impact on peace or war. The third section will look 
at the arguments in favour and against the utility of a r m  control in the post-cold 
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war era. The conclusion will then sum up the debate and the implications for 
international security in the future. 
Definitions & Approaches 
While the terms "arms control" and "disarmament" are sometimes used 
interchangeably, a good case can be made that they reflect very different views 
about international politics. Hedley Bull, in h s  book Control of the Arms Race, 
defines disarmament "the reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be 
unilateral or multilateral; general or local; comprehensive or partial; controlled or 
uncontrolled". Arms control, on the other hand, according to Bull, involves 
"restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy, whether in respect of 
the level of armaments, their character, deployment or use". 
John Spanier and Joseph Nogee in their study of 
provide a similar, although more specific definition of the differences between 
arms control and disarmament. In their formulation 'while disarmament refers to 
the complete abolition or partial reduction of the human and material resources 
of war, arms control deals with the restraints to be imposed upon the use of 
nuclear weapons'. (Spanier and Nogee, 1962,15) 
The Politics of Disarmament 
Several important distinctions arise from these definitions. Firstly, there is the 
difference between "reduction" and "restraint". Whilst arm control can involve 
"reductions" in armaments (and therefore can overlap with disarmament), it can 
also involve increases if this secures the objective of achieving "restraint" 
between adversaries. The SALT I Treaty in 1972 is an example of an agreement 
which sanctioned increases in armaments but at the same time tried to set limits 
to forces which could be developed in the future. Secondly, the terms reflect a 
very different view about the causes of war. The theory of disarmament is based 
on the conviction that armaments are a cause of war. The theory of arms 
control, on the other hand, accepts that armaments can play a part in heightening 
tension between states, but sees political tensions between adversaries as the 
major cause of conflict. For arms controllers the existence of armaments can be a 
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source of stability and security if they are managed properly. A third and 
related distinction is that disarmament has the final objective of abolishing 
weapons completely and thereby transforming the whole basis of international 
relations. In contrast, arms controllers do not believe that it is possible either to 
abolish weapons completely or to fundamentally change the way the world is. 
All that can be hoped for is to reduce the risk of war, to limit to consequences if it 
occurs, and contribute to peaceful change. The aims are strictly limited. 
According to supporters of arms control "adjustments in military postures and 
doctrines that induce reciprocal adjustments by a potential opponent can be of 
mutual benefit if they reduce the danger of a war that neither side wants, or 
contain its violence, or otherwise serve the security of the nation". (Schelling and 
Halp erin) 
The literature on disarmament tends to focus on a number of different 
approaches to reducing and eventually eliminating weapons. For some writers 
the way forward is to overcome tensions between states through a process of 
liberal education. According to this view, education can create greater 
understanding and help overcome the kind of belligerent attitudes which lead 
statesmen to acquire weapons. Another approach focuses on the political 
divisions between states. By seeking and achieving a political settlement 
between hostile states, the need for armaments will be eroded. In contrast, a 
third approach emphasizes the importance of disarmament itself in helping to 
achieve more peaceful relations between adversaries. This can either be done 
gradually, incrementally reducing armament and building up trust until 
eventually all weapons are abolished. Charles Osgood coined the term "GRIT", 
(Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction) in the early 1960s to reflect this 
approach.(Osgood, 1962). Alternatively, there are those who advocate the 
negotiation of a Single General and Comprehensive Disarmament (GCD) 
package which will simultaneously bring about peaceful relations by abolishing 
all armaments at a stroke. 
With its emphasis on "restraint" rather than "abolition", arms control theorists 
tend to draw a distinction between "structural" and "operational" arms control. 
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"Structural" a r m  control is often regarded as the most important of the two 
because it addresses the quantity and quality of armaments themselves. The aim 
is to try to achieve "parity" and/or "stability" in the balance of armaments 
between hostile states. (eg the SALT & START agreements). In contrast, 
"operational" arms control aims to contain the behaviour of armed forces by 
preventing military deployments and actions which may be regarded as 
provocative, thus increasing the chances of war. Such "operational" arms control 
measures are designed to help dampen down crises when they occur (the 1963 
Hot Line agreement) and to build confidence between potential adversaries (the 
1975 Helsinki Act). 
Despite the important distinctions between arms control and disarmament 
highlighted by Bull, and Spanier and Nogee, there are some problems in their 
definitions which need to be recognized. for Bull, arms control involves 'restraint 
internationally exercised'. What is not clear from this is whether Bull is saying 
that arms control can only exist between states or whether it can involve restraint 
within states. The Dayton Accords of 1995 was international, in the sense that a 
number of states were involved in the Agreement, it attempted to regulate 
armaments within Bosnia. Similarly, the Good Friday Agreement in Northern 
Ireland attempted to secure the decommissioning of paramilitary arms within 
Ulster. What this suggests is that arms control (and disarmament) can be intra- 
state as well as inter-state. 
The definition by Spanier and Nogee is more problematical because it focuses 
attention specifically on arms control in the nuclear era. The implications of this 
seem to be that arms control did not happen before the nuclear age and that 
nuclear arms control is all that matters when it comes to achieving international 
peace and security. In practice, as we will see in the next section, and the ones 
that follow, arms control has a long history and even in the nuclear age non- 
nuclear arms control has been a major and recurring feature of international 
negotiations and diplomacy. 
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Kev Points 
0 Disarmament seeks the abolition of weapons, whereas Arms Control seeks 
to restrain weapons 
0 Disarmament sees weapons as a cause of war, while Arms Control sees 
weapons as both a source of stability and instability 
0 Disarmers believe that weapons can be abolished and international 
relations transformed. Arms controllers do not believe that weapons can 
be abolished or that international relations can be significantly changed. 
0 Different approaches to Disarmament emphasise liberal education, 
political settlements, gradual reductions and the need for immediate 
abolition 
0 Arms Control can take two forms: “structural” and “operational” 
The Historical Record 
In order to understand the relationship between disarmament and arms control 
measures and assess their success we need to turn now to an analysis of the 
historical record. For the sake of convenience this record will be divided into 
four main phases: from 1900 to the Second World War; from 1945 to the early 
1960’s; from the early 1960’s to the mid-80’s; from the mid-80s to the present. 
Phase One: 1900 to 1939 
Although there are some early examples of disarmament ( for example, the 1817 
demilitarization of the US-Canadian border), it was not until the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century that significant diplomatic progress took place. Tsar 
Nicholas I1 was responsible for calling the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 
to try to limit the level of armaments. Although a permanent Court of 
Arbitration was set up as a result of the conferences very little was achieved. In 
practice, many of the European powers were concerned about Russian motives. 
It was widely believed that the Tsar wished to cut back on the production of 
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armaments largely because of the strain on the Russian economy. Reflecting the 
lack of trust which was to become a perennial feature of later negotiations, the 
delegations at the Conferences were also suspicious of the unilateral advantages 
which they believed others were seeking at their expense. (Gatrell, 18) 
Box 1 
Arms Control in Historv 
'In the ancient world, with endemic warfare and simple weapons, arms control 
had two purposes. first, it was used at the end of conflicts to create new strategc 
relationships as , for, example, in the Rome-Carthage agreement of 201 BC. 
Under this the Romans imposed thefoedus inaequum , or unequal treaty, on 
Carthage through which Carthage had its navy eliminated, had to destroy its 
war elephants, pay reparations, and was forbuidden to undertake any military 
action in regions adjacent to its home cities. Second arms control was used by 
political leaders to create or perpetuate stability between their political entities. 
One such example was the agreement between the Egyptian Rameses 11 and the 
Hittite Hattusilis 111 following the battle of Qadesh around 1280 BC, to separate 
their empires by establishing a neutral zone. 
During the Middle Ages, arms control was used to only one purpose: to create an 
orderly state of affairs in the Christian world as in, for example, the Truce of God 
proclaimed in the Diocese of Elne in 1027. The Truce included a requirement not 
to fight on the Sabbath, and the penalty for breaking these restrictions was to be 
declared anathema and face excommunication. 
The period between the Peace of Westphalia and the Treaty of Versailles, saw the 
emergence of nation states, the development of the technology of warfare, and 
the further evolution of attempts to create rules for the use of violence. Arms 
control was utilizes in three ways. First, it was used at the end of conflicts to 
create new strategic relationships, as in the Treaty of Utrecht. In order to 
maintain a balance, under article 1X the French agreed to British demands 'that 
all the fortifications of the City of Dunkirk be razed, that the Harbour be filled 
up, and that the Sluices or Moles which serve to cleanse the Harbour be Levelled, 
and that the said King's own Expense, within the space of Five Months after the 
Conditions of Peace are Concluded and Signed...'. Second, arms control was 
used to create or perpetuate stability between states, as in the Rush-Bagot 
Agreement of 1817, by which the United States and the United Kingdom 
(subsequently Canada) agreed to the naval demilitarisation of the North 
American great Lakes ..... Third, arms control was used to develop norms of 
behaviour regarding international violence, as in the Hague Conventions which 
in 1899 and 1907 set out a series of restrictions on the right to wage war. 
Examples included prohibitions on the use of poisoned weapons, the killing or 
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wpunding of prisoners, and the unnecessary destruction or seizure of property 
of the enemy.’ 
Croft, 1986 
It took the horrors of the First World war to renew further efforts at 
disarmament. The Treaty of Versailles represented an attempt by the victors to 
limit further German aggression by forcibly restricting the armaments it could 
develop and deploy. Attempts were also made in 1925 with the Geneva Protocol 
prohibiting the use (but not the manufacture and stockpiling) of poison gas, and 
with the Kellog-Briand Pact in 1928 to renounce war as an instrument of national 
policy. One of the most notable set of arms limitation agreements of the era, 
however, came with the Washington and London Naval Treaties of 1922 and 
1930. The Treaties involved a highly complex bargain mainly between Britain, 
the United States and Japan, in which the parties agreed to: 
stop building capital ships for ten years (subsequently extended by 
a further five years) 
a 5:5:3 ratio among their navies 
a 35,000 ton limit on capital-ship displacement and a 16 inch caliber 
limit to the main armament 
Although these naval treaties have sometimes been regarded as ”a remarkable 
achievement”, it has been pointed out that they did not stop the slide to the 
second world war. (Gray) For the critics of arms control in general the 
Washington and London Treaties provide a number of key lessons. The first, 
and most important, of these is that such agreements can only be negotiated 
when the international political climate is benign, but they fall apart when the 
political atmosphere is hostile. In the early 1920s and 1930 international relations 
were conducive to cooperation between states. By the mid-to late-l930s, 
however, the growing political storm saw both Imperial Japan and Nazi 
Germany refusing to be bound by earlier a r m  limitation agreements. 
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A second lesson identified by critics is that totalitarian government, not 
contained by public accountability and the rule of law, often cheat on the 
agreements they sign. This was true of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s with its 
secret attempts to overcome the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and both 
Japan and Germany in the 1930s with their open refusal to be bound by the 
obligations of the Naval Treaties 
A third, and related, criticism is that democracies are particularly ill-suited to 
responding to breaches of arms control agreements. Despite the abrogation of 
the Naval agreements by Japan and Germany, Britain and the United States were 
very slow to respond to the emerging threat in the late 1930s. In Britain’s case, 
appeasement rather than rearmament was the initial response. Linked to this is 
the argument that the actual terms of the agreement tended to tie the hands of 
the democratic powers to respond in a flexible manner to the rapidly changing 
circumstances of the late 1930s. In this sense, it could be argued that the 
agreements helped to diminish international security (at least for the status quo 
powers) rather than increase it. 
Although there were some benefits which emerged following the 1921 
Washington Treaty ( the avoidance of transatlantic naval rivalry and Japanese 
acceptance of the Nine-Power Treaty on China), in general the Treaties did not 
help significantly to avert war in 1939 and do not appear to have contributed in 
any meaningful sense to improving the political climate of international relations 
during the 1930s. (For a slightly different view see Croft, 1996). The same was 
true of the various attempts made by the League of Nations during the inter-war 
period to achieve world disarmament. In 1925 the League Council appointed a 
Preparatory Commission for a World Disarmament Conference which resulted 
in 1932 in Geneva in the setting up of the World Conference on the Reduction 
and Limitation of Armaments. With military force once again coming to the fore 
as an instrument of policy in the 1930s (the ‘Devils decade’), however, the 
Conference proved to be totally ineffective. 
Box 2 
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The Historical Record I (1900-1939) 
1899 & 1907 The Hague Conferences 
1919 The Treaty of Versailles 
1922 The Washington Naval Treaty 
1925 The Geneva Protocol 
1925 
Conference 
1928 The Kellog Briand Pact 
1930 The London Naval Agreement 
1932 
Limitation of 
1935 The Anglo-German Naval Agreement 
Prepatory Commission for a World Disarmament 
The World Conference on the Reductions and 
Armament 
Phase I1 1945-1962 
Following the problems of the interwar period, disillusionment with 
disarmament and arms control not surprisingly characterized the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War. The limited attempts that were made only 
helped to reinforce the skeptical judgment of the day. The most significant 
postwar proposal came with the US Baruch Plan in 1946. This was designed to 
achieve a supervised abolition of nuclear weapons, together with international 
control of nuclear research and production for peaceful purposes. It was 
envisaged that the whole process would be controlled by an International 
Atomic Development Authority. On the surface the proposal looked very 
promising, but from the perspective of the Soviet Union, it appeared much less 
attractive. The leaders in the Kremlin viewed it as an attempt to maintain an 
American monopoly of the knowledge of nuclear weapons. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, their suspicion of US motives led to a rejection of the Plan. In its 
place they suggested a ban on the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and 
the destruction of the existing (US) stockpiles. They were not, however, 
prepared to accept any system of effective inspection. This proposal, in turn was 
rejected by the Americans on the grounds that they would be giving up their 
nuclear programme without any guarantee that the Soviet Union would not 
produce a bomb of its own in the future. 
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These negotiations on the international control of nuclear weapons represents 
probably the best opportunity the world community has had to eliminate nuclear 
weapons. The fact that it did not happen reflects a number of the underlymg 
problems with disarmament as an approach to peace. The proposals, put 
forward by both the United States and the Soviet Union as their political 
relationship deteriorated, reflected their own distinctive national interests and 
also contained a strong propaganda element. Neither side was prepared to take 
risks with their own security (as they perceived it), especially when it came to 
weapons which could have a decisive influence on a future conflict. Far from 
contributing to easing the growing tension between the two powers in the late 
1940s, the international control negotiations only helped to exacerbate mistrust 
and heighten hostility. 
Much the same kind of lessons characterized disarmament negotiations during 
the first half of the 1950s. The first Soviet atomic test in 1949 was followed by the 
first American thermonuclear test in 1952 and a similar Soviet test in 1953. 
Against this background of these very rapid technological developments a 
'parallel monologue' took place in the early 1950s on a range of far-reaching 
multi-stage disarmament plans. Both sides focused on the issues that affected . 
their security interests most, proposing cuts in those areas where they were 
inferior to the other. As a result no progress was made. 
By the mid-1950s the lack of success in disarmament negotiations and growing 
awareness of the dangers of nuclear war caused a recognition that a change in 
approach was needed. It was increasingly evident that the chances of the super 
powers agreeing to a comprehensive disarmament treaty were slim. As a result 
attention began to be focused on what were known as 'partial measures' 
designed to deal with specific problems. Faced with growing anxieties about 
surprise attacks President Eisenhower proposed an 'Open Skies' arrangement in 
1955 which would break down the secrecy and distrust which existed by 
allowing aerial inspection to ensure that aggressive actions were not being 
prepared. This was followed by negotiations in Geneva on a nuclear test ban, 
proposals for atomic free zones and disengagement plans designed to reduce 
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forces in certain critical areas like central Europe (for example, the 1957 Rapacki 
Plan). 
This move towards greater flexibility at the policy level led to what has been 
described as 'new thinking' within the defence community. Although the ideas 
that emerged were not as original as the proponents sometimes claimed, a new 
literature began to appear in the late 1950s developing the theory of arms control. 
In contrast to the literature on disarmament the writing on arms control largely 
questioned the feasibility of general and comprehensive disarmament and 
argued that greater international stability could be achieved by more effective 
arms management. Attention was focused on the mutual interest which existed 
between the super power adversaries to avoid nuclear conflagration. This 
approach was summed up in the work of Schelling and Halperin. They argued 
that arms control included: 
'all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the 
interests of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it 
occurs, and the political and economic costs of preparing for it. The 
essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, 
of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential 
enemies with respect to their military establishments. Whether the most 
promising areas of arms control involve reductions in certain kinds of 
military force, increases in certain kinds of military force, qualitative 
changes in weaponry, different modes of deployment, or arrangements 
superimposed on existing military systems, we prefer to treat as an open 
question'. 
The aim was to focus on those 'most promising areas' of arms limitation which 
might involve reductions in armaments, but which might equally involve new 
arrangements at higher levels if that helped to make war less likely. The purpose 
was to work within the prevailing system of nuclear deterrence rather than to try 
to abolish it. Arms control was designed to "strengthen the operation of the 
balance of military power against the disruptive effects of the arms dynamic, 
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especially arms competition, arms racing and technological developments that 
tend to make nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence more difficult” (Buzan and 
Herring, 212). The essential aim was to make deterrence work better through 
managing armaments and thereby enhancing stability. 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s there were still residual attempts to achieve 
General and Comprehensive Disarmament (GCD). Khrushchev put forward a 
plan for ’total disarmament at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
September 1959. This led to the McCloy-Zorin talks in 1961 which culminated in 
’Agreed Principles’ in 1962 and a draft plan for General and Comprehensive 
Disarmament which was later discussed by the United Nations Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee in Geneva. Like similar earlier talks, however, this 
plan came to nothing. In contrast, some impetus was given to the ’partial 
measures’ approach by the Antartica Treaty of December 1959 which prohibited 
all military activities in this particular region. The Antartica Treaty was of 
significance because it set the scene for a number of ’other preventive’ arms 
control agreements which were reached in the following twelve years (eg the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1971 Seabed Treaty). 
Box 3 
Phase I11 1962-1985 
Even more impetus to the arms control project was given by the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in October 1962. As the superpowers edged back from the nuclear abyss 
both realized, more than ever before, that they had a mutual interest in more 
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effective crisis management. The crises highlighted the dangers of 
misinterpretation during periods of intense political instability. In June 1963 the 
United States and the Soviet Union signed a 'hot line' agreement to provide a 
secure and instant channel of communication between the leaders of both states. 
Four years later, during the Arab-Israel war, the hot line was used for the first 
time to achieve reassurance and prevent the crisis from dragging in each of the 
superpowers in support of their respective allies. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis also concentrated the minds of the key decision-makers 
on the issue of nuclear testing. Despite previous negotiations and periodic 
moratoria on testing in the 1950s, it had not proved possible to secure a lasting 
agreement. In line with the less ambitious agenda of the new arms control 
school, the US, Britain and the Soviet Union agreed on a Partial Test Ban Treaty 
in August 1963. The treaty prohibited all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, but 
allowed tests to continue underground. There was also an escape clause inserted 
in the Treaty which allowed testing to be resumed after a period of three months 
notice. This was designed to protect signatories who felt threatened by future 
technological advances or cheating. Significantly, neither France nor China (who 
tested nuclear weapons in 1960 and 1964 respectively) were prepared to accede 
to the Treaty because they felt it benefited the more advanced nuclear states. 
Limited as the Treaty was, it did help to encourage further development in a r m  
control. Between 1963 and 1968 the superpowers focused their attention on their 
mutual interest in trying to negotiate a wider agreement which would prohibit 
further nuclear proliferation. This culminated in the Non-proliferation Treaty 
being signed in July 1968. Once again China and France refused to sign, and a 
number of other states rejected the treaty on the grounds that it froze the nuclear 
status quo and involved only a limited commitment by the nuclear powers to 
give up their own weapons. 
The nuclear explosion by India in 1974, ostensibly for peaceful purposes, 
highlighted some of the weaknesses of the Treaty. Despite this, the Treaty 
provided some limited, but not unimportant benefits. It became the central 
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plank in the subsequent development of a non-proliferation regime which 
helped restrain the pace of further nuclear proliferation. It also emphasized the 
opportunities for cooperation between the superpowers even at times of political 
difficulty between them. 
This was shown in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968. Between 1969 and 1972 the superpowers focused for the first time on the 
difficult task of limiting strategic armaments. In May 1972 the SALT I 
Agreement was signed covering a number of different areas. These included 
limitations on anti-ballistic missile deployment ( the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty), an Interim Agreement on offensive strategic missiles, and a Protocol 
dealing with submarine-launched missiles. The aim was to 'cap' missile 
deployments at certain (increased) levels in order to prevent a future unrestricted 
arms race which would lead to greater international instability. Despite the 
unprecedented nature of the agreement, it quickly became the subject of 
criticism, both within the United States, and in the arms control community 
itself. For domestic critics of the US government, it froze the numerical 
superiority of the Soviet Union while at the same time allowing the Soviet Union 
to compete in those qualitative areas where the United States was in the lead. 
This failure to address the all-important qualitative issues (including accuracy 
and multiple warheads) was particularly disappointing even for many arms 
control supporters who were concerned that the arms race had simply been 
moved from the quantitative to the qualitative levels. 
As a result, it was not long before new negotiations began in Geneva. Progress, 
however, proved to be very slow. In June 1973 Nixon and Brezhnev committed 
themselves to complete an agreement by 1974. By July of that year, however, 
only very limited arrangements had been agreed: to adopt a threshold of 150 
kilo tons for underground tests and to limit the deployment of an Anti-ballistic 
missile system to one site. Neither arrangement was very significant but both 
sides agreed to continue the process of negotiation. By November a further 
Accord was reached at Vladivostock between Brezhnev and Ford agreeing 
ceiling for strategic delivery vehicles (2400) and Multiple Independently 
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Targettable Re-enty Vehicle (MIRV) warheads (1320). These ceilings were 
designed to provide guidance for subsequent negotiations and represented part 
of the complicated task of defining 'equal security' or 'priority' between the 
superpowers. Despite the apparent commitment of both sides to move towards 
a treaty growing difficulties in East-West relations meant that it was not until 
June 1979 that SALT II was signed. The Agreement eventually reached followed 
closely the guidelines reached at Vladivostock five years earlier. The ceiling for 
strategic delivery vehicles were set at 2400 (to be reduced to 2,250 by 1981); 1320 
for MIRVed ballistic missiles and strategic bombers; and 1200 for MIRVed 
ballistic missiles alone. 
Box 4 
The Limitations of Arms Control in the Cold War 
"During the period of East-West arms control between 1963 and 1979 ... the 
linkage of arms control to expectations of improved political relations proved 
to be a greater burden than the arms control process could bear. The process 
became deeply entangled with political detente, and the state of arms control 
talks was seen as a barometer of East-West relations. Any positive political 
influence exerted by the arms control process was easily overwhelmed by the 
intensifying US-Soviet rivalry in the LICs, growing US resentment at what it 
felt to be its loss of nuclear superiority, and growing Soviet resentment at what 
it felt to be a US attempt to re-establish nuclear superiority. Arms control was 
not able to insulate d6tente from East-West rivalry". (Buzan and Herring) 
Almost immediately, however, the arms control process was derailed by the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in January 1980 President Carter asked the 
Senate to delay the ratification of the Treaty. Although the SALT I1 remained 
unratified in 1982 both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to abide by 
the limits of the Treaty. Despite this tacit agreement, however, the following 
three years were characterized by frequent accusations by the Reagan 
administration that the Soviet Union was in breach of the Agreement. 
Difficulties in strategic a r m  control were also mirrored by the lack of progress in 
other areas during the ten years between 1975 and 1985. Attempts to negotiate a 
conventional arms control agreement at the MBFR talks became bogged down in 
complex technicalities and mutual recriminations. Following the Soviet 
deployment of SS20 missiles and subsequent Western deployment of Cruise and 
Pershing Missiles negotiations on Intermediate Range systems also served to 
exacerbate rather to improve international tensions in the first half of the 1980s. 
(See Box 4) 
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1972 SALT I Agreement 
1973 The Helsinki Final Act 
1973 
1973 
1974 Vladivostok Accords 
1974 
1979 Salt 11 Agreement 
1985 
The Partial Test ban Treaty 
The Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Agreement 
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Rist of the 
Nuclear War 
The Convention or the Prohibition of Biological Warfare 
the Production of Biological Weapons 
Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear Incidents 
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War 
Start of the Mutual Balance Force Reduction Talks 
The Treaty of Tlatelco (Latin America NWFZ) 
The Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific NWFZ) 
Phase Four: 1985 to the Present 
The first signs of change came with the Stockholm Accords in 1986. Following 
on earlier attempts to build confidence between East and West by the Conference 
of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Accords established an important 
precedent in enhancing transparency between the military blocs and especially 
by gaining acceptance of the idea of intrusive verification. With Gorbachev’s 
accession to power in the Soviet Union many of the traditional difficulties 
preventing agreement began to evaporate. A number of writers have argued that 
during the period from 1985 to 1989 Gorbachev adopted a distinctive strategy of 
Graduated Reduction in Tension-reduction (GRIT). According to this view, the 
Soviet leader continuously and persistently put forward initiatives designed to 
achieve a reciprocal response from the United States and thereby reduce tension. 
Although this strategy was not altogether successful in achieving the goal of 
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reciprocity (especially in the short term) Collins has suggested that ’it is difficult 
to imagine how the Cold War could have ended if neither superpower had been 
prepared to take an initial conciliatory step’. He goes on to argue that ’since the 
impetus for change came from the USSR - from the unilateral initiatives to 
crucial breakthroughs in treaty negotiations - Gorbachev appears to be the 
decisive figure (Collins, 1998; see also Box 5). 
One of the crucial breakthroughs occurred with the Intermediate Range Nuclear 
Forces (1°F) Treaty in December 1987 in which both sides agreed to abandon the 
deployment in Europe of all ground-launched theatre nuclear missiles with 
ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. This represented the first agreement to 
abandon an important category of nuclear weapons. Building on the Stockholm 
Accord it also introduced a very intrusive verification regime to support it. 
George Shultz, the US Secretary of State has argued that the Treaty came at a 
crucial time in the period leading to the end of the cold war. 
”The INF treaty.. . was a watershed agreement, not only because of 
its terms but also because it showed that large-scale reductions in 
nuclear weapons were possible: the United States and the Soviet 
Union could work out a complex problem of great importance”. 
(Shultz, 1130-1) 
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Proposal to halt deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in 
No. of SS-20 missiles reduced to 243. 
Announcement of unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. 
Moratorium extended. 
Plan announced to free the world of nuclear weapons in 15 
Moratorium extended. 
Reykjavik Summit - proposal to eliminate all nuclear 
Moratorium extended. 
Offer to eliminate Intennediate-range nuclear missiles. 
Moscow Summit - three point plan to reduce conventional 





Announcement at UN of plan to cut 500,000 troops, 
including 240,000 in Europe. 
14.2% cut in defence budget announced. 
500 tactical nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Eastern 
Europe. 
The ending of the Cold War brought a flurry of a r m  control activity. Following 
a number of years of detailed negotiation in 1991 a Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START I) was finally signed. Instead of imposing limits on increases in 
weapons START was designed to halt and reverse the arms race. Under the 
provision of the Treaty the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to reduce 
their nuclear arsenals to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads (of 
which 4,900 would be ballistic missile warheads, with a ceiling of 1,100 ICBM 
warheads). This was followed by a Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in 
Europe (CFE) in 1991, finally overcoming the impasses which had led to more 
than fifteen years of largely fruitless negotiations in the MBFR Talks in Vienna. 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin and Clinton continued the 
momentum of the early post-NATO years with a START I1 Treaty in 1993. The 
Treaty involved two main phases. Phase one was designed to run in parallel with 
the seven year timetable for START 1, with each side limited to between 3800 
and 4250 warheads at the end of the period. Phase two aimed to limit both sides 
to between 3000 and 3500 warheads by January 2003 (including the elimination 
of all ICBMs). As a result of a Protocol to the START 1 Treaty signed in May 
1992, it had been agreed, however, that START 11 would only enter into force 
once START 1 had been ratified by the US and Russia and entered into force. 
This also meant ratification by the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (UKB). This 
was eventually achieved in February 1994. The Russians refused to exchange the 
instruments of ratification for START 1 and its Protocol until the UKB acceded to 
the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. This was subsequently achieved in 
December 1994 when the Ukraine finally acceded to the NPT ( with the Belarus 
and Kazakhstan having acceded earlier). Following on from the progress made 
in these negotiations, in May 1995 the US and Russia agreed a 'Joint Statement on 
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Transparency and Irreversibility’. As the name implies, this was designed to start 
a process that would make,the reductions that had been agreed irreversible. 
After this Joint Statement, however, progress became more difficult to achieve. 
While the US Senate ap.proved the ratification of START 11 in January 1996, the 
Russian Duma held back. Concern in Moscow centred on three issues: the 
Treaty’s costs and strategic effects; the need to resolve a new debate over the 
ABM treaty before agreeing START 11 limits; and growing hostility towards 
NATO expansion plans. Some of these issues were dealt with (at least in part) as 
a result of subsequent agreements and the decision by NATO in 1997 to limit 
expansion for the time being to just three former members of the Warsaw Pact. A 
START 11 Protocol was agreed in September 1997 which deferred completion of 
Phase one of reductions from 2001 to 2004 and the second Phase of reductions 
from 2003 to 2007, thereby helping to defer Russian costs of dismantling its 
weapons. At the same time, US agreed to negotiate a START 111 agreement as 
soon as START 11 entered into force. The aim would be to bring the number of 
warheads down to 2000-2500 by 2007. Also in September 1997, ’Demarcation 
Agreements’ were reached which were designed to distinguish between US 
work on a theatre ballistic missile defence system against ’rogue’ states and a 
strategic system which would alter the balance between Russia and the United 
States. It was hoped that these ABM and START-related agreements would 
persuade the Russian Duma to ratify START 11 and its Protocol. They failed, 
however, to have their desired effects. 
Conventional arms control negotiations also proved to be difficult following the 
signing of the CFE Agreement in November 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet 
Union meant that the context of the Treaty fundamentally changed just as it was 
signed. The task of the negotiators then became how to adapt the Treaty to the 
new circumstances. Initially this involved trying to persuade the eight successor 
republics to divide up between themselves the entitlements and obligations of 
the old Soviet Union. This was achieved in mid-1992 but by mid-1995 new 
problems arose over the unwillingness of Russia to reduce its forces in the flank 
zones at a time when it was exneriencine difficulties in Chechnva. The issue was 
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discussed at the first CFE Review Conference in May 1996 when a new Treaty 
Map delimiting the boundaries of the flank zones was agreed, giving the 
Russians more freedom to deploy troops to the troubled region. Despite this 
agreement, attempts to achieve a more fundamental adaptation of the Treaty 
proved more difficult. It took until November1999 to negotiate an Agreement on 
the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe in 
Istanbul because of renewed fighting in Chechnya. 
The growing difficulty in making progress in arms control negotiations in the 
late 1990s was also experienced in a number of other fields. Despite the indefinite 
extension of the NPT in 1995, significant disagreements continued between the 
nuclear and non-nuclear states over the pace of nuclear disarmament (enshrined 
in Article 6 of the Treaty). At the same time the nuclear tests carried out by India 
and Pakistan in May 1998 demonstrated the fragility of the whole non- 
proliferation regime. The breakthrough achieved with the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 ground to a halt in late 1999 when the US Senate 
refused to ratify the Treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which 
entered into force in April 1997 also suffered from the failure of a number of 
Middle Eastern states to join, as well as implementation problems in many of the 
states that had adhered to it. Similarly, the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) suffered from the absence of a legally-binding verification and 
compliance agreement, regarded by many as essential to make it work 
effectively. Tensions have also arisen in recent years between the United States, 
on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, over US proposals to 
develop a National Missile Defense system which would require a modification 
of the 1972 ABM Treaty. 
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The Stockholm Accords 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) 
Missile Technology Control Regime (PVSTRC) 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Agreement) 
START I Agreement 
START 11 Agreement 
Chemical Weapons Convention 
The Pelindaba Treaty (African NWFZ) 
Indefinite Extension of the NPT 
Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement 
START 11 Protocol 
Demarcation Agreements (ABMT) 
NPT Review Conference 
Kev Points 
Disarmament agreements between 1900 and 1939 failed to prevent the 
drift to war either in 1914 or in 1939. 
The political antagonisms associated with the cold war meant that 
disarmament proposals between 1945 and the late 1950s were largely 
propaganda exercises, 
Arms control, as an approach to international security, emerged as a 
response to the earlier failures of disannament. 
The aim of arms control from the late 1950s on was to try and mitigate the 
the instabilities associated with nuclear deterrent policies. 
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Enthusiasm for arms control between 1962 and 1985 brought numerous 
agreements but were of only limited significance in easing tensions 
between the superpowers. Often they exacerbated the hostility. 
The period from 1985 to the mid-1990s was a more productive period for 
arms control and disarmament, leaving some supporters to believe that a 
new ”golden age” had dawned. Recent years, however, have seen 
growing difficulties over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START 111, 
the Chemical and Biological Conventions, and US research into a National 
Missile Defense system. 
The Lessons of the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras 
One of the key questions about arms control in the second half of the twentieth 
century is what role it played in helping to prevent war, in contributing to the 
end of the cold war, and what role it now plays in consolidating the new era of 
peaceful relations since 1989. It is worth spending a few moments considering 
two very different judgements. 
1. ’Arms Control has been of Crucial Importance’ 
For many arms control supporters the fact that war did not occur during the cold 
war indicates that the agreements reached, especially in the aftermath of the 
Cuban Missile crisisI performed their vital functions of preventing the outbreak 
of war between the superpowers. The Hot-line agreement, the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the SALT I and SALT I1 Treaties all 
contributed to a recognition that the superpowers had a vital mutual interest in 
avoiding nuclear war. According to this view, constant technological changes 
and mutual suspicions inherent in a system of international anarchy help to 
encourage arms competition which, in turn, pose dangers to international 
security. By addressing the instabilities of the military balance of power 
supporters argue that arms control significantly contributed to the absence of 
great power conflict during the cold war. Even those negotiations that didn’t 
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succeed, such as the MBFR Talks, are often seen as important events which 
contributed to greater understanding between the adversaries. Viewed from 
this perspective arms control has been the 'high road to peace'. 
Supporters also argue that not only did a r m  control help in preventing war but 
the agreements also contributed in an important way to ending the cold war. 
According to this view agreements such as the Stockholm Accords and the INF 
Treaty played an essential part in building confidence between East and West 
and creating the kind of trust which was crucial to the winding down of the 
adversarial relationship. Viewed in these terms, arms control was itself part of 
the process which broke the circle of mutual hostility between the United States 
and the soviet Union. The agreements reached were not simply a reflection of the 
improving climate of East-West relations. 
Those who support this positive role of arms control also point to the 
contribution it has made, and continues to make, in enhancing cooperation 
during the post-cold war era. According to this view, the START I and I1 
Agreements, the extension of the NPT and the signing of the CBT Treaty have 
helped to reinforce and further develop the trust created by earlier agreements. 
In this sense, arms control has played an important part in gaining wider 
acceptance of the idea of 'cooperative security'. The agreements have also 
helped to lock-in the signatories and make it more difficult for them to return to 
the kinds of politics they pursued during the cold war. This process will be 
enhanced, it is argued, by improvements to existing agreements, like the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxins Weapons 
Convention, and new agreements like START 111 and a Fissile Materials Cut-Off 
Treaty. 
'Arms Control has been Irrelevant' 
The more negative judgement is that arms control played little or no part in 
keeping the peace during the cold war, that it was insignificant in helping to end 
the cold war, and that it plays only a marginal role in the post-cold war world. 
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Indeed the opponents of arms control argue that the whole concept is fatally 
flawed. Writing in 1984 Louis J Halle put the point in the following way: 
‘In no other organized endeavour of the nations of mankind has so much 
work been expended to so little effect as in the efforts to achieve arms 
control. We must suppose that there has been something fundamentally 
wrong at the conceptual level to account for so consistent a failure on so 
large a scale over so long a period.’ 
According to this judgement the arms control agreements which were reached 
during the cold war had very little, if any, impact on the prevention of war. 
Testing continued, despite the Partial Test Ban Treaty; proliferation was not 
prevented by the Non-Proliferation Treaty; quantitative and qualitative 
improvements in strategic armaments continued in spite of (and because of) 
SALT I & 11; and MBFR wholly failed to achieve conventional arms limitation. 
Where agreements were reached, the states involved were often able to agree not 
to do-those things they did not wish to do anyway. Critics also argue that arms 
control negotiations were often used as a source of propaganda and as such 
helped, at times, to enhance distrust between the superpowers. 
It is often argued that arms control is possible when it is unnecessary, and 
impossible when it is needed. This is referred to as the ”arms control paradox”. 
In the context of the end of the cold war and the post-war era, arms control 
agreements simply reflect the thaw in the political antagonisms between East 
and West. INF, it is argued, reflected (but did not cause) the growing 
rapprochement of the 1980s. Similarly, C h ,  START I & I1 and the CBT were 
possible when more cooperative relations existed between the United States and 
Russia in the 1990s. However, this new political relationship made them largely 
unnecessary. 
Critics therefore see the agreements of the 1990s as being of little importance to 
the process of cooperation which developed between East and West. They also 
point to the fact that major problems continue to bedevil contemporary arms 
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control negotiations. In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention attempts to secure vital verification 
procedures have proved impossible to achieve. START 11 and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty still await ratification and serious difficulties 
have emerged over American proposals to modify the 1972 ABM Treaty to allow 
the deployment of a National Missile Defense System. Critics argue that despite 
the post-Cold war euphoria that the time had finally come for arms control, 
contemporary negotiations are creating more problems than they are solving. 
Kev Points 
0 Supporters of a r m  control point to the fact that war was avoided during 
the cold war and believe that arms control contributed to this. They also 
believe that arms control agreements contributed to the end of the cold 
war and are currently helping to maintain more peaceful relations 
between the great powers. 
0 Skeptics believe that the concept of arms control is fatally flawed, that 
agreements did nothing to help avoid war or to help bring the cold war to 
a close. They also argue that as political relations have improved post-cold 
war agreements have been unnecessary. 
Does Arms Control Make a Difference? 
Which, if either, of these two positions is correct? Is arms control 'the high road 
to peace' or a 'house of cards'? (Gray) The answer to this question raises very 
difficult problems for the student of strategic studies. If arms control is designed 
to 'reduce the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the 
political and economic costs of being prepared for it', we have the complex task 
of assessing how far these objectives have been, and are being, achieved in 
practice. But how can we establish 'cause' and 'effect'? It is difficult to prove or 
disprove whether a m  control has made or continues to make a difference. If we 
interpret 'making a difference' to mean making a contribution to initiating and 
maintaining peaceful, cooperative relations between adversarv states or ~ O U D S ,  
"1 I J u I '  
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how can we decide how significant arms control is in this process? Inevitably, 
this can only be a matter of interpretation and judgement. 
Our discussion of the historical record suggests that the skeptics are nearer the 
mark. However, to make a more balanced judgement we need to look in more 
detail at the impact of arms control on a number of key areas. These include: 
0 International stability 
0 Norms of behaviour 
0 Peaceful change 
These issues are inter-related, but it is useful to look at each one in turn. 
International Stabilitv 
One of the author’s of this study has written elsewhere that there is a great deal 
of ’analytical flabbiness’ when it comes to discussing concepts like ‘stability’. 
One of the central tenets of arms control theory is that a r m  control can head-off 
dangerous developments which arise from arms races and contribute to strategic 
stability and to crisis stability. This, however, implies that there is a connection 
between arms races and war and that there are clear criteria for judging 
’stability’. 
It is not altogether clear that arms races do lead to war. In some cases, such as 
the first world war, a good case can be made that the competition in armaments 
building did contribute to the political antagonisms which existed and played a 
significant part in the outbreak of war. In the case of the arms race between the 
superpowers during the cold war era, however, clearly war did not result. 
Whether the nuclear arms race contributed to international instability which was 
only prevented from escalating into war by a r m  control agreements is more 
difficult to judge. 
'Stability' and 'instability' are clearly political rather than military terms, but the 
politics can be affected by the armaments whch exist, or are planned. Instability 
is the result of political perceptions, but those perceptions are often formed by 
past or contemporary military policies pursued by other states. This is reflected 
in the perennial security dilemma between states. A state believes that its own 
armaments are defensive while those of others are often seen as offensive. What 
makes the policies of others appear offensive is a matter of political judgement 
about the threat which are conditioned by a wide range of issues, including 
historical animosity, ideology alliance affiliations, as well as contemporary 
military policies. 
In the cold war period arms control attempted to deal with the problems of 
perceived instability which arose from the military competition between the 
superpowers. Some of these attempts were successful, most were not. It was felt 
in the early 1970s that strategic stability (defined in terms of a rough calculation 
of military parity and what appeared to be a growing consensus about the 'rules' 
of nuclear deterrence) was threatened by an unrestricted arms race in both 
strategic offensive missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems. Concern existed 
that a quantitative and qualitative gap might appear in offensive missiles and 
deployment of ABMs by one side before the other might undermine the whole 
basis of the Mutual Assured Destruction basis of deterrence (on which strategic 
stability was generally believed to rest). The SALT I Agreement in 1972 
succeeded in restricting the deployment of ABMs but failed in its attempts to 
limit offensive missiles because it did not address the problem of qualitative 
developments. The Agreement therefore e&anced stability in one sense but 
undermined it in another sense by channeling the arms race into MIRVed 
technology and creating further distrust as well as uncertainty. Subsequent 
attempts to try and address the qualitative arms race with the SALT I1 Treaty 
failed with the withdrawal of the Treaty from the Senate ratification process 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Both sides agreed to be bound by 
the Treaty but the deterioration in East-West relations in the early 1980s led to 
accusations of cheating and non-compliance. Strategic stability was further 
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undermined by military doctrines of both superpowers which increasingly 
emphasized warfighting strategies. These helped to further encourage open- 
ended arms competition and played down the search for areas of mutual 
cooperation. 
One of the great concerns during the cold war was that the vulnerability of 
weapons systems might encourage a surpr se attack during periods of crisis. 
Arms control was seen as a means of helping to enhance crisis stability. The Hot- 
line Agreement in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis and the late 
agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear Incidents (1972) were designed to try 
and achieve these objectives. Such measures seem to have been of some value. 
For example, they did not prevent the confrontation which occurred in the 1973 
Middle East crisis when the US placed its nuclear forces on alert, but the hot-line 
did help the leaders to de-escalate the crisis. 
Arms control has also been used to enhance crisis stability by trying to 
restructure military forces to make them less vulnerable to attack. The SALT 
Agreements were somewhat unsuccessful in achieving this objective. START 11, 
however, was more successful in trying to address this question and shift 
deployment plans away from weapons which were perceived to be de- 
stabilizing. Much the same can be said of the INF Agreement, the unilateral 
decisions to abandon short-range nuclear weapons in the early 1990s and the 
CFE Agreement in 1991. Although these agreements have been criticized (with 
some justification), a case can be made that they were designed to overcome 
some of the dangers which could arise in crisis situations. The INF Agreement 
and the reduction of short-range nuclear forces were designed to diminish the 
dangers associated with theatre and tactical nuclear weapons which could have 
used at an early stage in any conflict which broke out. One of the purposes of the 
CFE Agreement was to try and reduce the perceived dangers of offensive 
conventional strategies and surprise attack. Equally, a case can also be made that 
such agreements were only possible when the climate of international relations 
was improving. Whether they would/will 'lock-in' states during periods of 
. . -. . 
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hostility remains much less certain. Arms control, after all, is most needed, but 
most difficult to achieve, in periods of stormy political weather. 
In the early post-cold war period arms control agreements were relatively easy to 
achieve and helped to enhance the perceptions of stability. As relations between 
the United States and Russia became somewhat more difficult from the late 1990s 
the steady flow of treaties dried up. Congress in the United States and the Duma 
in Russia became less willing to take risks in the interests of international 
security. Narrower perceptions of national security became the order of the day. 
As a result, the notion that arms control agreements could enhance international 
stability was increasingly questioned in national capitals. When the United States 
put forward proposals to develop a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) 
system to provide protection against 'rogue' states, both Russia and China 
perceived the plan as being (ultimately) directed against them. For the United 
States, the NMD programme and changes to the ABM Treaty were designed to 
enhance international stability. For Russia and China, these plans were deeply 
destabilizing because they were likely to re-ignite the arms race between the 
great powers. Whether a compromise agreement (which reinforces the different 
perceptions of international stability) can be reached between the great powers, 
remains one of the great security questions of the day. 
Norms of Behaviour 
When judging the utility of arms control much depends on how much is 
expected of it. Should we seek absolute standards or more relative standards of 
performance in an imperfect world? Supporters of arms control, with some 
justification, often argue that the latter is more reasonable. If this is accepted, it 
can be argued that arms control has played a part in helping to establish and 
maintain certain norms of state behaviour which has enhanced international 
security. The 1925 Geneva Protocol on the non-use of poisonous gas, the 1968 
NPT, the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the 1996 CTBT, have 
all been designed to establish regimes to prevent certain kinds of destabilizing 
developments. 
The problem is that such norms are often weak or only reflect the preferences of 
powerful status quo powers. It seems likely that the non-proliferation regime 
will only last as long as it suits the interests of the non-nuclear (but nuclear- 
capable) states. In particular, it does not appear to have influenced the search by 
Saddam Hussain for nuclear weapons even though Iraq is a signatory. India nor 
Pakistan were signatories of the NPT but it seems likely that even if they had 
signed it would probably not have prevented them from undertaking their tests 
in May 1998. For India and Pakistan, the NPT was largely a Western device to 
prevent others from acquiring nuclear weapons while they held on to their own. 
There seemed to be a rule for one set of (nuclear) states, and a different rule for 
the set of (non-nuclear) states. . 
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While these criticisms are justified, the establishment of regimes and taboos 
against undesirable international behaviour are not unimportant. For some, the 
effects of this kind of arms control are so limited as to be almost worthless. Such 
a judgement, however, tends to go too far. In the case of non-proliferation there 
are many reasons why states do not develop nuclear weapons and the regime is 
unlikely to be decisive in its impact on states thinking about developing such 
weapons. The regime, however, puts up barriers and increases the political price 
of going nuclear. While it is impossible to quantify its benefits, the fact that so 
many states have signed the NPT seems to indicate that for them (and for 
different reasons) it performs a useful and not unimportant role. The 
international community clearly feels that the world is a safer place with it than 
without it - despite all of its imperfections. 
Peaceful Change 
Linked to the establishment of certain norms of behaviour is the question 
whether arms control can contribute to peaceful change in international politics. 
Once again this is the subject of considerable controversy between supporters 
and critics of arms control. It also requires a judgement which is difficult if not 
impossible to prove. 
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For the critics, arms control reflects the state of political relations but does not 
help to shape them. According to this view, there has to be a prior improvement 
in international relationships before arms control becomes possible. During the 
cold war there were periods of detente when arms control appears to have 
played a part in helping to enhance confidence between the adversaries. This 
happened in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis and in the early 1970s. 
However, these were short-lived periods and more hostile relations followed. 
The effects of arms control were clearly limited and temporary. There is very 
little evidence of arms control significantly helping to improve superpower 
relations during periods of hostility. Indeed the evidence seems to support the 
view that differences over arms control more often than not exacerbated the 
problems which existed. SALT, lvIBFR and CSCE negotiations were often the 
occasions for major recriminations between East and West. 
In contrast, a rather different case can be made about arms control in the late 
1980s and 1990s. While the end of the cold war had many causes, arms control 
played a limited, but not unimportant, part. The GRIT-type initiatives by 
Gorbachev between 1985 and 1989 (See Box 5), the Stockholm Accords, the INF 
Agreements, the START negotiations and progress in conventional arms 
discussions, all contributed to breaking down the barriers of mutual mistrust 
between Washington and Moscow. Initially at least, the effects were largely 
psychological, but no less important for that . For President Bush conventional 
and nuclear negotiations during this period were 'part of creating a context of 
progress in East-West relations'. They were an integral part of the process, not 
independent from it. 
This said, there is certainly something in the argument that arms control becomes 
much easier when the political climate is benign. It is true that it does not follow 
from this that arms control does not play a part in helping to initiate and then 
maintain peaceful change once it has occurred. The START & CFE Agreements, 
the extension of NPT and the signing of CBT have all helped to continue the 
process of reassurance and building trust between the former adversaries. 
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Unfortunately, disagreements in other areas, over NATO expansion and 
involvement in the former Yugoslavia, and, as noted above, over American 
interest in deploying a National Missile Defense system, as well as domestic 
anxieties in both countries over the ratification of arms control agreements, has 
led to a faltering of the process of continuing peaceful change in recent years. 
Political relationships are complex and arms control is only one part of the 
process which determines how the relationship develops. 
Kev Points 
With the possible exceptions of the Hot-Line agreement and the NPT arms 
control made very little contribution to international stability during the 
cold war. 
More attention has been given to crisis stability in the post-cold war 
period. It remains to be seen, however, whether the agreements reached 
are capable of surviving in a more hostile political environment. 
Depending on one’s expectations, a case can be made that arms control 
regimes do contribute to international security. The norms, however, are 
fragile and easily flouted. 
Whether arms control contributes to peaceful change remains a highly 
contested question. Arms control is part of the political process 
influencing inter-state relations, but not necessarily, or often, a decisive 
part. 
Conclusion 
Even though arms control are part of the political process and can contribute to 
peaceful change, it does not mean that it is either the decisive element in 
achieving international (or domestic) security or that it can necessarily prevent 
or survive a serious deterioration of political relations. An analysis of the 
reasons for peaceful change in international relations during the late 1980s and 
1990s would have to include a wide range of other, perhaps more, important 
factors, including powerful economic forces, and especially political events in 
central and eastern Europe. Should relations between the major powers 
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deteriorate in the future we should not necessarily expect these states to comply 
with the agreements they signed in the 1990s. As Colin Gray has argued 
elsewhere: ’Sovereign states simply cannot be locked into arms control 
structures that express yesterday’s political assumptions and power relations.’ 
It does not, of course, follow from this that arms control regimes are wholly 
irrelevant in the search for international security, or security within states. 
Because the agreements are not universally binding and may not in themselves 
decisively influence interstate political relationships, especially during periods of 
hostility, it does not mean that they cannot be a (sometimes significant) part of a 
process of achieving and maintaining better relations between states. Admittedly 
the historical record is not a very positive one and exaggerated claim need to be 
treated with some skepticism, there is some evidence that not only is arms 
control perceived to be necessary but, if expectations are limited, that it can have 
some utility in contributing to international security. It is significant that in the 
post-cold war era there has been an important shift towards arms control and 
disarmament in regional and domestic contexts. The Dayton Accords attempted 
to provide military ratios ( in terms of tanks, artillery, aircraft, helicopters, and 
armoured personnel carriers) between the Serb Republic, the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation, Croatia and Yugoslavia. There has been some movement in the task 
of achieving the decommissioning of arms in Northern Ireland as a result of the 
Good Friday agreement, and in United Nations efforts to facilitate disarmament 
in Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia and Mozambique (all with varying degrees of 
success). 
Arms control and disarmament are certainly not a panacea and disappointments 
certainly await those who put too much faith in the independent ability of a m  
limitation agreements to transform the basis of international politics. For all their 
limitations, however, disarmament, and especially arms control, can ‘make a 
difference’, especially in building confidence and contributing towards the 
reduction of tension between adversaries. As such, it seems likely they will 
remain an important part of the search for greater global security in the future. 
At the same time, it remains true, that, given their relatively limited 
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achievements, states are highly unlikely to rely on arms control and 
disarmament as central pillars of their security policies. 
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Opening Summary 
Has the nature of terrorism and guemlla warfare shifted to the extent that it is 
no longer concerned with politics or political change? In order to address this 
question, the roots of and assumptions behind historical insurgent and terrorist 
theories must first be understood. Sparking prairie fires, to paraphrase Mao Zedong, 
has seemed easy enough to do in theory but vexing in practice. If sparking and 
sustaining the fire is difficult, quelling it has proven even more so. The practical 
difficulties faced by governments under siege will be discussed in detail and counter- 
insurgency and counter-terrorism theory evaluated. Recent irregular warfare 
commentators have suggested that the strategy of irregular conflict has been 
transformed fundamentally along with its tactics. Regardless of perceived changes in 
its nature, irregular warfare and terrorism will continue to be the most numerically 
predominant forms of conflict for the foreseeable future. This is because irregular 
forms of violence are often the only practical method by which a weaker party can 
diminish and overrun an intractable foe to gain political power. 
Introduction 
At the height of the period in irregular warfare known as the ‘wars of national 
liberation’ , Robert Taber asserted boldly that ‘the guerrilla fighter’s war is political 
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and social, his means are at least as political as they are military, his purpose almost 
entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase Clausewitz: Guerrilla war is the extension of 
politics by means of amted conflict.’ (Emphasis in original; Taber, 1970: 26) 
Postmodernists and critical theorists, however, roundly reject this explanation of 
irregular conflict. Martin van Crevald (1991), for example, suggested that warfare 
itself had transformed into an intrastate cultural exercise devoid of political goals. 
Therefore, the idea was considered invalid that terrorism and irregular warfare were 
forms of ‘political violence’. The key to understanding current and future forms of 
conflict was not allegiance to the state or conflicts between them; what matters is 
‘blood and belonging’ (Ignatieff, 1994), or more specifically, a better understanding 
of the identity and contextual circumstances behind sub-state violence (Munck, 2000). 
Finally, some authors suggest that technology and ideology has transformed terrorism 
from an act designed for political effect to wanton mass destruction. 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the spirit of Carl von Clausewitz 
is still very much relevant to current and future terrorist and irregular campaigns. 
Historical experience cannot be summarily dismissed. Social, cultural and economic 
factors do play a substantial role in defining the character and conduct of irregular 
conflicts. But terrorists and insurgents (and those who fight against them) ultimately 
seek to achieve a political result from their use of military force. These political 
results in turn serve goals defined by states fighting insurgencies or those aspiring to 
change the system through armed conflict. 
To illustrate the point, the campaign conducted by the Rwandan Tutsis is an 
excellent example of the political motivation behind irregular military action. The by- 
product of the war in Rwanda, namely the genocide perpetrated by the Hutus, was 
widely attributed as evidence of the dominance of cultural factors in the ‘new dark 
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age’ of irregular warfare. The ethnic animosity between Hutus and Tutsis was a factor 
contributing to the violence, but the goal of the rebel offensive was the overthrow of 
the ruling Hutu majority and, ultimately, control of the state. In other words, the 
expression of ‘primordial violence’ embodied in the actions of the Hutu army and 
militias, however morally reprehensible, sought to achieve a policy goal and was not 
merely violence for its own sake. 
Definitions 
The study of terrorism and irregular warfare can be confusing given the degree 
of subjective interpretation involved. For example, one commentator asserts that more 
Americans die in their bathrooms every year than from terrorist attacks, whereas the 
US Federal government spent $10 billion dollars in fiscal year 1999 on initiatives to 
protect Americans from something less dangerous than their own bathtubs (Cat0 
Institute, 1996). Obviously there are significant differences in the method of mortality 
and such contrasts between dissimilar forms of statistics can only lead to 
misinterpretation. Much of the confusion associated with terrorism and irregular 
warfare stems from the use of either value-laden or emotive language. ‘Freedom 
fighters’ sound appealing and worthy of support whereas the term ‘terrorists’ conveys 
cowardly violence, fear and intimidation. ‘Guemlla’ still connotes a spirit of 
adventure and romance to rebellious Western youth, evoked by the memory of 
Ernest0 ‘Che’ Guevara nearly four decades after his death. There is also little 
agreement on what to call these types of violence: political violence, terrorism, 
irregular warfare, military operations other than war (MOOTW), low intensity 
conflict (LIC) [insert Figure 1.1 about here], people’s war, revolutionary warfare, war 
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of national liberation, guemlla war, partisan war, warfare in the enemy’s rear, 
imperial policing and small wars, among others. As if this was not confusing enough, 
the effectiveness of terrorist and irregular action is often questioned. Terrorist and 
irregular campaigns are seen as military nuisances that fail to or rarely achieve their 
stated political aims without the support of conventional forces. Even worse, critics 
add, irregular diversions detract from what military organisations do best, namely to 
prepare to fight against one another. 
In order to grasp the fundamentals of a subject as complicated and contentious 
as terrorism and irregular warfare, it is necessary to provide working definitions of the 
key terms. Some definitions tend to be extremely inclusive, as in the case of the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) bewildering outline of tasks that constitute MOOTW: 
arms control; combatting terrorism; DoD support to counterdrug operations; 
enforcement of sanctions / maritime intercept; operations enforcing exclusion 
zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance; 
military support to civil authorities (MSCA); nation assistance / support to 
counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO); peace 
operations (PO); protection of shipping; recovery operations; show of force 
operations; and, strikes and raids (Joint Warfighting Center, June 1995: 111-1). 
Alternatively, definitions may be rather exclusive, as in Donald Hamilton’s eight-page 
exploration of the term ‘insurgency’ and the thirty-eight-page investigation of what 
constitutes terrorism in Political Terrorism (Hamilton, 1998; Schmid, Jongman, et al, 
1988). 
For the purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined as the sustained use of 
violence by a small group for political purposes such as inspiring fear, drawing 
widespread attention to a political grievance and/or provoking a draconian or 
unsustainable response. Terrorism doses not result in political change on its own, but 
is undertaken in order to provoke a response. If irregular warfare is the strategy of the 
weak in order to combat the strong, then terrorism is the strategy of the weakest who 
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believe they have no alternatives. What separates terrorism from other forms of 
violence is that the acts committed are legitimised to a degree by their political nature. 
Hijacking, remote bombing and assassination are criminal acts but consideration of 
their legal status can be mitigated if camed out in the name of a political cause 
perceived to be worthy. The problem exists as to who considers the cause worthy 
enough, beyond the terrorists themselves, to overlook actions that can be potentially 
horrific. International sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians, for example, 
diffused much of the outrage that might normally have been expressed at acts 
committed in their name such as the Lod Airport massacre in May 1972. The same 
cannot be said of those responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 that 
crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. Terrorism has been based on the need to generate 
domestic and international empathy for a plight that ‘drove’ the terrorists to arms. 
Whether or not this remains so is the subject of discussion in the subsection on ‘new’ 
terrorism. 
Defining irregular warfare is as problematic as defining terrorism for vastly 
different reasons. Whereas terrorism is an emotive and subjective issue, many believe 
that irregular warfare is perhaps best understood by first considering what it is not. 
Irregular warfare is not conventional war or terrorism, for example, but it shares with 
them the use of force to achieve a political end. The crucial difference is in the form 
the violence takes. Terrorism seeks to bring awareness to a political grievance but 
rarely, if ever, results on its own in political change. Irregular warfare, on the other 
hand, is an attempt to bring about political change by using force of arms. The 
principal difference between irregular and conventional war is relatively simple: the 
latter involves adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment, training and 
doctrine. In an irregular war, the adversaries are asymmetric and the weaker, usually a 
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sub-state group, attempts to bring about political change by administering and fighting 
more effectively than its stronger foe. Individual irregular conflicts differ in character 
(social, cultural and economic aspects) and type (revolutionary, partisan, guerrilla, 
liberation or civil wars) but ultimately the ability to wield political power is the 
desired outcome. Irregular warfare is also characterised by the active and/or passive 
support and mobilisation of a significant proportion of the population. Coups, 
however, are not irregular warfare as they are revolutions conducted by a small elite 
azainst the ruling elite. Finally, external physical and moral support for an insurgent 
cause is a prerequisite for success. The point to remember is that these are attempts at 
functional definitions for the purpose of this chapter and not the final word on 
irregular warfare or terrorism. 
Definitions act as gateways into the areas of study but rarely convey its 
complexity in theory or practice. In addition, capricious categorisations can lead to a 
misleading and seemingly irreconcilable divide between forms of irregular conflict. 
Terrorism and forms of irregular warfare are plainly not the same activity. But how 
does one then classify the so-called ‘urban guerrilla’ phenomenon and its ideological 
impact on terrorist groups during the 1960s? In addition, some terrorist groups adopt 
parallel efforts that are more commonly associated with insurgencies - have they now 
become insurgents, do they remain terrorists or have they become something else? 
The Lebanese organisation known as Hizballah demonstrates the difficulties inherent 
in assessing irregular conflict. The group was responsible for spectacular acts of 
terrorism early in its history, including several high-profile kidnappings and the 
suicide bombings of the US Marine and French compounds in 1983. Yet members of 
Hizballah fought a protracted guemlla campaign against Israeli forces that led to the 
latter’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon after 18 years. Finally, Hizballah manages 
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a substantial number of public service operations largely funded by Syrian backers or 
monies derived from legitimate and illicit commercial operations. Ultimately, some 
arbitrary distinctions must be made in order to grasp the business at hand, without 
losing perspective on the numerous ‘grey areas’ endemic to the subject. 
Subverting the System: The Theory and Practice of Irregular 
Warfare 
In its most basic sense, those who undertake forms of irregular warfare and 
terrorism are trying to find a way to use their strengths, such as mobility, organisation 
and relative anonymity or stealth, against the weaknesses of their more powerful 
adversary. Bernard Fall reduced this equation even further when he suggested that 
‘When a country is being subverted, it is being out-administered, not out-fought’ 
(Fall, 1998: 55). But subversion is a time-consuming and resource-intensive activity 
that does not guarantee success. In almost every case, the length of terrorist and 
irregular warfare campaigns, successful or otherwise, are measured in multiples of 
decades as opposed to years. Exactly how to achieve success depends on the local 
permutations of key factors that eventually make their way from the praxis of the field 
into irregular warfare and terrorism theory. The factors can be grouped into four 
‘elemental’ headings: time, space, legitimacy, and support. 
These elements are not mutually exclusive and excellence in one category will 
not compensate for drastic shortcomings in the other three. Much like the dimensions 
of strategy, the elements of a successful insurgency or terrorist campaign are 
. ... . . . .  
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adversaries (Gray, 1999: 23-25). By way of brief excursion, regardless of how just the 
cause might seem to be and given adequate space and time, a terrorist or insurgent 
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campaign will still fail if there is no internal or international support behind it. 
Absolute cases, in which an irregular group has none of these elements, rarely occur 
or last long. The goal for the irregular leader is to strike an effective balance between 
the elements, offsetting weaknesses in one category with strengths in another and 
pitting the organisation’s strengths against enemy weaknesses. The weight given by 
different writers to, and perceived relationships between, elements create substantial 
variations in the theories. The point to underscore here is that terrorist or irregular 
theories are developed in response to circumstances unique to the conflicts in which 
they are developed. The result of trying to apply a theory to another conflict, without 
analysing the differences in context, leads to disaster. 
Time 
Time arguably is the most important element required for the successful 
conclusions of an insurgent and terrorist campaign. Most of the theoretical discourse 
on the subject reflects the importance of time. But time, much like the other elements, 
cannot alone win an irregular campaign. In one of the most lucid statements regarding 
the interactions between the elements mentioned above, Mao Zedong stated simply 
that his forces had ‘retreated in space but advanced in time’ (1963). Time is 
important, in that it allows an insurgent organisation to organize itself, to sap the 
resolve of its adversary and to eventually build the conventional forces with which to 
overthrow government. Mao organized the time in his theory into three sequential 
phases: the strategic defensive, the stalemate and the strategic offensive [Insert Box 
1.2 about here]. Each phase, carefully conducted, would lead one step closer to 
victory no matter how long it eventually takes. Mao understood from his experience 
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and reading that the sequence of phases leading to victory was not necessarily linear; 
friction, in the form of unforeseen circumstances, could lead to setbacks and perhaps 
regression to a previous phase of the insurgency. But time without victory would 
eventually lead to the exhaustion, collapse or withdrawal of the enemy. To draw 
further attention to the interrelationship between theoretical elements necessary for 
success from Mao, space permits manoeuvre and gives insurgents time to demonstrate 
their superior legitimacy to the population. With legitimacy over a period of time and 
given adequate space in which to manoeuvre, internal and external support can be 
gained. Having gained support, government forces can be weakened further through 
bolder attacks and a superior army created with which to win decisively. 
Most irregular campaigns are not short-term propositions and can remain 
unresolved for a substantial period of time, as in the case of the 28-year insurgency 
waged by the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) for political autonomy from 
the predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lankan state. There have been exceptions to the 
‘rule’ of the long, drawn-out guerrilla struggle, the most famous of which was the 
Cuban revolution (1967-1969). Led by Fidel Castro against the regime of Fuguenaldo 
Batista, this irregular war was concluded in just three years but featured incidents and 
actors of which revolutionary myths are made. A number of factors contributed to the 
rapid collapse of the government forces; in the vast majority of cases, however, few 
states are as corrupt, inept and fragile as the Bastista regime in the late 1960s. 
Brittle adversaries that allow for a relatively short irregular campaign are few 
and far between. There may be, however, pressing local circumstances that convince 
the insurgent or terrorist to take immediate action and forego the prolonged struggle. 
Carlos Marighella believed that circumstances in Brazil in the 1960s necessitated a 
response other than careful Maoist first-stage planning. The Brazilian Communist 
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Party talked about and planned for insurrection but Marighella viewed this as 
inadequate for a number of reasons. The most pressing reason was time; the Brazilian 
state grew stronger every month while the revolutionaries continued to talk much but 
do little. By taking action, Marighella believed that the ‘urban guemllas’ would build 
a critical mass for the guenilla organisation, catch the Brazilian state authorities off- 
guard and provoke an extreme response. In other words, the state of affairs within 
Brazil required that the relationship normally perceived between the guemlla and 
time be reversed. 
Space 
Space is a prerequisite for a terrorist or irregular strategy to succeed as it gives 
the advantage to the irregulars to decide where and when to fight. If their adversary 
appears in overwhelming numbers, irregulars can simply make use of space to 
withdraw and fight when the odds are in their favour. A defender against sedition 
cannot be everywhere at once without risking spreading forces too thinly and inviting 
attack from locally superior guerrilla forces. Space can be considered in two ways: 
tactically and operationally. 
Geographical features, such as formidable terrain that limits the manoeuvre of 
government forces, are a potent way that terrorists or insurgents offset their relative 
weaknesses in technology, organisation and numbers. Insurgents have used imposing 
terrain for tactical advantage, often against foes ill equipped to deal with the 
challenges presented by mountains, jungle, swamps and even deserts. For example, 
Afghan Mujahaddin used mountainous terrain as their forefathers did against the 
British to ambush and limit the mobility of the predominantly road-bound Soviet 
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forces. Urban terrain can also be an arduous obstacle as the Russians found in 1994. 
Chechen guerrillas used buildings and narrow roads to offset their weakness and 
isolate and destroy Soviet formations during the battle for Grozny. Terrain difficult 
for government forces provides insurgent forces with the opportunity to establish safe 
areas or bases from which to expand the struggle. 
Space in the operational sense involves consideration of force-to-space ratios. 
Given the amount of territory to be defended, terrorists or insurgents can partially 
make up for their operational or strategic inferiority by means of local superiority. In 
a terrorist or insurgent campaign, the government forces attempt to defend territory or 
resources that have political, economic, social and / or military value. More often than 
not, states have the resources to protect local targets but such protection overstretches 
resources at the national or international level. Lawrence clearly articulated the Arab 
force-to-space ratio advantage over the Turks during the Arab Revolt (1916-1918). 
Given the amount of terrain to be covered, Lawrence calculated that the Turks would 
need 600,000 troops to prevent ‘sedition putting up her head’ across the entirety of the 
Transjordan, a figure six times in excess of those available (Lawrence, 1920: 60). 
Force-to-space superiority does not imply that the irregulars need a huge 
geographic area in order to be successful. In the case of the guerrilla campaign 
conducted against the British in Cyprus, the nationalist group EOKA was limited to a 
space little more than three percent of that roamed by Lawrence’s forces. EOKA’s 
leader, George Grivas-Dighenis, based his strategy on the assumption that substantial 
numbers of British troops would attempt to put down the insurgency. EOKA members 
operated in small groups and conducted ambushes, bombings and assassinations. 
These actions convinced the British that the benefits of remaining in Cyprus were not 
worth the political price to be paid. 
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Support 
Few insurgencies or terrorist campaigns succeed without some form of 
support. After all, only so much equipment can be manufactured or captured for use 
by the insurgents. Insurgents must also look after casualties and continually replenish 
their supplies, including food and water. In addition, they must constantly update their 
intelligence on the whereabouts and activities of government forces as well as train 
new recruits. Support, however, is interlinked with and inseparable from the 
legitimacy of the organisation. Violence conducted without a comprehensible political 
purpose will generate little popular support. Without support, insurgents and terrorists 
will eventually succumb to the efforts of the state. Clausewitz suggested that support, 
in the form of public opinion, was one of the key centres of gravity in a popular 
uprising (Clausewitz, 1993: 720). There are two main types of support: domestic, or 
internal support; and, external support 
There are circumstances where external support may not be available for 
either a terrorist group or insurgent movement. Almost all theorists agree that 
substantial popular support is required to compensate for the resources available to the 
state. Even Carlos Marighella, who initially advocated that urban guemllas could find 
and seize the necessary resources in major towns and cities to sustain the struggle, 
eventually relented and recognized the need to cultivate rural popular support. 
Domestic support can be forced from the population, using terror and intimidation, 
but long revolutionary struggles should not rely exclusively on such measures. The 
role that legitimacy plays in sustaining support will be discussed in the next section. 
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Mao’s analogy of the support relationship between the guerrilla and the people 
has almost become cliched but is still evocative. The guerrillas were likened to ‘fish’ 
that swim in a ‘sea’ of popular support. Remove the sea from the fish and the latter 
eventually die. A dramatic example of the consequences of failing to have domestic 
support is the fate of Che Guevara. Guevara believed that conditions in Bolivia in 
1967 were ripe for a guerrilla insurrection led by his ‘foco’ [insert Box 1.3 about 
here]. One of the supreme miscalculations, however, was on the degree of support to 
be expected from local Communists and farmers, The Bolivian Communists were 
hostile to advice on how to run their revolution from outsiders. More importantly, the 
Bolivian peasants were indifferent to the message preached by Guevara. Although 
other factors certainly played a role, Guevara and his ‘foco’ lacked popular support 
and were either killed or captured within seven months of the first shots being fired. 
Support is also contingent on the circumstances prevalent in the individual 
country. A danger exists in trying to reproduce success elsewhere using a previously 
effective revolutionary formula without taking into account the basis for support. The 
uprising of the urban proletariat was considered a necessary in Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary theory but failed dismally when attempted in China (1930) and Vietnam 
(1968). The reason for failure in both cases had much to do with the agrarian 
character of China and Vietnam, as in both states the majority of the population were 
rural peasants. As a result, Mao Zedong and Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap 
respectively modified their strategies. 
The other form of support for irregulars - external - largely depends on both 
the geography of the country and the political relations that the insurgents or terrorists 
maintain. External support can be physical, in the form of resources or cross-border 
sanctuaries, or moral, in the case political recognition and lobbying. Many Marxist 
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terrorist groups during the 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  such as the German Rote Arniee Faktioii, received 
physical support from Soviet or client states in the form of money, advanced weapons 
and training. Insurgent and terrorist leaders in countries ranging from the Dutch East 
Indies (1950, later becoming Indonesia) and British Palestine (1948, later becoming 
Israel) received timely external moral support from countries as part of an 
international backlash against colonialism. External support for irregulars serves 
political goals of client states, from the weakening of a rival state fighting a proxy war 
to conducting limited war for limited purposes where the threat of nuclear or 
conventional escalation is high, as in the example of Kashmir between India and 
Pakistan. 
Legitimacy 
The use of armed force deficient in a moral cause or without reasonable 
justification is unlikely to be popular regardless of the level at which it is undertaken. 
Strong democracies can suffer the grumbling of public discontent over the use of 
airpower in Kosovo but will continue to survive even if another political party is 
elected as a result. The same cannot be said in the context of terrorism and irregular 
warfare, where internal or external support is required to sustain the struggle. The 
leaders of terrorist campaigns, perhaps even moie so than insurgencies, need to 
convey the reason for their actions or lose sympathy for its cause and suffer instead 
the wrath of the state and its incensed citizens. Terrorist and irregular leaders often 
seek to legitimise their use of violence and translate this into meaningful support for 
their cause in a number of ways: demonstrating moral superiority over those who 
represent the state; supplanting the functions of the state at the local level; and, having 
a persuasive message. 
The moral superiority of the guerrillas is a cornerstone of all irregular and 
terrorist theory. Insurgents derive support from the people and as a consequence it 
pays significant dividends to cultivate the relationship with them. Mao went so far as 
to outline a ‘code of conduct’ for the guerrillas, known as ‘The Three Rules and Eight 
Remarks’[Insert Box 1.5 about here], as a practical method to demonstrate their moral 
superiority. Almost all theorists agree that moral superiority must be demonstrated in 
daily conduct so that people differentiate the guemllas from bandits or ‘counter- 
revolutionaries’. Che Guevara insisted that the peasants understand that the guerrillas 
were as much social reformers, or moral and physical arbiters of change, as they were 
protectors of the people. 
Cooperating with the insurgents could bring harsh consequences on the 
peasants but this could serve to further legitimise the revolutionary cause. Abdul 
Hans Nasution, military leader of the various Indonesian guemlla actions against the 
Dutch from 1945-1949, pulled few punches in his description of the true character of 
guemlla warfare: 
It is common practice that an occupation army takes harsh measures against 
sabotage. Collective punishment, extensive torturing, even the elimination of 
whole kampongs [villages] and the machine gunning of the people on a mass 
basis is common. Therefore, a people at war must be prepared for all the 
consequences so that the people’s spirit will remain unbroken and will allow the 
guerrilla army to launch even harsher measures against the enemy (Nasution, 
1965: 35). 
Provoking a disproportionate government response would only drive the people 
further into the arms of the insurgents. The insurgents could then act as the avengers 
for the people and further cement the ties between them. Or, as Carlos Marighella 
hoped, the actions of the Brazilian authorities would demonstrate conclusively that 
the ‘government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and that it resorts simply to 
the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation in the country is 
transformed into a military situation in which the “gorillas” appear more and more to 
be the ones responsible for violence, while the lives of the people grow worse’ 
(Marighella, 1969). 
The niceties designed to demonstrate that the insurgents were better than the 
government read well on the page but often only applied to those who helped the 
insurgents. In a number of irregular conflicts, guerrillas and government forces alike 
equated an unwillingness to help with aiding and abetting the enemy. Absolute 
popular support can never be guaranteed, as the population will be split invariably 
into willing assistants, staunch foes and the undecided majority. In order to help make 
up the minds of those undecided as to whom they will support, without resorting to 
violent intimidation, insurgents can demonstrate legitimacy by becoming the de facto 
government in areas under their control. This can include ‘positive’ measures like the 
establishment of schools and clinics or ‘negative’ measures like tax collection. Other 
negative aspects may be considered necessary to bring a reticent population into line. 
The use of terror as a negative measure to intimidate the population is a matter 
of divisive debate in irregular warfare theory. For Che, terrorism is unjustified as it 
invariably de-legitimises the guerrilla’s message. Both Mao and Marighella disagree, 
noting that acts of terror may be necessary to convince the population of the 
occupational hazards of working for the government or to provoke a response. In 
practice, extensive discussion often proceeded and followed rural acts of terror and 
the Viet Cong often went to great lengths to provide the justification for their actions 
during the Vietnam War (1960-1975). Negative measures backed by proselytising can 
be an effective way of legitimising the insurgent by showing conclusively that the 
government can no longer protect them. 
The most powerful method of legitimising a struggle, to create considerable 
internal or external support, is to equate the military struggle with a justifiable 
political end. Causes vary but self-determination has been the most pervasive and 
successful rallying cry. Given the fundamental rights outlined in the Atlantic Charter 
(1941) and the United Nations Charter (1945), it was difficult for nations such as 
Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal to maintain possession of 
overseas colonies in the face of native insurgencies claiming the right to self- 
governance. The ideological dimension of the Rhodesian insurgency (1965- 1980) 
aside, few could argue against the cause of black majority rule. More recently, the 
legitimacy of the East Timorese claim of independence led to internal and external 
pressure on the Indonesian government to end a 25-year insurgency. Other successful 
causes blend social, cultural and economic issues into a powerful political message 
that the government or international consensus finds difficult to counter or resist. 
Protecting the System: Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism in 
Theory and Practice 
The difficulties facing governments besieged by insurgents or terrorists may 
seem insurmountable at first glance but numerous works have been written to explain 
how to quell them. Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism works range from 
general theories and practical suggestions, based on hard-won experience, to 
complicated empirical models purporting to predict outcomes or test practical advise. 
In the quest for parsimony and comprehension, commentators have reduced the 
complicated political-military struggle against forceful usurpers to a number of 
principles or formulas for success [insert Figure 1.2 about here]. Brigadier General 
Samuel B Griffith, noted Asian scholar, suggested in his translation of Mao’s Yu Chi 
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Chan that ‘antiguemlla operations could be summed up in three words: location, 
isolation, and eradication’ (Tse-Tung, 1961: 32). Griffith’s summary is a useful 
reference point for exploring how to apply the strengths of a state (or group of states) 
to an irregular threat. 
Location 
The most important phase of any counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism 
campaign is recognising that the threat exists. It is self-evident that there is a problem 
when car bombs explode or local police stations are attacked for criminal or psychotic 
reasons. Counter-insurgency expert Robert Thompson believed it necessary to tackle 
an insurgency during its subversion and organisation phase or at the first signs of a 
sustained campaign of violence (Thompson, 1967: 50). In other words, it is necessary 
to defeat insurgents in both physical space and time. The problem for counter- 
insurgents and counter-terrorists is applying the theory to practice or distinguishing 
between lawful forms of discontent. Restricting guaranteed rights and freedoms every 
time a bomb is detonated will question the credibility and intentions of the 
government. Waiting too long to uphold the rule of law, however, will give the 
insurgents or terrorists the necessary time to build an organisational infrastructure that 
only the most dedicated efforts stand a chance of defeating. 
Terrorism and insurgency can be staved off with enough early warning but this 
implies an effective intelligence gathering and assessment organisation already 
operating with a high degree of coordination. Few states possess such resources or 
foresight and subversion therefore remains an attractive option for the discontented. 
Those willing and able to destroy the system need to be identified and their 
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movements tracked and this requires the assistance of a supportive populace. The 
question in pluralist systems is whether or not potentially seditious individuals can be 
taken under surveillance and pre-empted without violating their civil liberties or the 
rights of others. 
Upholding the rule of law is crucial if states are to preserve the legitimacy of 
their cause and maintain the moral high ground over insurgents or terrorists 
(Clutterbuck, 1990: 10-1 1; Wilkinson, 1986: 127). Methods to counter terrorism, for 
example, must be as unobtrusive as possible. Consider airport metal detectors. They 
are an example of a method to prevent terrorism while remaining within the boundary 
of the rule of law. Most of us regard them as an inconvenience and a necessary evil to 
prevent the smuggling of weapons on-board. More intrusive modem scanners under 
consideration can show concealed items through clothes. But popular outrage has 
been expressed at potential infringements upon personal privacy out of proportion to 
the perceived threat. Managing how and when (and in what measure) to begin 
counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism efforts, such as imposing curfews and 
controlling movement, while upholding the rule of law by legitimising the actions 
taken is the primary challenge to any government under siege. In most democratic 
societies, however, the initial steps are rarely preventative and almost always afrer 
horrific acts of violence have been committed. 
Once an irregular threat has been identified from among the substantial 
ambient noise of discontent prevalent in open societies, the various civil and military 
agencies must localise the threat while keeping each other informed. On a practical 
level this means identifying safe houses, group members and sources of supply. 
Gathering such information about the terrorists can be a daunting prospect, given the 
desire of most subversives to keep the organisation small, stealthy and secret. For a 
19 
state providing direct counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism support into a 
geographically and culturally unfamiliar country, as the United States did in South 
Vietnam, obtaining even basic information on subversives takes time that only allows 
the insurgent organisation to grow. 
Isolation - 
The isolation of insurgents and terrorists from their bases of support is 
arguably the most important aspect of a successful campaign. For counter-insurgents 
isolation translates metaphorically into ‘evaporation’ of the Maoist ‘sea’ in which the 
guerrilla ‘fish’ swim. Isolation can be considered in two ways: physical separation 
and political motivation. Physical separation can be undertaken in a number of direct 
and indirect ways: removal of villagers into more easily defended compounds, known 
in Malaya and Vietnam as ‘Strategic Hamlets’; denial of access through preventative 
measures such as curfews, prohibited areas (‘no-go’ areas) and food rationing; and, 
aggressive patrolling and overt presence. Like any form of deterrence, the threat 
posed by patrolling and presence must be a credible one and not consist of ‘cordon 
and search’ or ‘search and destroy’ operations conducted to fulfil quotas, as was the 
case with US forces in Vietnam. Isolation also means limiting the mobility and range 
of the insurgents or terrorists, in effect taking away their space and their time. Finally, 
insurgents and terrorists must be cut off from their external sources of support by a 
combination of diplomatic pressure and tangible military measures. The French 
managed to impose the most literal form of isolation from external support upon the 
A m t e  Liberation Nationale during the Algerian insurgency (1954-1962): the border 
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between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia was shut down by a combination of wire 
barriers, guard houses and patrols. 
Segregating insurgents and terrorists from the population goes far beyond just 
physically separating them. In order to impose meaningful isolation, the state(s) must 
defuse the irregular’s most powerful asset: its message. Put simply, those elements 
that create a potent source of recruitment and support must be addressed by the 
government(s) on the defensive. Obviously, some messages are more influential than 
others: self-determination is difficult to counter by an external or occupying power 
whereas domestic measures such as land reform or increased political representation 
may be much easier to implement. The words of the government must be 
accompanied by effective deeds, to show that the state can and will respond to what 
amounts to political extortion. The terrorist or insurgent ‘propaganda of the deed’ 
must be diffused by government displays of firm, yet lawful response. The displays 
can include measures as stem as enforcing a ‘no negotiations with terrorists’ policy to 
relatively simple yet effective measures like improving crop yields or building 
schools and wells. The onus is on the representatives of the state to prove that they are 
morally superior to the guerrillas and terrorists and will provide for the needs of their 
citizens, including responding to the sources of disgruntlement that led to armed 
insurrection in the first place. Likewise, the terrorist or insurgent cause must be 
discredited and demonstrated to be illegitimate. Leniency should also be extended to 
those insurgents and terrorists who give up the armed struggle. Above all, the 
citizenry must be mobilised and accept that the state’s fight is their fight; the security 
of the population, in other words, depends on their ability to defend themselves. 
Popular support for the terrorists or insurgents must be denied through credible and 
efficient actions to win what Sir Gerald Templar called ‘the hearts and minds’ of the 
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population (Insert Box 1.5 about here). With little internal or external sustenance and 
a population willing to support the government actively and passively, i t  is only a 
matter of time and of political will before the forces of the state destroy the remaining 
irregular threat to its existence. 
Eradication 
In its simplest terms, eradication involves the physical destruction or 
annihilation of the insurgents or terrorists, although few would go so far as to follow 
Robert Taber’s rhetorical advice: ‘There is only one means of defeating an insurgent 
people who will not surrender, and that is extermination. There is only one way to 
control a temtory that harbours resistance, and that is to turn it into a desert’ (Taber, 
1972: 11). The state has numerous advantages over potential irregular usurpers given 
its ubiquitous resources, including political control over social, fiscal and military 
resources. The most important question in democratic states is whether or not the 
leaders of the state can apply its resources in a coordinated fashion to extinguish the 
insurgent flame without alienating popular support. Cultural context matters when 
determining a response. Canadians, for example, would not approve of measures like 
the so-called ‘Wrath of God’ retribution campaign conducted by the Israelis against 
those responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre. The methods by which 
insurgents or terrorists can be eradicated fall into two broad categories: active and 
passive. 
, 
Counter-insurgency theory is rife with active plans that discuss destruction of 
guenillas. These plans range from French Marshal Lyautey’s innocuous sounding ‘oil 
patch’ method applied in Morocco in the first quarter of the twentieth century 
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(Gottman, 1948: 248) to the more sinister Nazi German ‘spider’s web’ and ‘partridge 
drive’ tactics (Dixon and Heilbrunn, 1962: 215-216). In order to be successful, all 
theorists agree that significant resources must be committed to ensure that the 
insurgents find few safe havens. The accepted force ratio of government military 
forces to guerrillas is often cited as 1O:l .  This ratio does not include additional 
civilian manpower resources. In addition to regular military forces, most theorists 
state the need for the use of other specialised resources including: some form of 
special operations forces, or ‘guerrillas or terrorists in uniform’, to defeat the 
irregulars at their own game; and, use of technologies not available to the insurgents, 
such as helicopters and remote sensors, to overcome the force-to-space ratio deficit 
and achieve superior mobility. 
As insurgencies and terrorist campaigns are first and foremost political in 
nature, active military measures must be accompanied by positive political efforts to 
address the grievances at hand and de-legitimise the irregulars. There are also passive 
ways in which the state can subvert an insurgency and cause numbers of guerrillas or 
terrorists to dwindle. One such method combines psychological warfare techniques, 
promises of amnesty (the Chieu Hoi, or ‘Open Arms’ programme used in South 
Vietnam) and cash incentives (for weapons and information) to convince insurgents 
and terrorists that their struggle is in vain. Passive and active techniques are not 
mutually exclusive and can be combined for significant effect. During the bush war in 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe, 1965-1980), for example, a sizeable number of guerrillas were 
persuaded not only to give up the armed struggle but also to operate against their 
former comrades. The ‘pseudo guerrillas’, as they were called, would dress as 
insurgents and continue to patrol villages, gathering information on the whereabouts 
of other active guerrilla units. Occasionally, ‘pseudo guerrilla’ groups would ambush 
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guemlla units leading to mistrust and, occasionally, pitched battles among ‘friendly 
forces’ (Reid-Daly, 2000). Other passive measures include engaging in political 
dialogue with, and support for moderates within an irregular organisation and 
convincing them of the need to start talking and quit fighting. 
Regardless of the methods chosen and a surfeit of resources, the political will 
must exist to see measures through to the end in order to counter successfully 
terrorism and insurgency. The eradication of an irregular movement is a gradual 
process of attrition that, as has been mentioned previously, requires a significant and 
consistent investment in both time and resources. The historical record regarding the 
number of states whose leaders could sustain the political will necessary to defeat 
insurgents or terrorists indicates that strategic success is a rarity. Equally daunting is 
the fact that the underlying causes of discontent often resurface and the embers of 
insurgency are rekindled in a different form. With US assistance and proactive efforts 
the government of the Philippines conducted a textbook campaign of how to defeat a 
communist insurgency during the 1950s. Yet barely a decade later the government of 
the Philippines was faced and continues to be faced by Muslim separatist guerrillas, 
like the Abu Sayyaf group, who have sustained themselves with a rather lucrative 
trade in ransoming hostage. The effects of terrorism can often be limited through a 
combination of offensive and defensive measures, but ultimately bringing terrorists to 
justice, especially for crimes beyond state borders, requires significant determination 
and political will. In the case of the Libyans allegedly responsible for the Lockerbie 
bombing, it took the US twelve years and a substantial degree of third-party support 
to bring defendants to trial. 
Bringing the System Down or Thriving on its Margins: The Future of 
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare? 
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As outlined briefly in the introduction, the perception that terrorism and 
irregular warfare involve the use of force for political ends has been challenged 
recently. Many commentators argue that bringing about political change no longer 
defines irregular conflict given the new paradigm of the post-Cold War landscape. In 
other words, wars of national liberation and revolution have joined colonial small 
wars in the museum of ‘conflict past’; instead irregular threats are and will continue to 
be driven by a mixture of religious fanaticism, culture, ethnicity or technology. 
Religion + WMD = Apocalypse Now 
Terrorists and insurgents often had a religious aspect of their cause and used it 
to gain legitimacy and support among the faithful, such as Lebanese groups Hizballah 
or their rivals, the Christian Druze militia. Religion has been a powerful motivating 
element of political violence. In exchange for sacrifice resulting in the deaths of 
heathen others, earthly representatives of the faith promise religious terrorists a 
glorious afterlife. Authors such as Walter Laqueur suggest that threat to Western 
democracies is more present and dangerous given the availability and desire of 
religious-motivated groups to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as 
biological, chemical and even nuclear weapons. 
The congruence of religion, WMD and the belief that the end of mankind is 
nigh (millenarianism) has the makings of a frightful and very real ‘apocalypse now’. 
Brian Jenkins argued in the 1970s that terrorist use of nuclear weapons was unlikely 
as ‘terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead‘ (Jenkins, 1987: 
352). Modem religious fanatics, it is argued, do not march to a political drum. There 
is no need, therefore, to convey a message by action. The action is what matters and 
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the desired outcome is the purging of the non-believers and the acceleration of ‘the 
end of days’. Other evidence is cited to support this thesis: the ease with which ‘poor 
man’s atom bombs’, or chemical and biological agents, can be manufactured or 
acquired; the number of groups that have stockpiled such agents in the past; the 
decreasing frequency and increasing lethality of terrorist acts; and, the breaking of a 
so-called ‘WMD taboo’ by the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinryko in Tokyo in 
1995 (Laqueur, 1999). 
Warriors, Ethnicity and Non-Trinitarians 
Others suggest that the future of irregular warfare will be over differences in 
culture, as opposed to religion. Westerners have been used to warfare by established 
rules in which the combatants grapple with one another to achieve political aims. 
Over time we have developed organisations within our society to fight by those rules 
for us. Recent experience, in places like Chechnya, Somalia and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, suggests that Western soldiers will be faced by an inexplicable 
foe: the warrior enabled by culture. According to this argument, modem conventional 
forces of volunteer or conscripted soldiers cannot match wamors forged to fight as a 
part of their culture since birth (Peters, 1994). The availability of modem small arms 
and a disdain for Western rules of warfare gives the wamors their military superiority. 
Political aims matter not to Somali clansmen, high on khat, driving around Mogadishu 
in heavily-armed civilian vehicles. In other words, the warrior culture dictates the 
goals to be achieved, such as killing to prove virility and plunder, not politics. 
Closely tied with and perhaps inseparable from the cultural vision of irregular 
warfare is the perception that violence will be ethnic or identity-based. According to 
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Martin van Crevald (1991), the Clausewitzian trinity of the people, the state and the 
armed forces no longer exists. States are no longer viable political entities, as they do 
not represent the will of the people and instead collapse into pockets of conflicting 
ethnic groups. Without the state the means no longer exist to sustain the armed forces; 
therefore, the only surviving member of the trinity is the people. Conventional armed 
forces possess equipment useless in today’s wars because it is TOO 6 EFIBUP: too 
expensive, too fast, too indiscriminating, too big, too unmanoeuvreable and too 
powerfuI (Van Crevald, 1989). Major powers wiII not gain anything from conflict and 
vested interests exist within the state to ensure high levels of defence spending. 
Therefore, non-trinitarian sub-state actors will fight for profit and glory and 
industrialised countries will be unable to come to grips with this new manifestation of 
a very old form of warfare. 
Cyberterrorists, Infosurgents and Lone Wolves 
The last variation on the theme of a radical shift in irregular warfare centres on 
technology. The Internet transcends borders and therefore future irregular war will be 
fought in cyberspace. Given the vulnerability of websites and servers to hackers, it 
will only be a matter of time before terrorists take to the World Wide Web and 
become cyberterrorists (examples include Serbian and Indonesian hacking of 
opponent’s websites). The evidence of this future is plain to see in the present; the 
defacing of NATO and other websites is considered to be only a glimpse into what 
ambitious cyberterrorists can accomplish. The fear is that cyberterrorists and 
infosurgents will conduct electronic raids on vital national systems controlled by 
computers, from financial services to transportation networks and power grids. The 
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creation of fear by physical means is no longer necessary: information and the ability 
to control it will become its own form of power. 
Accessibility to the Web and the portability modem computer equipment 
allegedly gives new power to aspiring terrorists and insurgents. With a computer and 
a connection to the Internet, a single individual can do more damage than the 
members of the Japanese Red Army during their careers. More importantly, the dream 
of a functional ‘leaderless resistance’ (Beam, 1992) can be realised in which secretive 
individuals or small insurgent cells can share information and coordinate action 
without a hierarchical leadership organisation vulnerable to penetration and 
subversion. 
Conclusion 
States will continue to be plagued by terrorism and irregular warfare as long as 
individuals are willing to use violence for political purposes [Insert Figure 1.3 about 
here - Source: US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, Appendix E: 
International Terrorist Incidents 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/ 
1999reporV752622.gifl. The shocking cultural details of irregular conflicts, such as 
the use of women and child soldiers in Liberia and Sri Lanka, can distract from the 
political dimension behind the fighting. That famine has been used as a weapon by the 
government of Sudan in its counter-insurgency campaign against the Southern 
Sudanese is undeniable. There are also significant cultural and religious differences 
between members of the opposing forces. But Sudan’s experience is no different from 
other irregular conflicts. Ultimately terrorism and irregular warfare is about changing 
the current political system and acquiring the political power to make decisions on 
issues ranging from tribal representation and language. 
28 
The most significant problem with current re-evaluations of irregular warfare 
and terrorism is the lack of context: a component part of irregular conflicts is 
examined at the expense of the overriding picture, namely the reason for the conflict 
and the desired outcome. The rescue of British military personnel held hostage by the 
‘West Side Boys’ in Sierra Leone in September 2000 was conducted ostensibly to 
ensure the safety of British nationals. Whether the ‘West Side Boys’ are harbingers of 
the ‘new wamor class’ or merely well-armed bandits is irrelevant. The rescue mission 
was intended to convey an unequivocal political message as valid today as it was 
during the punitive British expedition to Sierra Leone in 1899: to paraphrase Charles 
Callwell, an insult to British national pride would be wiped out, a wrong avenged and 
in this specific case, to deter other groups from taking British citizens hostage in the 
future (Callwell, 1899: 8). 
Religion, culture, ethnicity and technology have been and will continue to be 
important aspects of irregular warfare. These aspects define to a degree how and why 
individuals take up arms against perceived injustices. But the ulrima ratio for the use 
of irregular methods of warfare is to have a political effect that results in political 
change. A terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction is a frightening prospect. Yet 
Shoko Asahara, the spiritual leader of Aum, only attempted to use chemical and 
biological agents after his political ambitions were thwarted in 1990. Revenge was the 
motive in response to his humiliation at the polls. Government leaders have 
subsequently taken the threat of terrorist use of WMD seriously and a number have 
established at least rudimentary preventative and protective measures to demonstrate 
competence to its citizenry. For example, the vast majority of US Federal spending on 
counter-terrorism mentioned at the beginning of the chapter is to establish response 
mechanisms to the irregular WMD threat. Another category of ‘new’ terrorists, US 
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militia and patriot groups, desire to provoke a response through action in order to 
redress the political imbalance they perceive between illegitimate federal authorities 
and individual rights and freedoms established in the Constitution. 
Warrior cultures may appear to espouse violence for its own sake but at the 
root of a number of ethnic conflicts and wars deemed cultural is the ambition for 
political autonomy, control or power. The recent guemlla war fought by the Chechens 
against the Russians is no different than that conducted in 1856: the desire of the 
Chechens is to have political autonomy from the central Russian authority. Somali 
warlords seek to gain political power and influence for their clans in areas under their 
control. Native Americans fought against the US Army in the nineteenth century to 
maintain autonomy and protect their traditional hunting grounds. Even ancient 
irregulars, classified as barbarii by the Romans, were resisting attempts to have Pax 
Romana imposed upon them. 
Finally, the declaration that the Clausewitzian trinity is dead misrepresents its 
foundation and misconstrues the reasons why irregulars fight in the first place. After 
all, primordial violence (the people) serves no purpose unless it is subordinated 
ultimately to policy (the government). Purposeless violence is nothing more than a 
criminal act in civil society and should be treated as such. Even when violence is used 
to fulfil a policy goal, such as replacing or defending the ruling authority through 
force of arms, the outcome is uncertain. The reason for the uncertainty is that the 
combatants (the armed forces or irregulars) are prone to the effects of friction until 
their policy goals are achieved or subsumed. 
Key Points 
Terrorism and irregular warfare is the method by which the weak attempt to 
bring about political change through the use of violence. 
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Terrorism, more so than irregular warfare, is difficult to define as the 
interpretation of which acts constitutes 
Guerrilla and terrorist campaigns seek to defeat their superior adversaries 
through more effective political action through four elements: space, time, 
support and legitimacy. Military action plays a limited and subsidiary role. 
Political will to see an irregular conflict through to the end is a necessity given 
the time it takes to wear down an adversary. Irregulars are too weak to conduct 
a decisive campaign early; counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist forces are 
almost always aware of the problem when the irregulars have already 
established a base of support. 
Counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist forces must operate within the rule of 
law, in an efficient and decisive manner, in order to retain the moral high 
ground necessary for eventual victory. 
Irregular forces or even other states can be subverted by the use of one’s own 
guerrillas or special operations forces. 
Revisionist views of irregular warfare examine the subject on the basis of its 
component parts, such as religion, ethnicity, culture and technology, and often 
overlook the expected political outcome of the violence. 









Does the nature of irregular warfare change or merely its characteristics? 
Can insurgents sacrifice time in order to effect political change? 
Why is the element of space easy to discuss in theory but difficult to 
incorporate into practice? 
Why are irregular warfare theorists divided on the use of terror as a method of 
compelling support? 
Why is there no universal theory of irregular warfare? 
How is the balance struck between the rule of force and the rule of law on both 
sides of an irregular campaign? 
Can insurgencies or terrorist campaigns succeed without the assistance of 
conventional forces? 
Does the message matter in ‘new’ terrorism? 
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Box 1.1 
,T.E. Lawrence on Irregular Warfare 
The influence of the writings of Thomas Edward Lawrence (1888-1937, better known 
as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’) to the development of theory on irregular warfare cannot be 
overstated. Many future practitioners of the trade, from Mao Zedong to German 
special operations expert Otto Skorzeny, acknowledged the debt they owed to 
Lawrence in the development of their own thoughts. A quixotic character whose 
historical impact still remains the subject of much controversy, Lawrence nevertheless 
managed to explain lucidly in less than 250 words the essence of a guerrilla struggle: 
‘It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not 
merely from attack, but from fear of it; such a base as we had in the Red Sea Ports, 
the desert, or in the minds of men we converted to our creed. It must have a 
sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small 
to fulfil the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust the number to space, in order to 
dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts. It must have a friendly 
population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel 
movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking 
force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the 
qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. 
They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyse the enemy’s organized 
communications, for irregular warfare is fairly Willisen’s definition of strategy, “the 
study of comm~nication’~ in its extreme degree, of attack where the enemy is not. In 
fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), 
time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest 
with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against 
them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.’ 
Lawrence, T.E. (1920), ‘The Evolution of a Revolt’, The A m y  Quarterly, 1(1), 69. 
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Box 1.2 
Mao Zedong, China in the 1930s and the Three-Stage Theory of Insurgency 
Mao Zedong (1893-1976) received an education, which was a rarity in China at the 
time. His first job after graduation was as a librarian at Peking University in the year 
of the October Revolution in Russia (1917). Mao was an avid reader and began his 
revolutionary career as a peasant agitator, joining the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 1921. The CCP was working towards expelling foreigners and ‘gentry’ 
landowners. In 1928 the Chinese Nationalist forces (Kuomintang) went on the 
offensive and scattered the CCP. The few remaining ‘comrades’ retired to the 
mountainous Fukien-Kiangsi area and rebuilt. In the wake of a disastrous urban 
revolution in 1930, Mao developed a theory on how best to conduct irregular war in 
China. Chinese Nationalists resumed the offensive and drove the Communists out of 
their sanctuary, leading to the famous ‘Long March’ to Shensi province in 1933. The 
situation in China changed drastically in 1937. Not content with the acquisition of 
Manchuria, Japanese hawks within the Kwantung A m y  engineered the ‘Marco Polo 
bridge incident’ as the pretext for invading China. 
Mao’s best-known works include ‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary 
War’ (1936)’ ‘Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan’ (1938) and ‘On 
Protracted War’ (1938)’ from which the following synopsis is derived: 
Stage I, Strategic Defensive: This phase is characterized by avoidance at all costs of 
pitched, set-piece battles. Given limited resources, the adversary needs to conduct a 
quick military campaign and seize key cities to force a quick end to the war. One key 
goal of the insurgents is to get the adversary to reach what Clausewitz termed as ‘the 
culminating point of victory’: although victories and territory are won, the foe no 
longer has adequate forces to defend the gains made. Tactical offensives, with local 
numerical superiority, are carried out to further stretch enemy resources. The moral 
superiority of the guerrillas is established with the local population, political 
indoctrination is carried out and new recruits are trained to fight as irregulars in 
remote, safe bases. 
Stage 11, Stalemate: This phase begins the prolonged battle to attrit the enemy’s 
physical and moral strength and assume de facto control over a larger segment of the 
population. Government control, in the form of local officials, is targeted and its 
representatives killed or forced to leave. The enemy is now on the defensive 
strategically and the insurgents will use the initiative to force the enemy from the 
countryside into towns and cities. With government presence in rural areas 
neutralized, the population can be drawn upon for moral and physical support. The 
focus of the guerrillas must remain unchanged and peace proposals rejected; the 
enemy will try and subvert opinion within the guerrilla movement. 
Stage 111, Strategic Offensive: The end game of the conflict, in which the insurgents 
begin the battle of manoeuvre and use overwhelming force to destroy decimated 
enemy forces in their defensive positions. 
Tse-Tung, Mao (1966), Selected Military Writings of Ma0 Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press), 210-219. 
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Box 1.3 
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara and the Theory of the ‘FOCO’ 
Argentinian-born Ernesto Guevara de la Serna Rosario (1928-1967) was educated as a 
medical doctor and plagued throughout his life by health problems including asthma. 
Ernesto spent much of his time after graduation travelling throughout Latin America 
where he gained an appreciation of the stoicism of the Latin American peasantry. He 
also became aware of the huge disparity between the comparable wealth of the 
substantial number of American companies in the region and that of the average 
peasant. After his political awakening he travelled to Mexico where he made the 
acquaintance of Fidel Castro and assisted Cuban exiles to train for revolutionary 
struggle. ‘Che’, as he is popularly known, was a member of the Granma expedition 
that landed in Cuba in November 1956. He served as Castro’s political advisor and 
later as a field commander. His major work, Guerrilla Warfare, is published two 
years after the end of the Fidelista revolution. Che subsequently worked within the 
Ministry of Industries but disagreed with Castro over the direction Cuban socialism 
should take. The final acts in Che’s life are failed attempts to foment revolution in the 
Congo (1965) and finally in Bolivia (1966-1967). 
Che’s contribution to irregular warfare theory (and articulated most effectively by 
Regis Debray) is the idea offoco or the centre of gravity of the guemlla movement. 
Practically, thefoco refers to the initial critical mass of the guemllas, the vanguard of 
the revolution, from which all else is derived. Philosophically, thefoco represents the 
political and military ‘heart’ of the insurgency and from it Guevara and Debray 
believe that the guerrilla movement itselfcan generate the conditions for a 
revolutionary victory (the title of a book by Debray reflects this shift: The Revolution 
Within The Revolution). They believe that guemlla success will eventually ‘inspire’ 
local peasants to come to support them, allowing the organisation to grow in strength. 
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Box 1.4 
Mao’s ‘Three Rules and Eight Remarks’ 
Rules 
1. All actions are subject to command. 
2. Do not steal from the people. 
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust. 
Remarks 
1. Replace the door when you leave the house.” 
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. 
3. Be courteous. 
4. Be honest in your transactions. 
5. Return what you borrow. 
6.  Replace what you break. 
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. 
*The translator to this edition, retired US Marine Corp Brigadier General Samuel B Griffiths, notes that 
‘In summer, doors were frequently lifted off and used as beds.’ 
Tse-Tung, M. (1961), Ma0 Tse-Tung on Guerrilla WarJare (New York: Praeger), 92. 
Box 1.5 
‘Hearts and Minds’ 
The phrase ‘the battle for hearts and minds’ underscores the political dimension of 
irregular warfare. During the early stages of the Vietnam, or Second Indochina War 
(1965-1973, the South Vietnamese guemllas, or Viet Cong, made comprehensive 
and coordinated efforts to win the battle by coercing peasants. Coercion took forms as 
divergent as public executions and village propaganda sessions. The former would 
sow fear among those who were thinking of supporting the government whereas 
repetitive proselytising played upon the predispositions of the audience, such as the 
desire for land reform or the need to escape the tedium of village life, in order to 
persuade villagers to join or assist the Viet Cong. The response of one particular 
peasant illustrates the pervasiveness and influence of politics in irregular warfare: 
‘In the beginning I was very hurt and angry with [the Viet Cong] for killing my 
father.. . they told me that because my father had done wrong, he had to be 
punished.. .They talked to the point where I felt that they were right.. .I came to hate 
my father even though I didn’t know [exactly] what he had done.’(Italics added) 
Donnell, J.C. (1967), Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join, RM-5486-1- 
ISA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation), 97. 
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Useful Websites 
Terrorism Research Centre <http://www.terrorism.com/index.shtml> 
This useful site has an excellent links section, including links to relevant reports and 
terrorism news. 
This is Baader-Meinhof <http://www.baader-meinhof.com/index.htm> 
This site contains excellent information on the Baader-Meinhof group specifically and 
terrorism in general. It has a section for students and researchers as well as links to, or 
the complete text of, seminal works such as Carlos Marighella’s ‘Minimanual of the 
Urban Guerrilla’ <http://www.baader- 
meinhof.com/students/resources/print/manual .html> 
US State Department -- Patterns of Global Terrorism Annual Report 
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/gt_index.html> 
Archived from 1995 upwards, contains valuable information and statistics as well as 
American perceptions of what constitutes terrorism and the terrorist threat. 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Documents and Reports <http://www.csis- 
scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/othere. htmb 
Contains several interesting reports, including the Annual Public Report and short 
papers on subjects such as trends in terrorism and a report assessing the WMD 
terrorist threat. 
The Vietnam War Internet Project website 
<http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/shwv/shwvhome.html> 
This website, created by John Tegtmeier, contains on-line documents, articles, images 
and an extensive links page <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/shwv/link- 
faq.html#phoenix> to military unit webpages, veteran’s webpages and on-line 
journals. 
M a n  to Ma0 Website <http://gate.cruzio.com/-marx2mao/Mao/Index.html> 
Mao’s writings on guemlla warfare have been out of print for some time and this 
website provides the full text of most works, as well as works by Lenin, Marx and 
Engels. 
Jane S Listing of Terrorist and Insurgency Groups 
<http://intelweb.janes.com/resource/Groups_table.htm> 
A comprehensive table listing groups worldwide engaged in terrorism and insurgency; 
for more detailed information, see Jane’s annual World Insurgency and Terrorism. 
Leaderless Resistance by Louis Beam <http://www.crusader.net/texts/bt/bt04.html> 
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This essay provides valuable insights into both the concept of leaderless resistance 
and the worldview of US militia members and ‘patriots’. 
Chem-Bio Website <http://www.chem-bio.com> 
Numerous resources on all aspects of chemical and biological weapons, including 
reports from various US agencies and departments on the status of WMD anti- 
terrorism measures. 
Counterinsurgency Comics: Mr. Ba S Family and the Phoenix Operation 
<http://www .parascope.com/articles/O497/phoenix.htm~ 
Phoenix operations were the most controversial counter-insurgency actions 
undertaken by US forces during the Vietnam War and claims of effectiveness were 
overshadowed by allegations of sanctioned assassinations of member of the Viet 
Cong Infrastructure (VCI). This website posts a propaganda ‘comic’ for distribution 
in South Vietnam complete with English translations. 
Special Operations Website <http://www .specialoperations.com> 
Exhaustive number of pages devoted to all aspects of special operations, including 
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Surgical, hit-and-run raids, counterterror, spearhead, and hostage rescue 
This conflict follows a four phase pattern of US involvement: 
Phase I: Combined economic and other nonmilitary assistance and aid; weapons training teams; police training 
assistance; military training cadres. 
Phase I t :  Special Forces teams plus Phase I. 
Phase I l l :  Special Forces Headquarters (Team B and C) and additional A teams plus Phases I and 11; possible first 
commitment of light infantry units. 
Phase IV: Light infantry forces-active combat; administrative and logistical basis for expanded role plus Phase I 
through I l l ,  inclusive. 
From Sarkesian. S. (1988), ‘The Myth of US Capability in Unconventional Conflicts’, Military Review 68(9): 12. 
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Humanitarian intervention is directed towards two purposes: providing 
emergency assistance and protecting fundamental human rights (Minear and 
Weiss 1995: 21). Strictly speaking, humanitarian intervention can and often 
does take non-military forms: emergency aid in the form of money, medicine, 
food and expertise, and human rights promotion through diplomacy and 
sanctions (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996). However, usually when 
reporters and policymakers speak of 
humanitarian intervention they mean ’forcible military intervention in 
humanitarian crises.’ Such intervention is necessary in failed states, when on- 
going conflict threatens aid operations, and against murderous states, to stop 
massive human rights abuses (Wheeler 1997). 
Humanitarian intervention is a post-Cold War activity. During the 
Cold War, it was rare for three reasons.’ First, the Cold War dominated 
international politics. Great powers focused their military efforts on waging 
the Cold War, building up massive deterrent forces for this purpose. The 
great powers did intervene in Third World conflicts, but this was for the 
purpose of supporting ones’ own, or undermining the other sides’, client 
states. Such military intervention served to fuel these proxy wars rather than 
stop them. The great powers also funded and armed client states engaged in 
massive human rights atrocities. Second, there was insufficient public 
1 The two main humanitarian interventions that did occur during the Cold War were unilateral d t a r y  
interventions by one Third World state against another: Tanzania’s 1978 intervention in Uganda, and 
Vietnam’s 1979 intervention in Cambodia. In both cases, intervention was justified on grounds of self- 
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pressure for the great powers to do anything to ameliorate Third World 
conflicts. Publics in East and West were indoctrinated into viewing these 
conflicts and client states as elements of a larger Cold War battle, in which 
human rights could be sacrificed in the interests of national security. Third, 
Cold War politics prevented international collaboration in suppressing Third 
World conflicts or punishing murderous states, chiefly by paralysing the UN 
Security Council (UNSC). To be legal, forcible military intervention in a 
humanitarian crises must be authorised by a resolution of the Security 
Council. However, UNSC resolutions can be vetoed by any one of the 
permanent five members (P5). With the P5 split along the Cold War divide - 
Britain, France, the United States versus the Soviet Union and latter China - 
each side traded vetoes: 279 in all during the Cold War (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 
para. 14). 
The last decade of the twentieth century saw an unprecedented 
increase in the number and scale of military interventions by United Nations 
forces: this has been called the new interventionism (Mayall 1996). Between 
1998 and 1993 alone, 20 new peacekeeping missions were established. At the 
same time, the size of the annual UN peacekeeping budget which shot up 
from $230 million in 1988, to between $800 million and $1.6 billion throughout 
the 1990s. Behind this increased activity was the end of the Cold War, which 
produced the demand, opportunities and incentives for UN sponsored 
humanitarian intervention. A series of regional peace agreements in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America and Cambodia accompanied 
the winding down of the Cold War, and these demanded peacekeeping forces 
to supervise cease-fires, military demobilisation, and elections. The 
opportunities to do something about this existed with increased great power 
co-operation in the UNSC and with the freeing up of surplus Cold War 
military capability for peacekeeping duties. Incentives for humanitarian 
intervention have come from public pressure on Western governments to do 
something about large-scale civilian suffering in failed and murderous states. 
YET TO INSERT: Discussion (1) locating chapter in subject of strategic 
studies; (2) setting out aims of chapter; and (3) providing roadmap of chapter. 
defence but the effect was to remove murderous regimes from power. Despite this humanitarian outcome, 
~~~ 
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From Traditional to Wider Peacekeeping 
A few military deployments of limited size and scope were authorised by the 
UNSC during the Cold War in the context of traditional peacekeeping. 
Commonly referred to as 'Chapter VI and a half' activity, traditional 
peacekeeping is seen to lie somewhere between Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
on 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' and Chapter VII which provides for use of 
force by the United Nations to uphold international peace and security. 
Traditional peacekeeping missions were deployed only when a conflict had 
ceased and with the consent of the belligerents. They typically served to 
monitor cease-fires and supervise truces; occasionally, peacekeeping missions 
were deployed to keep belligerents apart as in Cyprus in 1974. These missions 
relied on their impartiality and the goodwill of the parties concerned to fulfil 
their mandate. Accordingly, they were small in size and lightly armed, 
typically comprising contingents from neutral and non-aligned states. 
Between 1948 and 1978,13 such missions were established, with none for the 
decade thereafter (Roberts 1994: 93-5). Only once during the Cold War did the 
United Nations authorise a US led peace enforcement mission under Chapter 
VII; in 1950 against North Korea? On another occasion, the UNSC permitted 
the peacekeeping mission in the Congo (1960-64) to turn into a peace 
enforcement operation to restore public order and protect. the government. 
In contrast, the UN humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War 
era have been much larger, more complex affairs than predecessor missions. 
These new interventions have involved a much wider range of tasks, 
including protecting territory, people, and aid operations, disarming 
belligerents, policing demilitarised sites, and monitoring demobilisa tion, 
monitoring and running elections, and helping to reconstruct governments, 
police forces, and arrnies. The British Army initially called these operations 
wider peacekeeping. This term not only reflected the wider range of 
operational tasks involved. It also recognised that such peacekeeping 
operations occupied a grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace 
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enforcement. Not all aspects of these mutli-task missions had the full consent 
of all the parties on the ground. Whereas consent was central to traditional 
peacekeeping, it was not to the new breed of wider peacekeeping. 
Peacekeepers had to be able to threaten and to use force to achieve their 
mandate; if necessary, to force aid through to the starving, to repulse attacks 
on civilians, to forcibly disarm troublemakers, and to arrest war criminals. 
In fact, the British Army's interim doctrine on Wider Peacekeeping (1994) 
was designed to caution policymakers and the public about the costs of using 
force in peacekeeping (unusually for military doctrine, a glossy version was 
on sale at bookstores). Critical here is the relationship between consent, force, 
and impartiality. Wider Peacekeeping distinguished between the tactical and 
operational level of consent for peacekeeping missions. It argued that should 
consent be withdraw at the tactical level, where one or more belligerent 
groups obstruct peacekeepers in the field, small amounts of force may be used 
to keep the mission on track. However, it warned that excessive use of force 
could result in a collapse of consent for the mission as a whole (i.e., at the 
operational level). Under such circumstances, the mission would have crossed 
the 'consent divide', undermining its credibility as an impartial peacekeeping 
force and prejudicing mission legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents. Loss 
of control and uncontrolled escalation in violence (including attacks on 
peacekeepers) were bound to follow 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Wider Peacekeeping deliberately painted a bleak picture of what happens 
when a modest force is given an ambitious mandate. It came at a time when 
the British Army was being asked to do much in Bosnia with few resources on 
the ground. This doctrine also reflected the UN operation in Somalia, which 
took on one of the warring factions and lost (see next section). It certainly 
resonated with the first British commander of UNPROFOR, General Sir 
Michael Rose, who referred to the consent divide as the 'Mogadishu Line'. 
The lesson was clear to General Rose: 'In Somalia, it has been well 
demonstrated that it was the move by the UN Force from peacekeeping to 
2 This resolution was not vetoed by the Soviet Union because the Soviets were boycotting the UNSC at the 
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war-fighting which so terminally damaged the prospects of the Mission’ 
(Rose 1996: 151). However, this attitude, reflected in Wider Peacekeeping, was 
unhelpful when peacekeeping missions had no choice but to the consent 
divide into peace enforcement. Wider Peacekeeping rightly warned that this 
must be a deliberate act of policy, but gave little advice as to what should 
happen next. This was because the chief author of Wider Peacekeeping, Colonel 
Charles Dobbie (like General Rose), considered peace enforcement to be 
synonymous with war, and thus not the business of peacekeepers (see Box 1). 
BOX 1 HERE 
However, Dobbie’s approach is too passive for it leaves peacekeepers 
dependent on the co-operation of the warring parties. Under such 
circumstances, peacekeeping missions can fall prey to ’spoilers - leaders and 
parties who believe that believe that peace emerging from negotiations 
threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to 
undermine attempts to achieve it’ (Stedman 1997: 5). Where spoilers are 
identified, peacekeepers must be able to engage in robust and aggressive 
action to bring them to heal. This option was discouraged by the sharp 
distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement draw in Wider 
Peacekeeping. In contrast, the US Army grouped peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement under the category of peace operations. In its doctrine, Peace 
Operations (1994), many of the tasks originally viewed as wider peacekeeping 
by the British, are conceived as peace enforcement by the Americans. These 
tasks invariably involve coercing belligerents to comply with UNSC 
resolutions: in short, to use force to induce consent for peace operations 
(lablonsky and McCallum 1999). Peace Operations advises US commanders as 
to how combat power can be used to induce consent. The British Army have 
since moved to closer to this position. It accepts that it must prepare to use 
force in peace operations, and that impartiality ought to be defined not in 
relation to the warring parties but to the mission mandate: i.e., force will be 
used equally against all who threaten the mission (Thorton, nd). 
thereby induce consent is well illustrated in the UN intervention in Bosnia 
(see Box 2). From 1992 to 1995, a 7,000 strong force deployed in Bosnia as part 
The importance of being prepared to neutralise peace spoilers and 
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of the United Nations Operations in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) 
attempted to alleviate the suffering of civilians trapped in the midst of a war, 
waged by Serbia and Croatia (in collusion with their Serb and Croat allies in 
Bosnia) against the new-born multi-ethnic and democratic Bosnia state. Under 
General Rose and with the support of the UN Secretariat in New York, 
UNPROFOR defined its principal mission as helping to deliver aid (Rose 
1996: 152). Later, it was mandated by the UNSC to watch over six designated 
’safe areas’ in Bosnia. These were enclaves of Muslim civilians surrounded by 
the Bosnian Serb military. Under Rose, UNPROFOR was not prepared to use 
force to push aid through road blockades or to protect civilians (including 
those in so-called ’safe areas’). During this time, UN policy amounted to a 
policy of ’endless appeasement’ (Thompson 2000); it relied on the goodwill of 
Bosnia Serb extremists to let aid through, protect defenceless Muslim 
civilians, and negotiate a peace. Yet these same Bosnian Serbs were bent on 
destroying multi-ethnic Bosnian democracy through a campaign of murder 
and terror against the Muslim population. Certainly, there was a dilemma 
facing UNPROFOR calling in air-strikes to punish Serb transgression would 
push it across the consent divide, but it lacked the land power to defend aid 
convoys and safe areas against Serb retaliation. But UNPROFORs military 
weakness was reinforced by a weakness in UN thinking which ruled out a 
military solution to the Bosnian crisis. For even when UNPROFOR was 
reinforced by a Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force of helicopter gunships 
and artillery, the UN Secretariat was reluctant to get tough with Bosnian 
Serbs. Thus, even when it was militarily equipped to deal with Serb Spoilers, 
it was conceptually ill-equipped with do so. The final straw was the 
overrunning of two safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, and slaughtering of the 
male civilian inhabitants by Bosnian Serb forces. Rose’s replacement, British 
General Rupert Smith, decided that it was time to ‘escalate to success.’ In 
retaliation for Serbian shelling of Sarajevo (another ’safe area’) in August 
1995, he called in NATO airstrikes. This military pressure in combination with 
military advances by Bosnian government and Bosnia Croat forces in the 
Eastern Bosnia persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to sue for peace. 
BOX 2 HERE 
Intervention Failures 
The consent divide-induce consent debate may be recast in more general 
terms as a clash of two perspectives: intervention pessimism versus 
intervention optimism Basically, intervention pessimism is the belief that 
little can be done about humanitarian disasters without the consent and co- 
operation of the major parties concerned (Tharoor 1995-96); all is lost if the 
peacekeeping force crosses the consent divide. Intervention optimism is the 
belief that the international community can forcibly rebuild failed states and 
reform murderous ones (Mnear and Weiss 1995); operational success 
depends on the ability to induce consent if required. Th~s tension between 
these opposing perspectives was played out in the cases of the two greatest 
failures in post-Cold War humanitarian intervention: Somalia and Rwanda. 
Intervention optimism led the United Nations to launch a recklessly 
ambitious operation aimed at disarming Somalia and reconstructing the 
government. Intervention pessimism led the United Nations to do nothing 
about to stop genocide in Rwanda. As we shall see, the UN should have done 
less in Somalia, and could have done much more in Rwanda. 
Somalia (1992-1995) 
The crisis in Somalia was generated by a combination of civil war and famine. 
The country descended into a second civil war in mid 1991, which was 
directly responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. Much 
worse, was the deadly famine that gripped Somalia in 1992. War and general 
lawlessness was making it extremely dangerous and difficult for Western aid 
agencies to operation in Somalia. The deployment of force of 550 Pakistani 
peacekeepers in mid 1992, the United Nations Operations in Somalia 
(UNOSOM I), did little to improve things. UNOSOM I operated with the 
consent of the main warlords in Somalia. However, since aid was power, the 
warlords were unprepared to let it flow freely. 
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Under intense pressure from UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali, and US based aid agencies, the United States led a 37,000 strong United 
Task Force (UNITAF) into Somalia (including 28,000 US troops) in early 
December 1992. Under UNSC Resolution 794, UNITAF was mandated to ‘use 
all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.’ UNITAF achieved this setting 
itself the modest goal for creating demilitarised zones around aid operations 
(as opposed to the more ambitious goal of disarming the warring factions) by 
then by using overwhelming military superiority to scare off armed groups 
from its area of operations. By its own measure, UNITAF was a success; aid 
got to the starving, and the famine receded. 
UNITAF handed over to a new 28,000 strong UN force, UNOSOM 11, in 
rnid 1993. UNOSOM I1 had a more much ambitious mandate; nothing less 
than the forcible disarmament of the warring factions and assisting in the 
reconstruction of the Somali state (UNSC Res. 814). Boutros-Ghali had wanted 
to see a general disarmament in order to produce lasting security in Somalia. 
The new Clinton Administration which came into power full of optimism 
about the multinational peacekeeping, was receptive to broadening the UN’s 
role in Somalia. However, the new mandated placed the United Nations on a 
collision course with the Somali warlords. In June 1993, one Somali faction 
ambushed a UN patrol, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. The UN responded by 
effectively declaring war on the warlord responsible, General Aideed: 
UNOSOM I1 was mandated to ’take all necessary measures against all those 
responsible for the attacks’ (UNSC Res. 837). It was a war the UN was to lose. 
UNOSOM I1 spent the Summer in pitched battles with Somali gunmen, while 
an elite US Quick Reaction Force (QRF) buzzed around the Somalia capital in 
helicopters, Mogadishu, hunting for Aideed. Any goodwill on the part of the 
general Somali populace towards the UN melted away as US helicopter 
gunships blew up buildings. The mission ended in disaster, when the QRF 
was ambushed on October 3 during a mission intended to capture top Aideed 
officials. US helicopters were shot out of the sky, and in the intense fire-fight 
that followed 18 US soldiers were killed, 78 were injured, and one was 
captured. That effectively ended the American involvement in Somalia; 
within months, US forces had pulled out. UNOSOM II dragged on until 1995, 
but without much UN heart and US backing, it achieved little. 
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Somalia was the ’Vietnam’ of peacekeeping. Despite pouring money 
($1.6 billion), material and personnel in Somalia, the United Nations failed 
restore long-term order and rebuild the state. UNOSOM I1 tried to do too 
much with too little: it lacked the command capabilities and combat power of 
UNITAF, yet it was tasked to do something UNITAF had deliberately 
avoided: disarming the warlords. In the wake of the dramatic collapse of 
UNOSOM 11, the modest achievements of UNITAF were forgotten. 
Rwanda (1993-94) 
Over about 100 days, between April and July 1994,800,000 people was 
massacred in Rwanda. This humanitarian crisis was caused by a power 
struggle between Hutu extremists and Hutu and Tutsi moderates, which 
broke out when the Hutu dominated regime of President Habyarimana 
bowed in the early 1990s to domestic and international pressure for the 
introduction of multi-party democracy. The regime sought to increase its base 
of support by bringing extremist H u b  opposition parties into a transitional 
government. This occurred in the context of simultaneous military and 
economic pressure on the government, respectively brought by invasion from 
neighbouring Uganda by the Tutsi army of Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), 
and a dramatic fall in export revenues combined with severe drought. Once in 
government, H u b  extremists used their monopoly of mass media to incite 
attacks against Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and to organise militias to carry 
out small-scale massacres. In reprisal, the RPF army launched an attack on the 
capital Kigali in 1993, that was only repulsed with French military support. 
After such a close call, Habyarimana was forced to sign a peace deal with the 
RPF that led to Tutsi inclusion in the government and the exclusion of H u b  
extremists. This was the trigger for genocide in Rwanda. In order to retain 
power and avoid judicial accountability for complicity in attacks on Tutsi 
civilians, H u b  extremists got rid of the President (shooting down his plane 
on April 6th) and began out a systematic campaign of mass slaughter 
designed to eliminate all opponents and incriminate the entire Hutu 
population in the process. 
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There was a UN peacekeeping force on the ground when the genocide 
started in early April; the 2,500 strong United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR had been deployed with a very limited 
mandate (UNSC Res. 872) to monitor the cease-fire between the government 
and RPF, and to assist in relief operations. Under-staffed, under-resourced, 
and unauthorised to use force to prevent war crimes, UNAMIR was 
completely overwhelmed by the horror that unfolded around it. Amidst the 
massacres, force of French, Belgian, and Italian troops arrived to evacuate 
Europeans but did not stay to save Rwandese. To make matters worse, the 
Belgian and Bangladeshi contingents of UNAMIR were withdrawn by their 
national governments (in Belgian’s case, after 10 Belgian soldiers were 
brutally murdered by Hutu extremists). The RPF retaliated by resuming its 
offensive against the Hutu authorities. The United Nations responded in 
April 21st, by reducing UNAMIR down to 270 personnel, and focusing its 
effects on re-establishing the cease-fire. It was not until May 17th that the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 918, expanding UNAMIR to 5,500 and authorising 
it to protect the populace. However, UN member states were not forthcoming 
with these forces and, one month later, UNAMIR was still only 500 strong. 
Eventually, the genocide ran out of steam. The RPF managed to save some 
civilians by sweeping Westwards across the country and pushing back Hutu 
extremists. In July 9th, the French deployed a force of 2,300 troops ostensibly 
to create a Humanitarian Protection Zone in the Western comer of Rwanda, 
but in reality to protect their retreating Hutu allies who eventually fled across 
the border to (what was then) Zaire. 
The current UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has acknowledged the 
UN’s failure in Rwanda. It has been widely argued that the United Nations 
could have stopped the genocide in its tracks by rapidly deploying a small 
force of even 5,000. This argument has recently been disputed by Alan 
Juperman. Juperman’s counter-argument, which focuses on the option of a US 
military intervention, runs as follows. The earliest time that President Clinton 
could have been aware of the scale of the massacres was two weeks have the 
genocide started, April 20th: by this time, 250,000 people had already been 
slaughtered. The smallest conceivable US military deployment, a 2,500 strong 
Air Assault Brigade, would riot have arrived before fourteen days: too late to 
save more than 75,000 people. For, as Human Rights Watch acknowledged, 
~ ~~~~- 
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’the worst massacres had finished by the end of April’ (Juperman 2000). 
However, Juperman downplays the option of beefing-up UNAMIR prior to 
the genocide. He disputes the argument that the UN had ‘three-months’ 
advance notice of genocide.’ Here he is referring to a cable from the UNAMIR 
Force Commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, which reported hgh-level 
intelligence predicting the genocide as it actually unfolded. Juperman notes 
that Dallaire had doubts about the reliability of his informant (who happened 
to be Prime Minister Designate) and that ’[rlaising further doubt, the cable 
was the first and lust from Dallaire containing such accusations’ (Juperman 
2000: 113 [emphasis added]). Juperman fails to note that Dallaire’s political 
advisor reported to Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary General for 
Peacekeeping, his ’total, repeat total, confidence in the veracity and true 
ambitions of the informant.’ (UN 1999b: 4). Furthermore, Dallaire’s command 
warned on the 2nd, 15th, and 23rd February of the worsening security 
situation. The United Nations could have done a lot more to halt the 
genocide. That is the finding of the Independent Inquiry set up by General 
Secretary A ~ a n  to investigate the UN response to the Rwanda crisis. The 
Inquiry found ’an overriding failure [by the United Nations] to create a force 
with the capacity, resources and mandate to deal with the growing violence 
and eventual genocide in Rwanda‘ (UN 1999b: 19). Its conclusion is 
inescapable: ‘The Security Council bears a responsibility for its lack of 
political will to do more to stop the killing’ (UN 1999b: 23). 
The Shadow of Somalia 
Somalia is partly to blame for the failure of the UN intervention in Rwanda. It 
explains why Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and President Clinton started 
out intervention optimists but ended up intervention pessimists. The 
Secretary General’s first Agendu for Peace, published in 1992, was decidedly 
upbeat about the prospects for wider peacekeeping and calling on member 
states to provide more resources for such operations. Significantly, it defined 
peacekeeping as ’the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, 
hitherto with the consent of all the Parties concerned’ (1992: uara. 20 [emphasis 
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added]). Similarly, President Clinton entered office in 1993 seeking to expand 
America’s commitment to multilateral peace operations. This was reflected in 
drafts of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25)’ The Clinton 
Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. After disaster 
in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali and Clinton both changed tune. Boutros-Ghali’s 
1995 Supplement fo an Agendafor Peace re-asserts the crucial importance of 
consent, impartiality, and non-use of force to operational success (UN 1995: 
para. 33). Equally, the final version of PDD-25 released in May 1994 stated 
that ’it is not US policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace 
operations or US involvement in such operations’ (cited in Daadler 1996: 482). 
The lack of political will identified by the Independent Inquiry on the UN 
Response to Rwanda, was all too evident in Boutros-Ghali’s failure to push 
the case for intervention, matched by US (and UK) obstruction in the Security 
Council of a rapid UN response. 
The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention 
Politics gives meaning to humanitarian crises, defining those that demand 
international response. It selectively focuses international attention on human 
suffering and human rights abuses on certain places in space and time. 
Serbia’s brutal repression of Kosovo triggered Western humanitarian 
intervention; Russia’s brutal repression of Chechnya did not. Equally Iraqi 
attacks on Kurds in 1991 resulted in the creation of a Kurdish ‘Safe Haven’ in 
Iraq guarded by thousands of troops and Allied airpower, while even more 
murderous Iraqi attacks on Kurds five years earlier [check year] met with no 
international response. Politics also shapes the form of humanitarian 
intervention: the speed and scale of international response. Politics operates at 
two levels, in particular, to define crises and shape responses: at the level of 
domestic public opinion, and the level of Security Council politics. 
Public Opinion 
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It is commonly believed by policymakers and commentators alike that 
Western public opinion can make and break humanitarian interventions. 
Public opinion can prompt military intervention when the public responds to 
media images of massive suffering. Thus, ’extensive media coverage of 
emaciated Somalis ensured a suitable international outcry (the ’Do 
Something’ response)’ (von Hippel 2000: 59) and later in Bosnia, according to 
the US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, ’the reason the West finally, 
belatedly intervened was heavily related to media coverage’ (cited in 
Robinson nd: 12). This is called ‘the CNN effect’: coined after the Cable 
News Network’s total televised coverage of the Gulf War. At the same time, 
public support for humanitarian interventions are assumed to be conditional 
on minimal peacekeeper casualties. This is ’the bodybags effect’; referring to 
the impact of returning bodybags with American war dead on US public 
support for the Vietnam War. We may expect the public to be particularly 
sensitive to casualties in humanitarian interventions because these military 
actions are freely entered into by their government: in this sense, they are 
’wars of choice’, as opposed to ’wars of necessity’ that must be fought to 
preserve national security (Freedman 1998-99). It is also widely believe that 
the bodybags effect is heightened in the televised age, in that extensive media 
coverage of dead peacekeepers will lead to a collapse of public support for a 
mission. In this sense, it is argued that the CNN effect is a ’double-edged’ 
sword; the off-cited example is Somalia: that is, the collapse in US support 
following the deaths of 18 American soldiers (see Box 3). 
the extent to which governments can frame the media debate, and thereby 
choose the place and moment of intervention (Robinson 1999). Generally, 
governments will be least able to do this when they are uncertain as to the 
best policy to pursue (whether to intervene or not, and how), and when those 
lobbying for intervention are able to mobilise opposition politicians behind 
their cause. Disunity within the politician establishment, be it within the 
executive or across the executive-legislative divide, not only reduces the 
executive’s ability to influence the media debate it also makes the public more 
responsible to media calls for intervention. In the case of Somalia, the CNN 
effect did operate because the Bush Administration was uncertain as what to 
do, and there was a powerful pro-intervention coalition comprised of US aid 
As a concept, ’the CNN effect’ is quite misleading. It underestimates 
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agencies and sympathetic members of Congress (Strobe1 1996). However, in 
the case of Kosovo in 1999, the Clinton administration was able to resist 
media pressure for a US led ground force intervention to stop Serbian 
atrocities against ethnic Albanian Kosovars; the administration was certain 
that it did not want to adopt such a policy, and opposition politicians in 
Congress were also against a ground intervention (Robinson nd). 
’The bodybags effect’ is similarly misleading. Empirical evidence from 
opinion polling suggests that peacekeeper casualties do not necessarily result 
in public calls for an immediate withdrawal. In the case of Somalia, most 
Americans favoured increased US military involvement following the killing 
of US soldiers. The polls also show that American public support was 
primarily conditional on evidence of Somali public support for US 
involvement in the UN mission, and much less so on US casualties. If 
ordinary Somalis wanted US troops to go home, then ordinary Americans 
saw little reason to for their soldiers to stick around. But if Somalis 
appreciated what US forces were doing on their behalf, then most Americans 
were prepared to support the intervention even if there were US fatalities. 
America pulled out of UNOSOM I1 following the deaths of its soldiers 
because of an anticipated (rather than actual) collapse of US public support. US 
policymakers expected that their public would demand an immediate US 
withdrawal and acted to head off this public reaction (Kull and Destler 1999: 
106-8). What the Somali case does reveal is the importance of domestic 
political unity in sustaining public support interventions. Doubts were 
expressed in Congress about US involvement in Somali in the Summer 1993 
when UNOSOM I1 drifted into war against Aideed, and this resulted in a 
drop in public support for the mission; public support actually rallied in the 
short term following US casualties (Burk 1999). 
Rather than focusing on public sensitivity to casualties it might be 
more analytically useful to think in terms of political sensitivity to casualties. 
Governments will be sensitive to casualties when there is policy uncertainty 
and political disunity which, in turn, will have already eroded public support 
for missions. There is also reason to believe that political sensitivity may vary 
greatly from country to country. Just as the loss of 18 US soldiers ended 
America’s involvement in Somalia so the deaths of 10 Belgian troops caused 
Belgian to pulled out of Rwanda. However, Pakistan did not withdraw its 
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contingent from UNOSOM I1 when it lost 24 soldiers, nor was Britain’s 
commitment to its intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 shaken by battle- 
casualties. This may have something to do with the political structure of 
countries, with some more likely to encourage and enable political disunity 
(e.g., sharing of powers and executive-legislative divide in the United States) 
than others (e.g./ executive dominance of Parliament in Britain). Obviously, 
political sensitivity has operational implications, which are discussed in 
section X. 
Security Council Politics 
The fifteen members of the Security Council have the responsibility for 
authorising humanitarian interventions. A majority of nine UNSC members 
are needed to take such a decision. However, real power resides with the P5, 
and their individual right of veto. As we saw, conflict between the P5 during 
the Cold War made the UNSC moribund as an instrument for managing 
international security. With the Cold War over, co-operation between the P5 
has greatly improved. But four political problems still dog UNSC sponsorship 
of humanitarian interventions. 
Even after the Cold War, the P5 remain states great power interests and 
aspirations. Where a particular humanitarian crisis is association with a 
certain P5 member (or members), others may withhold their support or even 
threaten to veto unless support is promised in exchanged for their interests 
elsewhere in the world. This is log-rolling problem. Thus, Russia and later 
China in obstructed TJNSC Resolutions on peace operations in Haiti. Russia 
wanted UN endorsement of its own intervention in Georgia in 1994, while 
China was seeking a public apology from Haiti for inviting Taiwan’s Vice- 
President to the inauguration of Haiti’s new President in 1996 (Malone 1997 
138-9). Sometimes, great power differences can produce a veto problem, 
when one P5 refuses to contemplate a LJN intervention which it considers 
threatening to its interests and/or aspirations. This was evident in Russia’s 
approach to Kosovo in the late 1990s: Russia refused to recognise the 
humanitarian dimensions of the evolving crisis and was clearly prepared to 
veto a UN intervention (Levitin 2000). This veto Droblem was solved bv 
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independent action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); an 
action which was to have significant implications for international law (see 
section X). 
Even when the P5 all agree to authorise the deployment of a UN peace 
operations force, two problems can still hinder effective UN intervention. The 
first is the P5 tendency to 'talk the talk' but not 'walk the walk.' The great 
powers acting through the UNSC often pass grand sounding Resolutions 
which they fail to back up with force. This is the posturing problem. The 
creation of 'safe areas' in Bosnia is a classic example; these areas were not at 
all safe, because the UNSC was not prepared to deploy additional military 
forces to actually protect them (see Figure 2). In this case, several UNSC 
members as well as the UN Secretariat warned at the time that 'without the 
provision of any credible military threat' these safe areas were meaningless 
(UN 1999a: 110). But the great powers went ahead regardless and set up 
defenceless 'safe areas'. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Finally, even when some of the P5 are prepared to 'walk the walk', 
they may totally disagree on which direction to take. Great powers may 
disagree on the nature of the humanitarian crisis as well as the most effective 
response. This is the co-ordination problem, which again was evident in 
Bosnia. The United States and its European allies had completely different 
perceptions of the Bosnia conflict which led them to fundamentally disagree 
on the appropriate response. The European powers saw an ethnic conflict, the 
solution to which was some form of partition. However, the United States 
saw it as a war started by Serbia and consequently were unprepared to 
support partition because this would reward Serbian aggression. It was only 
when this co-ordination problem was resolved in 1995, by the United States 
accepting that partition was a necessary evil, that the international 
community were able to take effective action to end the Bosnian war (Glitman 
1996-97). Militarily speaking, all these political problems have adverse 
operational implications. It is to this that we now turn. 
INCOMPLETE DRAFT (15 September 2000) 17 
The Military Character of Peace Operations 
BASIC ARGUMENT: Peace operations breach many of the principles of war; 
many of these operational pathologies flow from the politics of humanitarian 
intervention. 
KEY CONCEPTS 
Unclear purpose, disunity of command, means-ends gap, dispersal of force 
Strategic compression of the battlefield: tactical actions have strategic 
consequences. 
Also need to manage the media battle. 
Over-reliance on airpower 
Sacrificing the mission to force protection 
The perverse effects of exit strategies 
Intervention Norms and International Law 
BASIC ARGUMENT: brief description of relevant international law and 
evolution of intervention norms; go on to argue that recent humanitarian 
interventions suggest international norms exceeding the current state of 
international law. 
KEY CASES: 
Evolution of international norms: Kurdistan, Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti. 
Norms outstripping law: Kosovo 
Conclusion: Problems and Prospects 
Reforming the United Nations 
Regionalism and Great Power Intervention 
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Democracy, Development and Stable Security 
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Box 1. Charles Dobbie on Peacekeeper and Peace Enforcers 
as Pigs and Parrots 
'[Pleacekeeping and peace-enforcement cannot be guided by a set of 
common principles. The peacekeeper to peace-enforcer is as referee to 
football player. The objectives of each are different. One is there to win, 
the other to ensure fair play ..... Like pigs and parrots, the differences 
between peacekeepers and peace-enforcers outweigh their 
similarities .... Peacekeeping is depicted as a scaled-down version of peace- 
enforcement [in US military thinking]. The pig, in effect, is being 
regarded as small species of parrot .....[ This] can lead to peackeeping 
being subject to a set of common principles that impose combatant, 
adversary-orientated attitudes on the impartial third-party activities that 
constitute peacekeeping. Pigs are, as it were, being encouraged to fly.' 
(Dobbie 1994: 141-2) 
19 
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Box 2. The UN’s Failure to Stop Serb Spoilers in Bosnia 
’With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that many of the errors the 
United Nations made [in Bosnia] flowed from a single and no doubt well- 
intentioned effort: we tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of 
peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep. Knowing that any other 
course of action would jeopardize the lives of the troops, we tried to 
create - or imagine - an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping 
- agreement between the parties, deployment by consent, and 
impartiality - could be upheld ... None of the conditions for the 
deployment of peacekeepers had been met: there was no peace 
agreement - not even a functioning ceasefire - there was no clear will to 
peace and there was no clear consent by the belligerents .... Nor was the 
provision of humanitarian aid a sufficient response to ”ethnic cleansing” 
and to an attempted genocide .... The Bosnia Muslim civilian population 
thus become the principal victim of brutally aggressive military and 
paramilitary Serb operations to depopulate coveted territories in order to 
allow them to be repopulated by Serbs ... In the end, these Bosnian Serb 
war aims were ultimately repulsed on the battlefield, and not at the 
negotiating table. Yet the [UN] Secretariat had convinced itself early on 
that broader use of force by the international community was beyond our 
mandate and anyway undesirable. In a report to the Security Council/ the 
Secretary-General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali] spoke against a “culture of 
death”, arguing that peace should be pursued only through non-military 
methods. When, in June 1995, the international community provided 
UNPROFOR with a heavily armed rapid reaction force, we argued 
against using it robustly to implement om mandate. We decisive action 
was finally taken by UNPROFOR in August and September 1995, it 
helped to bring the war to a conclusion.’ 
(Kofi Annan 1999) 
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Box 3. The CNN Effect as a Double-Edged Sword 
‘The fact that the US pulled the plug on its Somali intervention after the 
loss of eighteen US Rangers in a fire-fight in October 1993 indicates how 
capricious public opinion is. Televised images of starving and dying 
Somalis had persuaded the out-going Bush administration to launch a 
humanitarian rescue mission, but once the US public saw the 
consequences of this in terms of dead American being dragged through 
the streets of Mogadishu, the Clinton administration was forced to 
announced a timetable for the withdrawal of all US forces from Somalia. 
What this case demonstrates is that the ”CNN factor” is a double-edged 
sword: it can presurize governments into humanitarian intervention, yet 
with equal rapidity, pictures of casualties arriving home can lead to 
public dillusionment and calls for withdrawal.’ 
(Wheeler 1997: 400-1). 
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WHAT IS STRATEGIC STUDIES AND DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE? 
Lawrence Freedman 
Strategic studies developed outside of the universities. Before the cold war there were 
military theorists and commentators, such as Boney Fuller and Liddell Hart in Britain, 
who often had substantial practical experience of the subject but who wrote largely for a 
popular and a professional audience rather than an academic. Their subject matter was 
similar to that of later strategic studies, and those that survived into the nuclear age 
fitted in perfectly well with the new milieu. There was some pioneering activity in the 
universities after the first world war with the moves to establish the scientific study of 
international affairs as a contribution to the avoidance of future wars. Many of those in 
this field had an interest in military matters although few claimed expertise in how best 
to fight wars, and, as will be discussed below, the bias in the discipline was to some 
extent anti-strategic. 
The special flavour of post-war strategic studies came from those who had been working 
in the physical sciences and engineering rather than the social sciences and humanities, 
many with their consciences stung and their policy interest engaged through the 
Manhattan Project. Those that had worked on operational problems from convoy 
protection to choosing targets for air raids had firm views about how the conduct of war 
could no longer be left to what they often took to be the rather primitive, intuitive forms of 
reasoning of the professional military. The conviction that civilians had critical 
contributions to make to strategic policy grew as traditional military patterns of thought 
appeared as being quite inadequate in the thermonuclear age. The combination of the 
arms race and the cold war created the conditions for the growth of a substantial research- 
led policy community outside of the universities - new government agencies, 
congressional committees, think-tanks and ‘beltway bandits.’ 
This created a market for professionally trained civilian strategists that university 
departments might attempt to fill. It also meant that academics were never able to 
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impose a scholarly framework for the subject that could survive independently shifts in 
the policy framework. Few really tried to do so. From the start it was the salience of the 
policy issues rather than intellectual curiosity that led to the growth of the strategic studies 
community. The universities were certainly not hostile to policy-led research. The cold 
war coincided with the expansion of the universities throughout the western world - 
not only in size but also in the range of their activities. They took in subjects that were 
often practical in nature and moved well beyond established disciplinary boundaries. If 
gender and the media could become appropriate subjects for university departments 
then it would have been surprising if questions of armed force had escaped the net. 
More seriously those making the case for higher education were pleased to have 
examples of contributions to national strength. When the universities went to the US 
Congress for more funds after the Soviet had apparently rushed ahead in the 
technological race with the launch of the world’s first artificial satellite (Sputnik 1) their 
case was made in the name of national security. Many academics thrilled to a potential 
role in a wider public debate, even if this meant enduring snide remarks about abstract 
theorising removed from real life, and certainty that their weightier tomes would be left 
unread while their short, snappy opinion pieces might reach presidents and prime 
ministers. Academic exponents of strategic studies might have had much more training 
in the of use evidence and sophisticated forms of analysis but they could still drift easily 
into advocacy, preferring popular and professional audiences to the dustier academic 
conferences. 
Little attempt was made to use the cold war opportunities to establish strategic studies 
as an academic subject. No core curriculum was developed, and there was probably 
only a brief period in the early 1960s, the end of what was later described as the ‘golden 
age,’ when there was a serious body of literature with which everyone in the field was 
reasonably familiar. There was not even a consensus on how academic work in this area 
should be described. The policy influence was always apparent. ‘Military studies’ 
appeared too technical and narrow, redolent of map-reading and staff exercises, and 
contradicted the factors that had shaped the civilian role in strategic policy: the 
prejudice against professional military thought; the democratic conviction that at any 
rate the military sphere should be subordinated to the civil: and the Clausewitzian 
presumption that if, as the master insisted, war is concerned with the pursuit of politics 
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by other means, then military means could only be properly understood by reference to 
political purposes. 
INAND OUT OF T H E  COLD WAR 
But what political purposes? As, at least at the governmental level, the ends of policy 
seemed somewhat fixed during the cold war, the focus was very much on means. The 
contest between liberal capitalist and state socialist forms of government was 
inescapable. The central problem of policy was awesome in its implications but also 
relatively simple in its formulation. The basic issues were of deterrence: in what 
circumstances would nuclear threats work and what would be the consequences if they 
failed to do so or were counter-productive in their effects? How could political benefit 
be extracted from a nuclear arsenal without triggering a cataclysmic conflagration? 
How could credibility be injected into preposterous posturing? The natural inclination 
of academics was to explore these paradoxes. This could be done both by exploring 
ways by which deterrence could be reinforced, thereby avoiding war, but also ways in 
which other policy instruments might reduce dependence upon this high-risk approach. 
They became interested in particular in arms control. Over time this had an important 
consequence in that it encouraged a perspective that went beyond the purely national to 
the systemic. Rational Soviet policies became as important as rational American. A 
rational American policy should be designed so as to coax out of Moscow a more 
rational Soviet policy. 
The changes in the character and tempo of the cold war naturally influenced strategic 
studies. After the Berlin and Cuban crises of the early 1960s further development of the 
purer theories of deterrence seemed less important. Academics began to find a role in 
questioning official policy and warning of the limits to deterrence, the distorting effects 
of domestic and organisational politics on crisis management and the perils of 
misperception. The second-order technical studies sought to offer ways out of practical 
difficulties experienced in arms control negotiations. A further development came as it 
was recognised that too much of the ‘golden age’ literature had taken the political 
context for granted, or had at least failed to appreciate the dynamic consequences of the 
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upheavals in the third world. After Vietnam these aspects of strategy were much harder 
to ignore. To under the conditions in which armed forces might be used, or at least 
threatened, it was necessary to delve into a diverse range of regions. It seemed more 
important to draw attention to the complexities of the Middle East or Central America 
than to think up fancy but safe ways to threaten Armageddon. Furthermore, as even 
official deterrence policies moved to reduce their nuclear bias and strengthen the 
conventional elements, professional military knowledge and experience appeared much 
more relevant. So well before the end of the cold war the field of strategic studies (now 
as often known as security studies) had became much more diffuse. There was no 
recognised academic discipline, only a broad area of study, studied under a variety of 
headings (peace, war, defence, security, strategy, arms control). The only unifying factor 
was that the interest lay beyond practical matters concerned with the actual 
employment of armed force to the political purposes for which it might be employed 
and the political measures that might be adopted either to prevent this employment or 
to bring it to an end. 
In these circumstances it was inevitable that those working in the universities would have 
to follow the shifts in focus in the wider policy debate. Given the sort of upheavals 
associated with the end of the cold war and its aftermath this was no small matter. When 
the policy issues of the day moved from such topics as great power confrontation and 
nuclear arms control to intra-state wars and humanitarian intervention then quite different 
skills might be thought to be needed. To deal with the old agenda one might hope for 
scholars with a grasp of traditional statescraft, a knowledge of the political thinking at the 
highest levels of the worlds key capitals, sensitivity to alliance relations, and a technical 
understanding of the properties of the critical weapons systems and how they might be 
employed. Add in such questions as the mariagement of defence budgets and the 
intricacies of arms control negotiations and it can soon be seen that during the cold war 
years strategic studies had to draw on a great variety of types of expertise. 
Then out goes the cold war and in comes ethnic conflict, carrying with it vast quantities of 
anthropological and sociological literature, combined with a necessity to follow political 
developments in small and weak states, whose leading lights are not themselves plugged 
in to the international policy circuit, dirty little militia wars and problems of humanitarian 
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intervention, which have nothing to do with elaborate theories of deterrence. Some argued 
for an even more complete shift away from the traditional agenda, insisting that the 
staples of conflict and violence must give way to the far more important factors of 
environment and economics. A hypothetical university department set up to address 
strategic studies during the cold war would find that the original inter-disciplinary 
requirements - polyrnathic enough - were suddenly expanded to absurd lengths. 
Not surprisingly, academics often appeared to be as uncertain about the future of the 
international system and how to handle the new agenda as were the policy-makers. It 
became even more difficult to give confident advice in the form of three crisp bull 
points. Policy-makers became impatient with those qualities that academics believe to 
be those most valuable: long-term thinking, stretching the bounds of the possible and 
taking complexity as a challenge rather than an excuse for not going into too much 
detail. Academics in the strategic/security studies field could see their funding in 
decline and their best work crowded out by partisan clamour, parochial agency interest 
and the more sensationalist fare on offer. While the pull from the policy world was to 
go for the simple, snappy and the short-term, the push from the academic world was 
almost exactly in the opposite direction. The study of international relations, established 
to address the problem of war, sought to gain respectability by acquiring all the 
attributes of a proper discipline, including a preoccupation with theory and 
methodology. Academic advancement has come to depend on ‘conspicuous 
scholarship’ - publishing in the right journals, linking relatively innocuous case studies 
to great theoretical issues and, through extensive footnotes, demonstrating a capacity to 
reference (though not necessarily to read) all potentially relevant literature. To those for 
whom language itself has become an ideological battlefield, and all empiricism suspect, 
policy relevance signifies the antithesis of sound scholarship and not its highest 
aspiration. 
THE ACADEMIC AND POLICY WORLDS 
The relationship between the academic and policy worlds is fraught with ethical and 
practical difficulties - balancing the need for access and the desire for influence with the 
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risk that critical faculties might be blunted and intellectual integrity corrupted in the 
search for preferment. The academic may not want to help the Practitioner, perhaps 
disapproving of the basic objectives being pursued. In terms of defining a field of study 
the vantage point of a student of strategy is quite different from that of a practitioner. 
When the former tried to second-guess the latter in an effort to display some superior 
wisdom, then it may well deserve to be treated with contempt. The most helpful role 
remains that can be properly described as ‘academic’ (even though in the policy world this 
is all too often synonymous with irrelevant). The task is to conceptualise and contextualise 
rather than provide specific guidance. If it is done well then the practitioner should be able 
to recognise the relevance for whatever may be the problem at hand. 
Strategy is rarely a-theoretical in practice. The theories may be implicit and undeveloped, 
following Keynes’ famous observation: 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, 
who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler 
of a few years back. 
Yet is it the case that academic theory, even of the highest quality, is of great value to the 
‘practical man’? The complaint might be that academic works rarely address his problems 
in the form that he faces them. He has little choice but to range far and wide because of the 
nature of the judgements he is required to make, often in a hurry. It may be necessary to 
address the efficiency of various f o m  of coercion as well as inducements, and in so doing 
to draw on views about human nature under stress, problems of organisation of large 
groups of people on the move, negotiating techniques, visions of a good society and 
standards of ethical conduct. 
Consider a general entering into battle. He must consider: 
politics (how best to define the goal of the campaign, the importance of keeping allies 
sweet, what the people back home will stand), 
engineering (how well the weapons work are likely to work in practice, possible 
modifications to suit local conditions, ensuring that they are properly maintained), 
sociology (the likely cohesion of the enemy force under fire), 
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psychology (how to motivate his own men, getting into the mind of the enemy 
commander), 
0 geography (the possible impact of terrain on particular tactics), 
0 history (what other generals got away with in similar circumstances), 
0 economics (the rate at which he dare expend materiel on specific targets), 
andsoon. 
Note that all these considerations apply only to getting the best out of one’s own side. 
Add the need to think about an enemy and even more types of issue have to be factored 
into the strategic deliberations. 
Furthermore the ‘practical men’ can expect to be judged by results. They will therefore 
tend to rely on what works for them. This may be intuition and hunch, or lessons drawn 
from searing experience or remembered bits of history. These may be relied upon in 
preference to excellent information sources and exemplary staff work. When matters are 
finely balanced but a decision has still to be taken, a feeling about the issue may be as 
good a guide as any. This may strike an academic as being wholly inappropriate or based 
on disgracefully exaggerated generalisations. Certainly the results from such approaches 
can be very poor. But whether a proper academic methodology would do any better is 
moot when there is no time for long projects and there can be little tolerance of lots of 
caveats. Wise strategists may research their decisions as much as possible, but time often 
precludes further deliberation. When a general is wondering whether an enemy formation 
might break in the face of a sudden attack he is not going to be impressed if told that more 
research is needed or that his working hypothesis is inherently untestable. Once a fateful 
decision has been taken, an open mind becomes a luxury for any reappraisal may result in 
confused orders and demoralisation. 
The ‘practical man’ offers another observation. Strategic practice, as opposed to the theory, 
demands risk-taking on behalf of a wider constituency, normally with the lives of service 
personnel and possibly with whole societies, and this brings with it certain 
responsibilities. It involves mobilising human and material resources according to a 
developed plan against anticipated opposition and in pursuit of stated objectives. If the 
objectives are misplaced, the plan rnis-conceived, the resources unavailable or poorly 




sense of being tested by practice and judged by results that gives strategic reasoning its 
edge.The unaccountable academic should properly feel a degree of humility when 
advising on such matters. 
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This may help explain why the study of strategy is accommodated only with difficulty in 
academic life. As practice it provides opportunity for chance and irrationality to hold 
sway. The purist might be appalled at the arbitrary mixture of politics, sociology, 
economics, psychology and history that regularly influence decisions in crisis and combat, 
never mind the great contributions made by intuition and hunch. Yet the fact that reality 
rarely shows respect for disciplinary boundaries might give the academic pause for 
thought, as might evidence of the extent to which carefully qualified propositions, 
excessively careful formulations and a reluctance to pronounce until all possible avenues 
of research have been exhausted can get in the way of clear thinking. 
Effective policy outside of academia draws on a range of considerations that within 
academia are each confined to its own disciplinary box. Intellectual progress is assumed to 
depend on commonly accepted methodologies being rigorously applied within a h o w n  
conceptual framework to produce results able to withstand peer review. The process is 
watched over sternly by professional associations and journal editors. They ensure that 
standards are maintained so that progress can be measured. Without the disciplinary 
boxes it could well be that teaching and research would become unmanageable. 
Nonetheless, disciplinary boundaries are often artificial, and sustained through jargon that 
excludes the uninitiated. Indeed academics often develop particular strategies to sustain 
these disciplinary boundaries and to fight off intellectual intruders. Yet many of the most 
important academic cleavages cut across these boundaries. Fads and fashions - from 
rational actor theory to deconstructionism - migrate easily. Often the most innovative and 
influential figures are those that refuse to be confined by the established boundaries, but 
are happy both to borrow from others. Imaginative academic administrators often ignore 
them. In universities as in other organisations the closer one gets to a particular decision, 
issues become much more complex and problems can rarely be encapsulated in the terms 
of a single discipline. Life is inter-disciplinary. 
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Strategic studies poses a particular challenge to the social sciences. It tends to adopt the 
perspective of individual actors within the system, as they try to make sense of their 
environment and shape it to their needs as best they can. Much social science theorising 
necessarily seeks to reduce the importance of human agency - by looking for patterns and 
regularities in areas which we might have thought in our naivety to be governed by 
choice. Deliberate political change is still inadequately studied in political theory except in 
a rather cynical way. There is no point in studying strategy unless one believes that the 
course of history can be altered by the choices made by individuals. 
Those who believe that the analysis of politics and international relations requires 
attempts to identify long historical cycles or universal laws of political life or invariable 
patterns of behaviour or structural determinants of actions that leave little scope for local 
decision are unlikely to find strategy particularly interesting or even relevant. Instead of 
finding anomalous behaviour intriguing they may find it irritating because it undermines 
the predictive power of their models. Even those who make little pretence to science, and 
follow the traditions of political theory, often seem preoccupied with taming power, to 
render it accountable and its operations predictable. Yet without the imaginative use of 
power little can be done for good, as well as evil, and history would well and truly come 
to a grinding halt. 
Strategy is important only if it is believed that individuals, groups, governments face real 
choices - to the extent that the reasoning which informs these choices is worthy of careful 
examination. By focusing on actors within the system and their sense of their own interests 
and aspirations, strategic studies must be seditious. It encourages the analysis of those 
situations where order is absent or else where disorder is encouraged by those who 
believe that it will be to the advantage of those on whose behalf they are acting. 
THE STUDY OF STRATEGY 
This appreciation - almost celebration - of choice is essential to the study of strategy. 
Strategy is undertaken in the conviction that it is possible to manipulate and shape one's 
environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond control. For this 
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reason, students of strategy are naturally political voyeurs, observing the choices of others 
with a disceming eye, whether or not they have sympathy with their ultimate aims, 
assessing the efficiency of various forms of coercion as well as inducements, developing 
and refining views about such things as human nature under stress, the organisation of 
large groups of people on the move, negotiating techniques, visions of a good soaety and 
standards of ethical conduct. 
For this reason it might be argued that there is no reason in principle why strategic 
studies, defined as an intellectual approach to certain types of problems rather than a field 
of study, could not become more prominent in the academic life. Indeed we know h s  to 
be the case. Many of the more formal methodologies, of which the most famous remains 
game theory, developed in the late 1950s were developed with nuclear deterrence in mind 
and were responsible for promoting the basic insight that antagonists could have shared 
interests. They have now become even more influential in economics and management 
studies. There are now far more cowses about strategy in management departments than 
in international relations departments. Intriguingly, the classical military strategists - Sun 
Tzu more than Clausewitz - loom large in the management literature, far more so than 
the business strategists loom in the military literature. One unfortunate effect of this 
development is to encourage the view of strategy as being concerned with more 
visionary planning or the management of large organizations in uncertain 
environments rather than inter-dependent decision-making. 
Within international relations departments courses on strategy may suffer from 
association with what is now assumed to be a hopelessly old-fashioned ‘realist’ 
preoccupations with the state and military power, often derided for failing to consider 
domestic and transnational factors, or even peaceful means of exerting influence and 
resolving disputes. The attack on realism often goes beyond the assumptions it is 
believed to embody to its readiness to legitimise armed force as an acceptable 
instrument of policy. The more radical approach argues for focusing less on what makes 
states secure and more on what made individuals and particular groups secure. This 
supports the case for a new agenda dominated by concerns over human rights, world 
poverty and the environment. The argument over the status of realism has encouraged a 
tendency to caricature (unfortunately often abetted by self-styled realists), so that an 
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approach to political analysis that prided itself on coming to terms with the world as it 
was rather than as idealists would like it to be is now supposed to depend on a dubious 
claim that key international events can largely be explained by the structurally-defined 
means by which states must safeguard their security. By contrast a non-dogmatic realism 
would acknowledge the significance of non-state actors, the impact of social, economic, 
cultural and local political factors on state behaviour, the importance of values and 
mental constructs, and can be sensitive to the epistemological issues raised by 
presumptions of objectivity. If practitioners of international politics now talk regularly 
about issues of identity, norms and globalization then they are part of international 
reality. 
That argument might be taken further to argue that the business of states, often described 
as issues of security, now takes in far more than armed forces but also much wider 
economic, social and environmental factors. To what extent might these be legitimate 
areas for strategic studies? At one level they are vital to the traditional preoccupations 
with questions of armed force. These factors influence the course and character of all 
conflicts, even when they have reached their most violent forms. Strong rates of 
economic growth and forms of interdependence may well reduce tensions between states 
and create a stake in peaceful coexistence. Environmental disasters can undermine the 
credibility of the state apparatus so that it becomes vulnerable to other types of 
challenges. Changes in family structures and social mores may affect attitudes to 
violence, and so on. An awareness of these issues is essential to any attempt to make 
sense of the changing state system. 
That is not the same as saying that issues of armed force have largely become, at least as 
far as the western world is concerned, of marginal interest, so that strategic studies 
needs to retool to address economic, environmental and social issues directly. 
Politicians may dramatise the more troublesome social problems by calling for ‘wars’ 
against them (on drugs, cancer, etc.) and suggest that strong generalship is needed for 
them to be defeated. The unreflective application of the war analogy can hinder 
understanding by attempting to squeeze quite different types of issues into an 
inappropriate conceptual framework geared to military threats. In the case of drugs, for 
example, it may have some relevance to confrontations with third world drug cartels 
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but less so with attempts to make sense of patterns of consumption. Equally the notions 
of ‘economic security’ can encourage a confrontational approach to trade policy and 
‘environmental security’ a search for explanations based on hostile actions rather than 
natural causes or everyday economic activity. Even more difficult is a term such as 
‘internal security’ which might once have referred to the ability of states to deny armed 
groups, whether criminal or political, the ability to challenge their authority, but which 
now takes in anything to do with the control of borders, including economic migration or 
the smuggling of contraband. 
If, as argued earlier, much of the fascination of strategy is with the exerase of power, then 
there is an unavoidable strategic dimension to all policy areas -how to mobilise support, 
sideline opponents, ensure effective implementation and so on. This is why it is a fit 
subject for management schools. Nonetheless it would be unfortunate if those working in 
this field abandoned their special concerns with issues of armed force. The characters and 
competences of states may have been subject to many changes but an enduring feature 
remains the aspiration to define and dominate the means of legitimate violence within 
territorial borders. The challenges can come from other states, or from within states in the 
form of secessionists or revolutionaries or elitist conspirators, or from non-state actors in 
the form of drug cartels and gangsters, religious sects and minority political movements. 
This provides an enduring and relatively sharp focus for strategic studies and provides 
some compensation for an unavoidably wide context. 
Even in terms of the development of a general theory of strategy, capable of addressing all 
manner of political situations, there is a case for continuing to pay the closest attention to 
issues of armed force. If strategy is about choice then armed force provides some of the 
most perplexing and starkest choices that can be confronted. At these points of choice can 
be observed clashes between conflicting interests and values, the rough impact of brute 
force and the more subtle effects achieved by pule and wiles. It is the case that most 
political objectives can be met without the use or threatened use of violence. There are 
other sources of power. But physical violence is the ultimate and, if available, can 
overwhelm all others. The threat posed is one that no individual or group or state can 
ignore because it challenges their whole existence. It is one that is only likely to be made 
when basic values are at stake, and this is by definition the case for those on the receiving 
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end. Situations involving the purposive use of violence are likely to stand out from the run 
of the mill activities at both the national and international levels. By their nature they 
concentrate minds on fundamentals. Ethically and politically they require exceptional 
justification. For all these reasons they provide a natural starting point for any attempt to 
build up a general theory of strategy. 
Whether a general theory of strategy can sustain departments of strategic studies must 
be doubted. Even if one could be agreed its value would be in influencing the 
understanding of the exercise of power in all areas of human activity and should not 
therefore be confined to one department. To the extent that academic institutions 
remain committed to the area of study that has hitherto been covered by strategic 
studies (under its many headings) it is most likely that they will be carried forward by a 
developing policy agenda rather than intellectual agenda. The prospect is therefore that 
it will become more rather than less diffuse, and may well struggle to hold on to its 
traditional concern with questions of armed force. 
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